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Abstract
The thesis, Making Biotechnology Happen: Agricultural Biotechnology Policy,
is the most comprehensive analysis of the Danish agricultural biotechnology
Policy to date. It is concerned with the processes by which Danish policy-
makers implemented the Gene Technology Act in the period 1989-1997.
Particularly, the thesis considers the regulation of the release and marketing of
genetically modified sugar beets and fodder beets by the biggest plant breeding
company in Denmark, Danisco —as a case study of science and technology
policy-making under circumstances in which a large number of different social
interests are actively involved in the policy-making process. Sociologists have
paid considerable attention to the difficulties of policy-making under such
circumstances. In particularly, they have emphasised that under the conditions of
post modernity, issues of scientific ignorance, uncertainty and risk come to play
a crucially important part in public debate and decision-making processes. The
thesis develops Ulrich Beck's idea of reflexive modernisation, and Douglas
Torgerson's notion of the "third face" of policy analysis - as tools for the
analysis of Danish policy-making in the area of GMO release. Finally, the thesis
considers the implications of the case study for current sociological and policy
science theories of decision making in sceptical contexts.
The general conclusion is that, throughout the policy implementation process,
the Danish government consistently maintained a wholly supportive stance
towards the development and application of modern agricultural biotechnology.
But faced with a potentially sceptical and risk-averse public, the Danish
government developed a sophisticated policy infrastructure that gave every
appearance of: being somehow ambivalent about modern agricultural
biotechnology; integrating both scientific advice and public perceptions in the
decision making process; being cautious, transparent and responsible. However,
this infrastructure curtailed considerable democratic scrutiny while facilitating
the continued development of agricultural biotechnology in Denmark
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Introduction
In the second half of the 1980s, in the wake of intensive public
debates that were initiated by environmental activists on the risks
associated with the release of genetically modified organisms
(hereafter GMOs), the Danish Parliament passed the Gene
Technology and the Environment Law (law 288) in 1986. This made
Denmark the first countiy in the world to introduce a law regulating
the release of GMOs into the environment. This law banned all field
releases of GMOs. However, under § 11, line 3 of the law, the
responsible minister was given considerable power of discretion. In
individual cases, proposed releases could be exempted from the
ban. The grounds for such exemption were not made clear. In 1991,
the European Commission adopted the 90/220/EEC Council
Directive of 23 April 1990 on the Deliberate Release into the
Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms. Following this,
Denmark revised the 1986 Gene-technology and the Environment
law to adopt the stipulations of this Directive. In 1991, the Danish
Parliament approved a revision to law 288. Under the terms of the
new law (law 356 of 6 June 1991 on Gene Technology and the
Environment), GMO releases came to require Ministerial approval
on the basis of specific risk assessments.
On the face of it, both the original law and its subsequent revisions
appear to be strict. At face value, the law can be read as a policy
opposed to the development and application of modern agricultural
biotechnology in Denmark. However, between 1988 and September
1997, the biggest plant breeding company in Denmark, Danisco,
submitted no less than six successful field release applications and
one successful market notification for approval. By exempting all of
these applications/notifications under the terms of law, the Minister
for Environment and Energy effectively supported the development
of modern agricultural biotechnology in Denmark.
This thesis is concerned with the processes by which Danish policy-
makers implemented the Gene-technology and Environmental law
in the period 1989-1997. It considers the regulation of the release
and marketing of genetically modified sugar beets and fodder beets
by the biggest plant breeding company in Denmark, Danisco, as a
case study of science and technology policy-making under
circumstances in which a large number of different social interests
are actively involved in the policy-making process. Sociologists have
paid considerable attention to the difficulties of policy-making under
such circumstances. In particular, they have emphasized that
under the conditions of post-modernity issues of scientific
ignorance, uncertainty and risk come to play a crucially important
part in public debate and decision-making. The thesis develops
Ulrich Beck's idea of reflexive modernization and Douglas
Torgerson's notion of the "third face" of policy analysis as tools for
the analysis of Danish policy-making in the area of GMOs release.
Key questions considered in the analysis are: How were the different
interests represented in the assessment of successive applications
bjr Danisco? On what explicit and/or implicit bases did the
responsible authority decide to recommend exemption of these
applications under the terms of law? How did the policy process
deal with issues of scientific ignorance, uncertainty and risk? And
how did the policy process deal with public concern and public
criticism of gene technology?
The thesis assesses the Danish Government's deliberations on all of
Danisco's applications between 1988 and 1997. Its objective is to
map the mechanisms that were put in place to facilitate the
development of agricultural biotechnology in Denmark. Finally, the
thesis considers the implications of the case study for current
sociological and policy science theories of decision-making in
skeptical contexts.
The thesis falls into five principal chapters: 1) Problem Formulation;
2) Theory; 3) Case Study; 4) Integrative concluding discussion; and,
5) Perspective.
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Chapter 1
Problem Formulation
Agriculture is a fundamental human resource the key to which is a
balanced eco-system. Agricultural products not only nurture the
quality of human life but also its very existence. Hence, there is a
need to establish harmonious agricultural practices. The context in
which this need must be met is a symbiotic, delicate and fragile
macrocosm - not least, for example, a healthy soil. John P. Reganold
et. al. described soil as a complex, living medium whose coherent
structure holds moisture and invites airflow; ants and earthworms
mix the soil - naturally. Rhizobium bacterium living in the root
nodules of legumes such as soybeans create fixed nitrogen (an
essential plant nutrient). Reganold et al further argue that some soil
micro-organisms, including fungi, actinomycetes and bacteria
decompose the organic matter - thereby releasing more nutrients.
Micro-organisms produce substances that help the soil particles to
adhere to one another. Some soil micro-organisms are a rich source
of insecticidal proteins. For example, the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) produces proteins that have been used as
insecticides for the last four decades. They are well known not only
for their effectiveness against important agronomic insect pests but
also for their safety1.
The last couple of decades have seen a greatly increased use of
chemicals in agriculture - pesticides, herbicides, inexpensive
fertilisers, etc. These sophisticated crop protection measures have
made it possible to practise mono-cropping year after year without
depleting the nitrogen reserves in the soil or causing serious pest
problems. Unfortunately, these products consist of toxic and
otherwise harmful compounds some of which may build up in food
plants and groundwater. A considerable number of these toxins
have been documented to be harmful to the workers who apply
them; they may promote soil-erosion, deplete soil fertility, and be
harmful to earthworms and beneficial microbes2. Little wonder that
critics have questioned the use of these chemical crop protection
measures3.
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Concern about the effects of the increasing use of chemicals in
agriculture was first brought to wider public attention in 1962 by
the biologist Rachel Carson in her book, Silent Spring, and shortly
afterwards by Barry Commoner in his book, Science and Survival
(1963). These works criticised many industrialised agricultural
practices as unnatural threats to the environment and human
health.
Within a decade, the United Nations Conference in Stockholm
(1972) had endorsed the modern era of environmentalism. Following
the publication of Our Common Future, the so-called Brundtland
Commission report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development (in 1987), the concept of a sustainable development
was ushered in. The Brundtland Report defined sustainable
agriculture as agriculture that is energy-efficient, environmentally
sound, productive, stable and capable of being pursued indefinitely
in the future. Sustainable practices in agriculture, it claimed,
should be benign to the groundwater and other key aspects of the
environment; they should depend as much as possible on natural
processes and renewable resources; and they should not depend on
chemical products such as fertilisers, pesticides, herbicides, etc.
Thus defined, sustainable agriculture is not so much a specific
farming strategy as a system-level approach that understands the
complex interactions within the agricultural ecosystem and its place
within the wider natural and human environments.
In the quest for sustainability, there has been a search for chemical
herbicides and pesticides that are more environmentally friendly.
For example, Monsanto introduced the glyphosat-based herbicide,
Roundup; and Du pont came up with a series of compounds based
on the sulfonylureas. Unfortunately, these sophisticated crop
protection measures have not solved the weed or pest problems
entirely. Besides, these new compounds have been documented to
have their own harmful effects on the environment and human and
animal health. Against this backdrop, the scientific and industrial
communities were led to explore a biological approach to pest and
weed control4. Plant biotechnology is the outcome of this
exploration. Transgenic crops have been developed with properties
believed to be advantageous from the point of view of pest and weed
control; and in recent years, these have received increasing
attention.
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Biotechnology: Benefits
Proponents of modern biotechnology hail transgenic plant
technology as an emerging solution to age-old agricultural problems
- the control of pests and weeds. In their view, research on the
genomes of diverse organisms can reveal the genetic basis of any
number of plant traits; and in the control of such traits lies the
solution to any number of agronomic problems. Relevant traits
include, for example: disease and insect susceptibilities; and a wide
range of bio-chemical compositions and nutritive values. Through
the genetic modification of crop varieties, the proponents of modern
biotechnology argue that any number' of useful traits - resistance to
pests, competitiveness in relation to weeds, resistance to stress from
high-acidity soils, drought or toxic elements, etc. - can all be
successfully engineered.5
Examples abound. Alan McHughen and his team developed what
they term a CDC Triffid.6 The C DC Triffid is a transgenic linseed
flax, genetically engineered to grow in contaminated water as well as
normal soil7. The plant has immunity to a common class of
herbicides used by cereal farmers all over the world8. Besides its
commercial importance for linseed oil production, linseed flax meal
serves as a food for livestock. The CDC Triffid was the first
transgenic plant to be grown commercially by farmers 9.
The Swiss based company Ciba-Geigy (now Norvatis) has developed
a transgenic maize. The Norvatis transgenic maize carries several
novel genes: the Bt gene, which makes it resistant to the European
corn borer; a second gene for herbicide resistance; and a third,
marker gene for resistance to widely used beta-lactam antibiotic,
ampicillin. (Marker genes are commonly employed in research as a
way of screening for the presence of target genes.) The Bt gene has
"proven to be a source par excellence of insecticidal principles to be
used in transgenic plants"10. The prospects of using insecticidal
proteins in transgenic plants were unknown until 1981. However,
cloning and sequencing the Bt gene has made the Bt proteins what
Estruch et al. termed as the first generation of insecticidal proteins.
According to Roush et.al, "when Bt genes are incorporated into
plants, the plants are made much more persistent and active - even
against insects that feed at sites difficult or impossible to reach with
sprays"11. According to Roush et al., the introduction of the Bt
transgenic crops allows marked reductions of the use of pesticides.12
L3
Bt transgenic plants were amongst the first genetically manipulated
plants with a commercial relevance on both sides of the Atlantic.13
The Bt gene is but the best-known of the many ways in which gene
technology is being applied in agriculture. To take another example,
Hall et al. developed a transgenic sugar-beet that is resistant to the
glufofinate-ammonium based pesticide. This sugar-beet was created
by transforming the sugar-beet guard cell protoplasts.14 As a result,
the transformed sugar-beets were shown to be resistant to a
number of severe viral diseases such as rhizomia and beet yellow
virus, as well as to numerous other invertebrate and vertebrate
pathogens. Hall et al suggest that this technique may be applicable
to "other recalcitrant crops as well".55
Another example is the development of a transgenic fodder beet that
is resistant to the commonly used glyphosat herbicide known as
Roundup. Two plant breeding companies in Denmark, Danisco
and DLF-Trifolium - have been engaged in a joint venture to
develop a transgenic fodder beet for the last 7 years. To pave the
way for its move into the market, the joint venture submitted a
market notification to the Minister of Energy and Environment in
March 1997. Following several months of deliberation, on the 26th
of September 1997, the Danish Minister of Environment and
Energy (Svend Auken) accepted the placing on the Community
market the genetically modified fodder beet16.
The genetic engineered potato. Wolfgang Rohde et al. reported a
transgenic potato that was engineered to induce broad-range
protection against infection by the viruses PVY, PLRV, and PVX. For
decades, viral infections have greatly reduced the yields of potato
cultivation. If well tapped, this breakthrough would help to
eliminate viral infections and at that tripling the yearly yields for
farmers17.
On the whole, by the end of 1996, not less than 53 bio-pesticides
were registered and were in the queue for market approval. In the
USA, only 10 of the so-called reduced risks had been accepted. Most
of them are based on the insecticidal - Bt.
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Biotechnology: Risks
Although agricultural biotechnology has many potential benefits, it
has been the subject of a great deal of criticism and active
resistance. For example, in Germany in 1996, most of the field trials
with genetically engineered crops were either totally or partially
destroyed by protesters18. Similarly, the commercialisation of the
Ciba-Geigy (now Norvatis) modified maize met massive opposition.
Following the European Commission's approval of the modified
maize and its subsequent importation into Europe in 1996,
Austrian Health Minister Christa Krammer announced a ban on its
importation into Austria19'20. Luxembourg and Italy soon followed
suit, while Denmark and Sweden were reported as watching the
situation closely21. Although the French government had allowed the
importation of the modified maize sooner than expected, French
Prime Minister Alain Juppe announced a prohibition of the
cultivation of transgenic maize in France22. This step was based on
the fear that an antibiotic resistance marker gene in the maize
might spread to bacteria in the guts of livestock fed with the maize;
and thence to humans. According to the then French Minister of
Environment Corinne Lipage, the transgenic maize contains a DNA
sequence that triggers cells to make up to 600 copies of the
antibiotic resistance gene. This, it was argued, could increase the
chance of the marker gene being passed to other bacteria. Lipage
also reported that "the modified genes are susceptible to
dissemination ... in the environment"".
Almost at the same time, Tony Atkinson, an employee of the Drug
company Duramed and a member'of the British Advisory Committee
on Novel Foods and Processes, reported that there was plenty of
evidence that DNA can survive in animal guts24. Following these
developments, Danish Minister of Environment and Energy (Sven
Auken) rekindled the transgenic maize debate in Denmark. He made
a press statement on the need to take the issue seriously if other
countries come up with a different conclusion to the Danish. For
him, this was done in conformity with the Danish precautionary
tradition, even though Danish scientists had claimed that the issue
was nothing to lose sleep over.25 The Danish newspaper Information
interpreted this move as a calculated step towards prohibition of the
cultivation and possibly even the sale of modified maize in
Denmark, depending on what was happening elsewhere on the
international stage.26
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Plants modified with the Bt resistance gene have been the most
praised breakthrough in plant biotechnology. Nevertheless, research
data has shown that transgenic Bt plants produce this toxin
continuously, thus exposing insects to the toxin all the time. This
exposure creates a strong selection pressure on insects to develop
resistance to the toxin. But this is old news. Resistance to Bt toxin
was observed 10 years ago in a lepidopteran - a pest to grain and
grain products. It has also been found in the diamondback moth - a
pest to cruciferous crops. In the research, when moth larvae were
fed with cabbage treated with Bt in an experiment, selection led to a
build-up of resistance 1,000 times greater than the level in larvae
that had not eaten the treated cabbage. Furthermore, 15
generations later moths that had consumed the Bt toxin were found
to have a resistance level 170 times that of control populations 2?.
In the case of Bt corn, it has been claimed that the time period over
which transgenic plants will achieve the desired effect is limited. It
is feared that the additive effects of the insects developing resistance
to the engineered toxin might in the future force farmers to go back
to chemical pesticides. Besides, it has been suggested that super-
bugs could emerge - insects that have adapted their behaviour and
genetics in unpredictable ways and can survive in the constant
presence of toxins. If this were to result in other insecticides being
used, then it is possible that insects could develop resistance to a
much wider range of insecticides, with the result that their effective
host range might expand 2b.
What these criticisms amount to is that, while genetic modification
can assist in the battle against insect pests it does not represent a
permanent or final solution to the problem. Although much is made
of this point by critics, it is actually well-known to bio technologists
themselves. According to Russ Hoyle "scientists inside and outside
the biotechnology industry know that with time, the product will
create a tougher, resistant corn borer. But they do not know when,
or exactly how to avoid it. With assiduous crop management
techniques, some believe the window for such Bt products is less
than a decade. Scientists do not know".29 A few weeks later, Bruce
Tabashnik et al. (University of Arizona at Tucson) announced
experiments showing that a widespread resistance to Bt could
emerge in just a few years. Reporting their research in Nature
Biotechnology, Tabashnik et al stated that their work shows a single
gene in resistant moths confers resistance to four different Bt
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toxins, and this gene appears to be far more common than anyone
believed. Tabashnik et al. experimented with two moths from two
groups: one from a field that had been highly sprayed with Bt
toxins, and another from a laboratory population that had not been
exposed to the toxins for 100 generations. A series of experiments
showed that the offspring of the survivors of exposure to a single
toxin were resistant to all four toxins. Worse, 21% of the moths in
the isolated laboratory possessed the resistance gene.30 These very
toxin genes are the ones currently under test in crops such as
cotton, maize, tobacco, soybean, potato and tomato. The possibility
of things not working out as planned is very high. With time, as
JVeif Scientist commented, "the Bt gene may start popping up in
crops everywhere. Insect pests will then be under enormous
pressure to develop resistance to the toxins. So after a brief boom,
everyone would have lost"31.
The long-term effects of transgenic plants in the environment are
difficult if not impossible to predict with current levels of scientific
understanding. According to New Scientist, we do not know nearly
as much about managing resistant pests as we do about cloning
genes. And we don't know how the farmers will use the new
varieties. Monsanto's boll-weevil resistant Bt cotton (in 1996) is a
case in point. Pests survived in the two million acres planted with
NuCOTN, and Monsanto had to order the fields to be sprayed with a
traditional pesticide to save the crop.3a Given that the industry
judges the economic potential of Bt transgenic plants to be
enormous, the widespread evolution of resistance is, as Roush et al
have argued, "a harrowing prospect, yet, the speed at which
resistance might evolve is unknown". 33 To anticipate this, as far
back as 1994, the scientific community underlined the need for
implementing resistance management tools (see for example Gould
et al.34). Unfortunately, even four years later the implementation of
resistance management in the field lag far behind what would be
considered best practice on the basis of past experience and theory.
Needless to say, therefore, there is an urgent need to put in place
effective resistance management, without which the odds for
resistance look pretty good.35
Critics of agricultural biotechnology frequently ask why industry
does not develop plants that do not require to be sprayed with costly
and environmentally damaging chemicals. The force of this criticism
is felt when we consider the level of recent industry investment in
genetic modification for herbicide and pesticide resistance. Take for
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example transgenic plants that are resistant to glyphosate - the
active ingredient in Monsanto's Roundup herbicide. The theory
behind this development is that Round-up ready crops are
environmentally friendly because they do not require as much
herbicide treatment as unmodified crops. In addition, it is claimed
that glyphosate breaks down readily in the soil and constitutes
virtually zero risk to animals and humans. The scientific basis for
these claims, however, is open to criticism. For example, in 1996
the Germany authorities reported that the ground water in two
German districts had been polluted by Roundup. This was
documented 10 times, with two cases involving pollution below the
water-table. In Holland, glyphosate has been found in rivers on
several occasions, while in England it has been detected in surface
water.
There are other potential problems with glyphosate. For example, it
has been reported that glyphosate-based herbicides can be lethal to
beneficial insects such as ladybirds and lacewing flies which are
predators of common agricultural pests such as aphids.36 Again, it
is widely known that weeds near fields of genetically engineered
crops may, given time, develop resistance to herbicides to which
crops are tolerant. This will mean that higher and higher doses of
herbicide will have to be sprayed - leaving larger and larger amounts
of chemical residue on the crops. At some point, a new genetically
engineered crop will have to be grown - resistant to a different kind
of herbicide. In this way, it has been argued that super-weeds may
be produced. Worse still, engineered crops themselves may
conceivably become herbicide resistant weeds.
Viral resistance is no exception. Falk et al. have shown that under
selective pressure, viral RNA and cellular RNA recombination can
occur, and that the same can occur between viral and transgenic
RNAs. Worse, "the transgene sequence could recombine with a non-
target virus genomic RNA and in theory could provide novel
recombinants".... They continued, "we cannot predict whether
recombination between similar and dissimilar sequences is more
likely to generate virus with adverse consequences." What this
means is that the recombination might develop new viruses that
could cause more serious diseases that are also difficult-to-control37.
The scientific community have not yet introduced any measures to
address this issue other than probabilistic risk calculations. Greene
et al. made an experiment to determine whether mRNA from
Cowpea chlorotic mottle bromovirus expressed in a transgenic host
could recombine with a replicating virus. They tested 125 transgenic
plants and reported that their experiment demonstrated intragenic
recombination in 3% of the transgenic plants inoculated. According
to Greene et al., this is as a result of strong selective pressure. Their
research also indicated that recombinations between the fragments
and the infecting virus could yield different variations in the newly
combined virus.38
In Denmark, evidence of pollen transfer between related wild and
weedy species has been documented. Mikkelsen et al., in an
investigation that involved hybridisation and back-crossing between
transgenic Basta (glufosinate)-tolerant oil-seed rape and its weedy
relative Brassica campestris, documented that transgenic inter-
specific hybrids were produced spontaneously on both parental
species. After two generations of hybridisation and back-crossing,
Mikkelsen et al. observed fertile transgenic weed-like plants in their
research. 39 Recently, a French team has documented the
occurrence of gene flow from transgenic oil-seed rape plants to
related wild species. Chévre et al. made a study of the genetic
mechanism where they developed an inter-generic model of gene
flow from the transgenic. oilseed rape which confers resistance to
glufosinate-ammonium to wild radish - a widely distributed weed.
On studying four successive generations under field conditions,
their research showed inter-generic gene flow which occurred by
transgene introgression within the genome of the weed40.
Little knowledge is currently available regarding the longer term
effects on the environment and animal and human health of the use
of transgenic crops that are developed to resist chemical
agricultural tools. Furthermore, there are no clear mechanisms in
place to anticipate such effects. However, there is a theory among
the biotechnology companies of how the spread of such resistance
may be slowed down. With Bt, growing ordinary crops in the areas
where Bt crops are grown is a case in point. With this, the argument
goes, if a Bt resistant strain appears, it should breed with strains
that are not resistant from the surrounding areas, thus mitigating
the spread of Bt resistance. However, the weakness of this strategy
is that it partly undermines the case for agricultural biotechnology
as a long-term solution to the problem of sustainable agriculture.
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Agricultural Biotechnology Policy Landscape
In the agricultural biotechnological realm, the last three decades
have witnessed policy debates and conflicts that have revolved
around issues of risk. What risks does this novel technology pose to
the environment, animal and human health? And how acceptable
are these risks in relation to the benefits that the technology
promises to the society? These are the questions that have
dominated around emerging agricultural biotechnology. Such
discussions have been wide- ranging, and they have drawn new
actors into agricultural policy debates. Pressure groups have had
growing influence within the debates, and the mass media have
taken an increasing interest in them. For these reasons, scientific
expertise and governmental decision-making processes have come
under steadily increasing public scrutiny.
For example, in Denmark, the Government's response was to set up
a committee under the Ministry of Interior Affairs to assess the need
for public regulation. Similarly, an ambitious project, Pegasus, was
launched by the National Technology Council to make a proactive
technology assessment and to act as a tool for social assessment of
biotechnology41. And in 1985, when two Danish medical companies,
Novo and Nordisk Gentofte, announced their plans to use GMOs for
the production of insulin and human growth hormone (respectively),
biotechnology technology assessment moved into the public sphere
as NGOs and the general public came to be involved in the risk
assessment process. Local meetings and public hearings were
organized all over the country by the environment organization
NOAH. With the help of government grants, NOAH's activities fed
the public debate with qualified counter-expertise, both through
public meetings and through a series of popular books on
recombinant technology, gene-technology and the environment -
with a critical review of the political processes around the first
industrial applications. These meetings and publications
disseminated balanced information about biotechnology while
representing opposing views and removing the debate from the
closed circles of experts to wider public. NOAH's activities played an
active role in shaping the world's first law on Gene Technology and
Environment (in 1986). The law itself did not establish public trust,
so in 1986 the Danish Parliament allocated funds for public
information campaigns to enhance citizen knowledge about gene-
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technology. Similarly, in 1986 a Parliamentary Technology Board
was established that came to be close to the public and the
Parliament. The Technology Board was given the responsibility of
informing about and following the biotechnology development. It
was also to carry out comprehensive assessments of biotechnology
development, its possibilities and consequences to the Danish
society. Among other things, the Technology Board organized
consensus conferences as a way of involving the public in the
process of technology assessment. The first large scale consensus
conference was organised in cooperation with the Union of Younger
Biologists (Foreningen af Yngre Biologer) in April 1989. The
conference addressed the issue of gene-technology in industry and
agriculture. In short, therefore, the period from 1983 to 1990
witnessed a Danish biotechnology policy assessment development
that came to be characterized by a move towards more open public
assessment, with active NGOs, public meetings and consensus
conferences which received a relatively high profile in the media42.
Thus far, it is evident that the genetic-engineering polic}^ arena is an
unusually challenging arena. Responsible bodies find themselves
caught up in issues in which many interested or concerned actors
have much at stake. Instead of talking to a single source of
authority, they talk to multiple authorities. On the one hand,
biotechnology industries want the biotechnology potentials to be
fully tapped. For example, the Danish plant breeder, Danisco, has
been opposed to any special regulation of the deliberate release of
the genetically manipulated organisms43 In the USA, since the
1970s, American firms have sought Food and Drug Administration
backing to help them get through public scrutiny which was seen as
the most difficult trial of all. In response to public criticism,
Monsanto and Calgene launched programs to explain their
positions. For example, Roger H. Salquist, the (former) Calgene
Chief Executive officer embarked on what he termed as
"infrastructure marketing". The aim was to educate the government
and the press about biotechnology. And Monsanto held lectures on
genetic engineering, while making tours to facilitate everyone - from
President Bush to members of garden societies"44.
On the other hand, environmentalists and ecologists portray
biotechnology as further industrialisation of agriculture which is
aimed at locking farmers into reliance upon particular
manufacturers' products. Besides, they argue, this technology
would lead to heavier use of agricultural chemicals. And overall,
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they see transgenic plants as a threat to the environment, the
ecosystem, human and animal health45. At the same time, there has
been growing public distrust of transgenic plants. This distrust is
clearly manifested in the general public's growing opposition to
genetically modified agricultural products. For example in Germany,
1996 saw the destruction of all the genetically manipulated crops by
protesters.46 In the UK, 1998 witnessed the uprooting of Monsanto's
genetically manipulated oil-seed rape. And in Denmark, autumn
1996 witnessed the controvers}^ surrounding the importation of
23,000 tons of mixed genetically modified and unmodified soybeans.
The controversy was covered prominently in the media, and
gradually it became a hot issue in the public and the political arena.
When the ship docked in Århus harbor before Christmas 1996,
environmental activists blockaded the unloading of the soybeans.
This forced Central Soya, the company that had imported these
beans - despite the government's approval - to export a good part of
the imported soybeans to other countries47,48.
In addition to this, currently (1998), in France and England, there
has been a growing demand for new public forums for consensus-
building among science, industry, politics, and populace. This is
similar to the Danish experience between 1983 and 1990. Here in
Denmark, the pressure from environmental activists combined with
the Danish civic tradition (the so called "people's enlightenment
tradition" dating from the turn of the century) forced the Danish
government to draw on both inter-ministerial in-house expertise
and extensive public consultation when drawing up safety
procedures. The parliament decided to maintain openness and
transparency for GMO releases as an important means to avoid a
public image of secrecy49. Similarly, the Ministry of the Environment
arranged to provide public consultation on each notification where
universities, independent researchers, industry, pressure groups
and other interested bodies were heard as a part of the consultation
As if this were not enough, policy-makers had also to deal with the
fact that it was far from clear that current levels of scientific
knowledge were sufficient to ensure the safety of this technology.
Scientific uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminancy predominate
in this realm so long as existing knowledge remains contested.
Throughout the policy process, we witness repeated disagreements
within the scientific community about the effects and the future
impact of this technology. More often that not, opposed view are
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based on mathematical probabilities or models, which by their
nature are provisional and uncertain. As the number and
complexity of agricultural biotechnology issues increase, so
scientists are asked more and more to offer advice based on
uncertain and ambiguous evidence. Lacking a secure basis on
which to make policy recommendations, there is a temptation for
scientists to turn to other political tools in order to justify what they
believe but. cannot prove to be true.
For their part, decision-makers find themselves butting their heads
against the limits of knowledge as they search for secure grounds
on which to base their decisions or actions. More often than not,
they are forced to translate scientific uncertainty, probability and
provisional statements as sure and certain facts about risks or
benefits. This is necessary if they are to legitimate their decisions
and fulfil the requirements of governmental policy agendas. We may
hypothesise that when provisional or qualified scientific evidence is
delivered to the policy community, its provisionality and multiple
qualifications tend to be minimised in the process of justifying
policy decisions.
Thus, in the field of modern agricultural biotechnology policy, policy
makers experience pressures and demands of many different kinds.
In the midst of what are often partisan and ideologically driven
debates, they must make use of expert evidence that is frequently
subject to severe scientific limitations but that is nonetheless
absolutely necessary for the development of informed and
accountable policy decisions.
Denmark, like most other countries in the western industrialized
societies faced the challenge of regulating this controversial area
within the public sector. And, as mentioned above, in reaction to the
announcement of the plans to use GMOs in the production of
insulin and human growth hormone, the Danish government
arranged local meetings and hearings between 1985 and 1986,
where experts from the two companies were confronted by the
public.51
These debates culminated in the enactment of the first world law on
gene technology and the environment (Gene Technology and the
Environment Law (law 288, 1986). The law that was passed in the
Danish Parliament by a green majority banned all field releases of
genetically modified organisms. However, in 1990, when the
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European Commission adopted the EU-Directive 90/220 on Gene-
technology and the Environment, Denmark revised the 1986 Gene-
technology and the Environment law to adopt the stipulations of
this Directive. In 1991, the Danish Parliament approved a revision
to law 288 under the terms of which the general ban on deliberate
releases was substituted by a general approval; that is, GMO
releases came to require Ministerial approval on the basis of specific
risk assessments. The 1991 Act removed the national opportunity
for plaintiffs to object to field releases; nevertheless, it maintained
the public consultation procedure.
Although the 1986 law banned all field releases, it nevertheless
provided for Ministerial discretion in individual cases. The test for
how this policy was implemented in practice came in 1988. This
was when the biggest plant breeding company in Denmark,
Danisco, made an application to undertake a deliberate release
research with genetically modified sugar-beet. The sugar beet was
engineered to resist Round up Ready and Rhizomia virus. Though
law 288 (1986) had banned any deliberate release, § 11 line 3
stipulated that the minister of environment could exempt a given
application under special circumstances. However, with the first
application, the Minister of Environment approved the release
without any reference to what the special circumstances in this
particular case actually were. Thereafter Danisco made no less that
5 deliberate release applications and 1 market notification between
1988 and 1997. All of the release applications were approved by the
Danish government, despite the scientific uncertainty that was
prevalent in the risk assessments. And in 1997, the Danish
government finally gave permission for a genetically modified fodder
beet to be put on the Community market.
There are several reasons why the Danish experience is particularly
intriguing. First, it is interesting because, as I have shown in this
section, the issue of risks has dominated this emerging agricultural
biotechnology realm. That is, what risks does this novel technology
pose to the environment, ecology, animal and human health?
Furthermore, what are the social, moral or ethical risks that may
accompany this development? If there are any risks, are they
socially desirable or acceptable? Should they be encouraged by the
society? In Denmark, all public surveys carried out between 1989
and 1997 confirm that the Danish public's opposition to
agricultural biotechnology has continued to grow. For example, a
1989 survey showed that 40% of the Danish public were opposed to
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plant biotechnology; and in 1996, a Eurobarometer survey showed
that 61% of the Danish population indicated that genetically
modified food should not be encouraged52. Again, a December 1997
survey showed that 69% of the Danish population endorsed that
genetically modified food should be banned in Denmark53. Thus, one
may ask: in a country whose mode of science and technology policy
assessment are widely noted for their relative openness to public
opinion and democratic debate, how is it that a series of release and
market applications were approved in what was a generally risk-
averse society? How did the government justify and legitimize these
approvals?
Second, as I have indicated earlier in this section, so far, the
emerging agricultural biotechnology involves serious scientific
uncertainty and not least that scientific evidence has pointed to a
potential danger of this technology to the ecology, environment,
human or animal health. Similarly, the scientific community has
continued to face difficulties of providing clear-cut judgements on
the risks that may accompany the release of genetically modified
organisms, while the interpretation of research results has
remained uncertain - thus putting strain on the conventional
mechanisms for providing scientific advice. From the outset, the
Danish government treated this field as alien; while throughout this
period, the government held the position that they had a very
limited basic scientific knowledge that could be used as a valid
ground for risk assessment. Once again, therefore, one may ask,
with the existence of an uncertain science that was feeding into the
policy process, how did the Danish government justify and
legitimize both the release approvals and the market approval of
genetically modified fodder beet?
For these reasons, this thesis is concerned with the processes by
which Danish policy-makers implemented law 288 and its
vSubsequent revisions in the period 1989-1997. It considers all of
Danisco's applications to release and market genetically modified
sugar/fodder beet between 1989-1997 as a case study of science
and technology policy-making under circumstances in which a large
number of different social interests are actively involved in the
policy-making process, at the same time as scientific uncertainty is
putting strain on the conventional mechanisms for providing
scientific advice crucial for an informed policy.
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Methodology
The exercise is rather ambitious. This is because the phenomenon
that I am trying to explain or understand is not of manageable
proportion. The case involves volumes of reports, application
documents, laws, statutory orders, deliberation reports,
correspondence documents, minutes of meetings - the list is
exhaustive. So in order to make the analysis manageable, I need
concepts for helping me to conceptualize and ascribe meaning to
what I see when I go through these documents. But the concepts
must be relevant for the case in question. And by saying that the
concepts are relevant, then I am moving towards a much more
value-laden statement. This is because concepts, as it were, have a
disciplinary-cultural and a theoretical 'baggage" that they reflect. As
the same reality can be perceived in several different ways, I need to
have a theoretical background with basic concepts as tools that will
be used throughout the analysis for the act of perceiving and
understanding.
As a student interested in analysing decision-making processes on
science and technology-related risks, and particularly how science
and scientific uncertainty is (in controversial issues) feed into the
policy process, I tend to have a bias towards those theoretical
orientations in sociology or policy science that have paid
considerable attention to the difficulties of policy-making in
sceptical and controversial contexts. In particular, I will explore a
theory that has emphasized that under the conditions of post-
modernity issues of scientific ignorance, uncertainty and risk come
to play a crucially important part in public debate and decision-
making processes. Similarly, I will explore a theory in policy science
that assesses the place of science or for that matter scientific
knowledge in public policies. Ulrich Beck and Douglas Torgerson,
respectively, have been acclaimed to be eminent contributors to this
understanding.
Thus, in the following section, the thesis will explore Ulrich Beck's
theory of reflexive modernization and Douglas Torgerson's notion of
"three faces" of policy analysis. But modern biotechnology emerged
in the wake of the political disillusionment of the late-1960s and
early-1970s. At around the time that modern biotechnology was
born, a series of accidents and incidents - Seveso, Bhopal,
Chernobyl, etc. - signaled a burgeoning crisis; and at the same
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time, they provided powerful precedents for the critics of modern
biotechnology. For this reason, finally, in this chapter, the thesis
will make a condensed account of some of these debates. The
account recapitulates the environmental-ecological discourses of the
past twenty-five years or so, charting the gathering storm of debate
about the credibility of an older, technocratic view of the role of
scientific advice in policy-making. The concepts and the hypotheses
that will be derived from this theoretical background will be used in
the case study as tools for describing, interpreting and explaining -
with reference to Danisco's release and market applications'
deliberations - how the Danish government implemented law 288
and it's subsequent revisions in practice.
At the empirical level, the thesis will make a qualitative analysis of a
rather complete set of documents produced in the course of
Danisco's various release and market application's deliberations
(1989-1997). For each application, the documents include:
applications/notifications for approval, inter-agencies notification
documents, reports, correspondence documents amongst the
competent authorities, minutes of parliamentary readings and
discussions, acts, laws, publication documents or statements
representing various interests groups such as agricultural
organizations, industries, pressure groups, public consultations
reports, etc.
For each application/notification and it's subsequent deliberation,
key questions considered in the analysis are: How were the different
interests represented in the assessment of Danisco's applications?
How did the policy process deal with issues of scientific ignorance,
indeterminancy, uncertainty and risk? And how did the policy
process deal with public concern and public criticism of gene
technology? On what explicit and/or implicit bases did the
responsible authority decide to recommend exemption of these
applications under the terms of law 288 and its subsequent
revisions? The objective is to map the mechanisms that were put in
place to facilitate the development of agricultural biotechnology in
Denmark in the face of an uncertain science that was feeding into
the policy-making process together with a mounting pressure from a
risk-averse public - with a view to considering the implications of
the case study to current sociological and policy science theories of
decision-making in skeptical contexts.
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For that reason, chapter four is an integrative concluding
discussion which draws out the lessons that can be learned from
the case study. It does this by relating the case study to the
theoretical orientations described in the first part of the thesis.
Here, the key question is: what light does the case study throw on
current sociological and policy science theories of decision-making
in sceptical contexts?
The field of Biotechnology is changing so fast. In fact, by the time of
delivering this thesis, there are various revolutionary, indeed,
intriguing and sensational technological, scientific and political
developments that are taking place. Nevertheless, it is a truism that
we must learn from our past mistakes or experiences lest history
repeats itself. For that reason, the final chapter - though outside
the scope of this thesis - is a perspective based on my own
reflections (and should only be seen as such) and it deals with the
question: how could we put in place better, sounder and more
consensual decision-making processes (in the future). The final
chapter will draw up four suggestions.
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Chapter 2
Reflexive Modernization
The process of negotiating scientific knowledge in skeptical
contexts, where traditional practices and commissioned government
or social institutions come under pressure from a wide range of
complex and critical concerns have presented some particular
explanatory challenges to theoretical sociology (Wynne, 1989a: 32).
Ulrich Beck is one of the social theorists who is struggling to
comprehend these challenges through the advancement of the
notion reflexive modernization. In Beck's eyes, late industrial
societies are experiencing a critical form of change. For example,
there is a gradual erosion of the traditional practices of policy
making - namely, those practices that underpin the autonomy and
the preeminence of the scientific and technological realms while
depicting them as arenas that are immune to social and political
influences. For Beck, the comprehension that these reductionist
polic)' practices are utterfy inadequate is of critical importance in
the late industrial societies (Beck 1992; Beck et al. 1994).
Classically, modern western society is characterized as positivist
and technocratic; it is a society that takes for granted the
progressive role of science and technology. However, for Beck, late-
industrial society has cast its eye across the vast panorama of
modern science or technology and found it wanting. It has come to
realize that, for all its power and richness, modern science has strict
limits, particularly as an instrumental tool for policy making or risk
management. Late-industrial society has learned that science
cannot predict rare events with any great accuracy and that its
ability to quantify risks of chronic or cumulative exposure to
hazardous substances is also limited. With this realization, late-
industrial society has come to recognize some of the limitations of
scientific knowledge as applied in the solution of complex social or
physical questions. One effect of this realization is a pervasive
tendency to question science and scientific knowledge. It is with this
tendency that Beck perceives the emergence of what he terms
"reflexive modernity"; that is, a form of modernity that recognizes
the need to question its own scientific and technological
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foundations. Under these conditions, societies feel the need to
review scientific knowledge as an integral part of the policy process.
For Beck, this shift marks a fundamental change in policy-making,
away from the classical model in which policy realms are clearly
differentiated as separate, autonomous and functionally distinct
spheres (cf. Beck 1997 or 1998).
The concept of risk is central to Beck's analysis. In Beck's view,
late-industrial society is coming to understand that increasing levels
of risk are generated by the physical impact of scientific knowledge
within industry and by the highly competitive pursuit of scientific
rationality by competing social groups. Late-industrial society has
awoken to its lack of absolute knowledge; it has awoken, indeed, to
"non-knowledge", "unawareness" and uncertainty about humanity's
impact on the physical world. For Beck, a growing awareness of the
existence of unintended consequences accompanying many forms of
scientific and technological intervention in nature is part and parcel
of what he terms the "return of uncertainty", which in turn is an
important accompaniment of reflexive modernity (Beck et al,
1994:8).
The unintended consequences to which Beck refers are more than
merely theoretical problems. In cases such as dioxin in the air,
trihalomethanes in drinking water, pesticides in food, radioactive
pollution from nuclear power plants, late-industrial societies have
come to recognize the practical reality of unintended consequences.
Beck argues that a late-industrial society in which science has
never been more powerful has nevertheless been forced to
acknowledge that scientific control has ironically increased, rather
than decreased the level of risk and uncertainty in western societies
(Beck et al, 1994:174). This acknowledgment in turn has forced
such societies to reflect on the social conditions of their existence
and to change them." For Beck, the task for social change is urgent;
for in his view, the side-effects of science and technology threaten to
overwhelm late-industrial society by threatening not only its
immediate health but the continued survival of humanity itself.
Beck cites modern biotechnology as a case in point. Here,
particular policy disputes are taking place in a context
characterized by a rather new and incomplete science amid
widespread social and political concern. For Beck, modern
biotechnology discourses are enmeshed within the general themes
of reflexivity, deference, skepticism, and the inadequacies of
30
institutions founded on reductionist approaches to policy making.
These discourses also are imbued with discussions of appalling
future impacts and considerations of effects that cover a broad
spectrum of activities. At the heart of these discourses lies a
scientific knowledge base that, while crucial to the policy-making
process, remains complex, uncertain, and contested.
The much discussed consequences of what Beck terms "mega-
technologies" such as nuclear power and biotechnology pose major
dilemmas involving crucial choices about future ways of life. Faced
with what are sometimes awful forebodings, people tend to fear that
we shall be unable to manage the unwanted side-effects of current
technology in ways that we find acceptable. Exceptionally,
biotechnology is a mega-technology many of whose potential
impacts have been recognized from the earliest stages of the
technology's development; yet this recognition has not enabled us
effectively to deal with these potential impacts. One key reason for
this is the uncertainty of the scientific knowledge base itself. In the
absence of definite scientific knowledge, expert opinions tend to be
colored with personal values as well as professional judgement,
leading to different assessments of the significance of particular
risks. And in managing risks, public authorities are thus drawn into
mediating not only among competing social, economic and political
interests but also among conflicting technical interpretations.
Beck argues that, faced with a large number of potentially
intractable risk issues, governments and private companies tend to
cooperate in an attempt to manage risks compatibly with the
continued development of technology. However, such cooperation is
widely seen by the public as a form of complacency on the part of
established and dominant social interests. Together with
experiencing actual risks, this generates concurrent discourses
about the need for new types of science and technology policy-
making which are more sensitive and open to wider social concerns.
In seeking to comprehend these developments, western democracies
have developed various mechanisms that have been put in place to
address certain basic values, such as the citizen's right to
understand and to participate in governmental decision-making. For
example, a number of new forms of public consultation have been
developed in the field of science and technology policy. These forms
of public consultation provide vehicles for continued debate on
environmental and health impacts of new technologies.
3i
Concept Definition
According to Beck, Reflexive modernization "is a keyword in group
formation. It is comparable to such words as "Dadaism" or
"Expressionism" in art - a notion that does not pin much down but
does suggest a tendency and permit distinctions" (1997 page 15).
For Beck, reflexive modernization delineates a tendency in late
industrial society to comprehend and analyze its social situation in
a more realistic and reflected way. It involves a realization of the fact
that the "unintended consequences" of new technologies are
produced by activities that are intrinsically valuable; that they are,
indeed, by-products of otherwise legitimate activities in society.
Further, this realization arises in a social context of relative
affluence. It occurs amid what Baumann calls an "enticing and
alluring spectacle of lavish consumption enjoyed under capitalist
auspices" and the "narcissistic culture of self-enhancement, self-
enjoyment and instant gratification and life defined in terms of
consumer styles" (Bauman 1997). As unintended consequences
accumulate and their potential risks become actual, late-industrial
society is forced to question the very foundations of industrial
modernization. For Beck, the all-pervasive neo-idealism of the new
environmentalism is a case in point. Since the 1970s, this neo-
idealism has renounced the crass materialism of the modern life for
forms of higher aesthetics and altruism (Beck 1997).
In Beck's view, late industrial societies are at an historical stage of
contradictory and yet critical experiences. Here, one encounters
"simultaneity, uncertainty, synthesis, ambivalence, farewell to
order, overflowing chaos, its extravagant hope for unity, its
helplessness in the face of merely additive growth, its limit and
limitlessness" - all at the same time. However, for Beck, it is the
cumulative negative side effects amidst limitless growth and
affluence that delineate a new modernity; a modernity that
encompasses the dichotomies of "safe-unsafe, inside-outside,
political-unpolitical." Nevertheless, none of these dichotomies
permits a clear social opposition or group formation. Rather, they
tend to diffuse in one way or another. This does not alleviate the
disputes - it intensifies them and makes them more bizarre (1997 p.
9).
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At the same time, the established institutions, those organizations
that have traditionally been entrusted to steer society, have failed to
address the prevailing dilemmas, as clearly illustrated by the BSE
scandal. Here, reductionist policy communities (that is, policy
communities committed to an exclusive reliance on scientific
evidence) failed to oversee and to comprehend matters of critical
importance. The institutions of politics did not grasp or respond
adequately to key and pressing issues of social concern. In Beck's
eyes, it is such events that demonstrate the need to reinvent
politics. And little wonder that in the new modernity, the
established regulatory enterprises, those "institutions of industrial
society and their claims to exercise control and provide securities
are being refuted" (1997 pp. 1, 7-8).
Following social disputes such as the BSE scandal, the Brent Spar
scandal, nuclear power plant accidents, or for that matter the
recent debates in agricultural biotechnology about genetic pollution,
government institutions were besieged by environmentalists, animal
rights activists, and other affected or interested groups with an anti-
science and/or an anti-reductionist outlook. As with the UK
Conservative government following the climax of the BSE scandal in
1997, policy-making institutions discover that they have to rethink,
change, and indeed, reconstitute regulatory bodies to deal with the
challenges they face in more accountable ways. This is what Beck
understands as a "momentous and unreflected basic state of
affairs". In such ways, late industrial societies alter the overall
conditions and foundations for industrial modernization. For Beck,
the deeper implication of such alterations is that societies can no
longer be envisaged only in instrumental rational and linear terms,
but "as refracted, as the rule of side-effects becomes the motor of
social history" (ibid.).
Consider for example the mass attack on Monsanto's genetically
manipulated soybeans in Denmark in 1996, or the uprooting of
genetically manipulated plants in the UK in 1998. These events
occurred despite the fact that at the time government bodies,
industrial and scientific organizations all claimed that genetically
modified crops were perfectly safe. For Beck, the implicit distrust
displayed in protests such as these suggests that the economic and
political foundations of late-industrial society are "becoming
obsolete and must be re-arbitrated and streamlined" (1997 p. 6).
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In Beck's view, reflexive modernization brings with it the need for
what he terms the "re-invention of politics." Everything becomes
political where, "theoretical, empirical, normative and moral
statements appear to be surreptitiously connected and fused." In
this situation, an entire political and social language is becoming
antiquated and needs to be revised. As Beck asserts, we witness
"not just rule-enforcing but rule-altering politics, not just politics for
politicians, but politics for society, not just power politics, but
political design, the art of politics," indeed, the re-invention of
politics - the coming of age of a new modernity; a modernity that is
overwhelmed by dissatisfaction amidst affluence; a distrusting and
doubtful modernity; a modernity where the medium of social change
is uncertainty, non-knowledge, unawareness; in short, a reflexive
modernity (Beck 1996, 1997, 1998).
The Age of Side-Effects
With the advent of the many problems that accompany
technological and scientific development, reflexive modernization
becomes what Beck terms an "age of side-effects". Increasingly,
unintended side-effects become the motor and the instrument for
social change. Here, a number of features deserve close attention .
To start with, late-industrial society realizes that the problem if
unintended side-effects is caused by its own dynamism. This
realization heightens a growing sense of insecurity that steadily
permeates late-industrial society. An increasing number of
examples - effluents from agricultural chemicals, industrial toxins,
nuclear power plants accidents - gradually bring home the all-
pervasive nature of the risks that arise from applied science and
technology; and this in turn leads to a steady loss of trust in
scientific and technological expertise. Increasingly, people come to
believe that many experts proceed with insufficient awareness of the
potential dangers that are inherent in their work; and this in turn
undermines public confidence in the pursuit of progress through
science and technology. According to Beck, one result of this is that
society struggles to make the challenge of coping effectively with
unintended side-effects a criterion of social change.
Moreover, in recent years, late-industrial society has gradually
awakened to the reality of the symbiotic relationship between
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science, economics, politics and policy making. With this
comprehension, belief in the so-called systemic differentiation of
industrial modernity - the state of affairs where (for example) the
realms of law, science or technology are taken to be quite separate
by virtue of their functional differentiation - is undermined. Here,
Beck criticizes Luhmann's view of systemic differentiation, arguing
that under conditions of reflexive modernity the boundaries between
systems become increasingly blurred. Gradually, in place of
functional differentiation we see the pursuit of functional
coordination - cross-linking, harmonization, synthesis, etc. Society
demands clearer and more explicit acknowledgments within the
policy process of the necessary inter-connections between science,
economics, politics and the law. Thus, there occurs what Beck
refers to as "systemic harmonization", which allows the possibility
for both coordination and autonomy between systems (Beck, 1997
p. 27).
Similarly, for Beck a growing awareness of the problem of
unintended side-effects leads to a revision of the basic assumptions
of industrial modernity. By such revision, society aims at "further
development, not refusal, of modernity, at opening it to the
challenges of a world of global homogeneity which has lost the
securit}' of its foundations and oppositions." In this step, society
turns its back on a romantic view of nature within which progress is
relatively easily secured. Instead, it embraces a more sober view,
according to which progress is hard to achieve because every action
has a plethora of intended and unintended consequences - some
beneficial, and some not. Within such a view, the need becomes
apparent for radical change in the structure of scientific, economic
and political institutions to cope with the new world (Beck, 1997, p.
15). At the height of this anxiety, we see an erosion of belief in
science, certainty, progress and the policy arena. There is increasing
distrust of established social institutions as responsible agencies for
steering society; in many fields of social activity, there is "a gradual
or eruptive collapse of previously applicable basic certainties". A
case in point is the emergence of the environmental movements.
Environmental "neo-idealism" tends to defy the reductionist and
technocratic policy orientations of modernity, with their claim of
limitless growth and un-ending progress. The relentless criticism of
the ideological foundations of modernity tends to generate what
Beck terms "a new frailty of the late industrial societies even behind
the facade of established prosperity" (Beck, 1997 p. 12).
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In addition, under conditions of reflexive modernity there are calls
for the policy community to expand its decision-making processes
in order to involve various interested and affected social groups. At
the same time, there are calls for the integration of moral, ethical
and feminist issues in public policy making. Late-industrial society
tends to refute the assumption of lineality - that is, the idea that
more technology creates further progress, by opening up new
markets, stimulating economic growth, promoting international
competitiveness, etc. Instead, society comes to see, not that
technology is uniformly detrimental, but rather that it creates a
mixture of good and bad effects. Obvious good effects include the
wealth produced by instrumental rationality (capital, jobs,
opportunities for consumption, etc.); and obvious bad effects
include risks and dangers of many different types (Beck, 1997, p.
30). This acceptance of the mixed effects of new technology
stimulates greater public efforts to reclaim control of such
technology.
Besides, with the collapse of reductionist and technocratic models of
policy-making, there is a search for alternative models better suited
to dealing with the scientific, economic, legal and political
complexities of technological decision-making. Uncertainty and
unawareness become "the motive power of social change in
categories of side-effects", as Beck puts it. The western society tends
to realize that it cannot be steered with the conventional mode of
operation without incremental, diminishing returns (1997 p. 38).
Furthermore, the crisis of confidence tends to undermine accepted
views of science itself. Gradually, the belief in the power of that
purest and grandest science, that primordial human quest to
understand the universe - tends to come to an end. Instead, the
feeling grows that perhaps science as a unified, universal, objective
endeavor is over; that further research may yield no more great
revelations or revolutions, but only incremental, diminishing
returns. At the same time, new forms of scientific instruments for
policy - more suited to the conditions of reflexive modernity -
appear. Impact assessment is a case in point. It derives from a
general fear of the effects of technological and scientific
development, caused by "the inherent pluralization of risks that
called the rationality of risk calculations into question" (Beck, 1997
pp. 31- 32).
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Equally, because science tends to generate not only that which is
seen and desired (for example, information technology) but also that
which is not seen and not desired (for example, pollution or the
nuclear weapon), there is increasing ambivalence and uncertainty
about the scientific process itself. Industries see immense economic
opportunities in scientific research and development; and
government officials see it as instrumental for international
competitiveness or for surging national economic growth; but
environmental idealists see it as a threat to nature and society in
general; and citizens feel that governments do not give precedence
to their concerns as citizens or consumers. Beck expresses this as a
state of affairs where "what seems like decay and crises to one
person is a departure for new shores to the other." However, what is
critical is that this ambivalence constrains while making it more
difficult to practice science, and pure science in particular ( Beck,
1997 p. 11).
In summary, in late-industrial society the motor of social
transformation is no longer instrumental linear rationality. Rather,
it is a very different and more ambiguous rationality - one in which
not only the intended consequences of thought and action but also
the unintended consequences of thought and action are motors of
social change (Beck, 1997 pp. 22-23; and 1998, pp. 90-81). If, as
Beck suggests, industrial society as we have know it is coming to an
end, it is not because of this society's lack of success; rather, it is
the very triumphs of science that are seeds of social reform. For
Beck, industrial society is ending because its industrial enterprises
worked well but were unaware of the side effects of their
accomplishments (Beck, 1997 p. 25).
Ways to Alternative Modernity
According to Beck, as late-industrial society moves towards the end
of the millennium it is facing the fact that "the law of techno-
economic innovation is inviolate and implacable." That is, this
society acknowledges the fact that science has spawned such
marvels as the jet, the computer, information technology, etc. As
such, it treats science - and especially pure science - as a
meaningful human creation. However, what .most people deplore are
certain by-products of science, such as pollution or nuclear
weapons. Late-industrial society accepts that science on the whole
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has made life immeasurably richer, intellectually and materially. It
acknowledges that despite the negative side effects of techno-
scientific progress, it cannot afford "to shut down or re-program this
out-of-control human machinery." This does not come as a surprise.
Technological and scientific progress has conferred substantial
benefits on western society in the form of better health, increased
productivity, and in general, a higher quality of life. Thus, even
under the conditions of reflexive modernization, the western society
comprehends that science is still an immensely powerful force and
that "the pursuit for and faith in progress, is still left untouched."
However, what late-industrial society comes to understand under
the conditions of reflexive modernity is that science needs - and can
withstand - informed criticism; indeed, that it is only through such
criticism that science can responsibly and critically pursue the
tremendously important tasks that lie ahead (Beck, 1997, pp. 110 -
111).
For Beck, late-industrial society perceives the quest for knowledge
as by far the noblest and most meaningful of all human activities.
However, economic and political constraints make it more difficult
to practice science (especially pure science) in the future. The
intrinsic problem with techno-scientific rationality is that, first,
technological and scientific developments are driven by economic
imperatives. This is a major factor that precipitates the problems
that western society is lacing today. For Beck, what western society
needs is an autonomous technology - that is, a technology that is
not bound by the dictates of economic imperatives or the drive for
international competitiveness. This is what he terms a " technology
that is free, modern and liberated. A technology that is released
from the shackles of business and the state while exposing it to the
wind of doubt." For Beck, what is needed is for technology and its
practitioners to look into the possibilities of a non-utility science or
technology that are concerned with effectiveness. Such technological
development should involve an "effective distrust," that is, a
technology that accepts and reflects doubt rather than denying it
(Beck, 1998, p. 95). For Beck, the way forward is "to disabuse
technology of its old habit of copying economic necessities among
others in order to make it more autonomous." As Beck contends,
the core source of all the unwanted side effects and unintended
consequences of technology is its motivation in the drive for
economic utility, effectiveness, profitability, enhanced speed or
functionality.
Beck argues that institutions are only willing to support and
promote research as long as it has the potential to generate
powerful new technologies, such as nuclear weapons or modern
medical biotechnology. However, when science becomes impractical
and incomprehensible, these institutions withdraw their support.
Enterprises invest not in order to benefit humanity or to protect it
from problematic side-effects, but rather to open markets and areas
of expansion with promise for the future. They evaluate what the
competition is doing and, from market prognoses, make decisions
regarding their future research and production. However, these
planned innovations rarely come as responses to social sensitivities
and articulations of public interest. Rather, they are oriented only to
the goals of business efficiency and profitability. This means, among
other things, that they are largely uninfluenced by democratic
debates, and thus by wider public interests in the future trajectory
of technological development (Beck 1997; 1998).
To this criticism about economic motives, Beck adds the charge that
in late-industrial society technological developments - indeed, the
whole of science and technology - are driven by (ultra) reductionist
doctrines. Somehow, Beck implies that the problems associated
with technology under the conditions of reflexive modernity are
linked with the reductionist philosophical style of science and
technology themselves - almost as if science and technology
developed on alternative (e.g., "holistic") principles would
automatically be free from the problems of unintended
consequences and deleterious side-effects. For Beck, what is needed
now is for science and technology to disengage completely from
what he terms "extrinsic instrumental rationality and
controllability." Instead, he suggests that science and technology
should embrace "uncertainty, ambivalence" and context
specificness of their knowledge (Beck 1997; 1998).
What underlies this sort of criticism is the fundamental thesis that
economic and industrial imperatives should not take precedence
over social needs and concerns. Beck sees in many government
policies towards industrial development an appalling complacency;
an almost casual disregard of the inevitable dangers and risks that
accompany economically-driven technological development. Beck
criticizes governments across the industrialized world for not
controlling the speed of techno-scientific progress, and for not
sharpening perception of its threats and problematic side-effects. He
castigates governments which, instead of generously supporting the
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search for technological alternatives and conceding more
participation to society in the decision-making processes, simply
protect national business interests and international
competitiveness at the same time that they handle the dangers of
new technologies as a mere afterthought. Beck finds it absolutely
appalling that most government policies promote the acceleration
and entrenchment of dangerous technological trajectories instead of
cautious and responsible developments (Beck, 1997, p. 116).
What, then, is necessary if late-industrial society is to succeed in
pursuing more satisfactorily or that pure and grandest science?
First, Beck argues that a way must be found to advance a "value-
free" or "pluralistic" science and technology. By this, Beck means a
science and technology that are not closely wedded to particular
industrial and commercial interests. Here, Beck asserts that
industrial research should be abandoned since it is through the
power of industrial research that science comes to be subservient to
commercial interests irrespective of its larger or longer-term
consequences. Significantly, Beck views basic research as the
highest form of research, precisely because basic research is
indifferent to the practical and commercial imperatives of industry
(Beck, 1997 pp. 116- 117).
Second, Beck asserts the need for an alternative model of a free and
abstract technology; that is, a technology that is independent of
specific economic and political interests. Technological development,
must be slowed and reformed. For Beck, it is only in this way that a
fault tolerant technology or a technology that can withstand
informed criticism can become possible. Similarly, science and
technology policy must take up social problems, correct
technological mis-developments, and actively encourage alternative
technological trajectories (Beck, 1997 p. 118).
Third, Beck argues that the policy elites' preeminence in the
discussion and resolution of safety issues must be overcome.
Instead, power of decision-making in this area should be allocated
on more democratic - and hence, more morally legitimate - grounds
(Beck, 1997 p. 120-121).
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The age of ambivalence
Under the conditions of reflexive modernity, scientists regularly
disagree with one another on important matters of science and
technology policy. This serves to undermine public confidence in
scientific expertise; and at the same time, it creates the need for
new forms and forums of debate and decision-making. Such forms
and forums must take as their starting-point the existence of what
Beck terms a "new ambivalence" about the place of scientific and
technological expertise in society. However, a dilemma then arises:
how can new democratic processes simultaneously acknowledge the
existence of expert disagreement (and hence uncertainty) and also
generate meaningful and robust political consensus?
First, Beck argues, society needs to be cross-linked. The boundaries
between subsystems must be planned differently and yet
collaboratively, that is to say, cooperatively (Beck, 1997, p. 121).
Late-industrial society must look into the possibilities of mediating
between the dominant terms and values of different social systems
(science, law, politics, etc.), taking into account existing attempts to
bring these systems together in meaningful interaction. For
example, at the turn of the century we are witnessing attempts to
combine art and science, technology and ecology, economics and
politics. These attempts result in something altogether new - a third
entity, hitherto unknown and yet waiting to be discovered.
According to Beck, late-industrial society must accept that science
changes everything (Beck, 1997 p. 112).
Secondly, Beck argues that society needs to recognize that the
effects of technologies cannot be justly distributed. For this reason,
the conventional instrument of political consultation - expert
opinion - cannot be trusted. Where experts disagree, some form of
arbitration or negotiation appears to be needed; but few social
mechanisms for such negotiation exist, and even where they are
employed it is not clear that the mere interplay between opinion and
counter-opinion is sufficient to resolve conflicts. Debates can
abolish neither conflicts nor uncontrollable dangers; all they can do
is point up the need for precaution and prevention and encourage
people to accept ambivalence (Beck, 1997 p. 113). What such
debates may encourage is the creation of new forums for
negotiation. In such forums, scientific and industrial experts would
occupy the intellectual high ground, using evidence based for the
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most part on hard science. Counter-expertise would come armed
with informed criticism, while the interested or affected public
would come with rationales based mainly on direct experience. This
public rationality is what Beck describes as a rationale that is
"related to everyday life, drenched with experience...and in any case
devoid of a laboratory" (Beck, 1997, p. 123).
But for this to be realized, Beck contends, we need to open and
democratize science and technological policy arenas. New
institutions for public consultation, for the conduct of ethical
controversies, for shared decision-making and for voting must be
put in place. The common feature of these institutions is that they
will be based on the acknowledgment that administrators and
scientific experts are not in the privileged position of being able to
know and to determine what should be done. For Beck, the policy
arena can no longer be closed according to considerations internal
to specialists; instead, it must be opened up according to wider
social standards of relevance. In line with this, older styles of
conflict resolution that depend upon negotiations between experts
and decision-makers behind closed doors must be abandoned.
Instead, there should be public dialogue between the widest
possible variety of individuals and interest groups. Norms for this
process - modes of discussion, protocols, debates, evaluations of
interviews, forms of voting and approving - must be agreed upon
(Beck, 1997 p. 123).
Summary
In trying to comprehend the new political reality at the turn of the
centuty, Beck's theory of reflexive modernization theory begins with
a late-industrial society that is materially satisfied due to the
success of its own scientific and commercial dynamism. In a sense,
he portrays a society that is drowning in affluence.
In parallel with this, Beck describes a late-industrial society that is
threatened by risks of varying degree and impact. He portrays a
society that is witnessing the dark side of its own success, through
the unwanted consequences of unintended side-effects; a society
that is increasingly aware of the chaos and risks that accompany its
own development.
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Given its great affluence, this society can afford to be risk-averse.
Capitalism and science have delivered material goods, and people
are generally happy and satisfied with their life as it is. Naturally,
they are reluctant to take risks as there is much at stake in the
event that things go badly wrong. If people are willing to take risks
under such circumstances, then such risks must be (socially)
negotiated, justified and agreed-upon.
For Beck, late-industrial society is a relatively well- informed
society; it is a society that can reflect on its own situation,
understand the mechanisms and the effects of its dynamism, and
act to make the necessary changes. As it undertakes this reflection,
Beck argues that late-industrial society comes to see scientific
knowledge itself as uncertain and contestable.
Late-industrial society is a society in which power can no longer be
accumulated and held by a small core elite of scientists,
industrialists and politicians. Rather, it is a society in which power
must be diffused and decentralized. Policy decisions must be
negotiated, discussed and justified. For this reason, policy makers
are obliged to awaken to the fact that they speak to multiple power.
In his theory of reflexive modernization, Beck depicts a late-
industrial society that acknowledges the twin aspects of its own
development; of its dependence upon science and technology, and at
the same time of the inherent limitations of science and technology.
Being aware of the limits of science and technology, and of the
incapacity of many existing institutions to deal effectively with it,
late-industrial society searches for new methods of ensuring the
social control of science and technology. What it seeks is a
decentralization of power within the grey zone - the area outside the
formal policy arena (not confined to, but including the mass media),
in which power and influence are exercised over the policy process.
It is in this grey zone that informed criticism of science and
technology takes place; and it is in this grey zone that the potential
for new and more robust decision-making processes within the
policy arena is explored.
In sum, then, Beck depicts a new form of modernity; a modernity
where everything must be discussed, negotiated, justified and
agreed-upon. What this implies is the democratization of science
and technology within the policy arena. However, as Douglas
Torgerson will show us in the following section, in order to do this,
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we must first understand the different relationship between
knowledge and politics in science and technology policy arena.
Furthermore we must also understand the different assessment of
reason and its place in public policy. And how we can find
appropriate ways of ensuring that democratic debates and
disagreement take place within a space that allows for robust and
reasoned negotiation. We turn to this discussion in the next section.
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Three Faces of Policy Analysis
Douglas Torgerson describes policy analysis as those activities
designed to acquire and advance knowledge critical for the
formulation and implementation of public policy. Seen historically
and politically, Torgerson argues that policy analysis has no
consistent appearance; rather, it takes a variety of different forms.
These different forms are what he terms "faces". Torgerson identifies
three faces in policy analysis. In each face, he articulates a different
relationship between knowledge and politics, and furthermore a
different assessment of reason and its place in public policy
(Torgerson, 1986, pp. 33-34).
The first face of policy analysis
For Torgerson, policy analysis involves an old dream; a dream of the
eradication of politics to alleviate strife and confusion via an orderly
administration of things based upon objective knowledge. This was
commonplace in the period of Enlightenment in the 18th century,
and it reappeared with the dawn of Positivism in the 19th century.
According to Torgerson, the early Positivists announced the dawn of
a new era based on "a smooth, efficient industrial civilization,
establivshed and managed not by the dictates of political interests,
but by the dictates of genuine knowledge" (Torgerson, 1986, p. 34).
The positivist orientation suggested that industrial society should
address the world objectively. This was by observing facts that could
determine the lawful order of nature and society. Within this
orientation, notions of uncertainty and ambivalence played no part;
everything that was important in social affairs was to be known
scientifically - that is, clearly and certainly. In particular, through
the establishment of precise and reliable knowledge of lawful
regularities, science was to contribute to the progress of human
civilization. In this sense, for the early Positivists knowledge
replaced politics.
In a positivist policy analysis, all genuine knowledge is scientific
knowledge - that is, it is knowledge of facts together with logical
inferences about the relationships among facts. With this kind of
knowledge, the Positivists hoped that all future events could be
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predicted by reference to foregoing developments. Clearly, if such
knowledge were possible it would be of crucial importance in the
administration of society generally and in the determination of
science and technology policy in particulars (Torgerson, 1986, p.
36).
For Torgerson, then, the first face of policy analysis is the face of the
Enlightenment; it is the vision of a rational civilization for which
scientific knowledge is the essential pre-requisite of industrial order
and social progress. In this first face of policy analysis, we see the
old Enlightenment dream of the perfectibility of humankind through
science. Here, knowledge takes the place of politics. For this reason,
the first face of policy analysis is inherently technocratic.
Torgerson argues that this Enlightenment ideal of substituting
politics with knowledge persists implicitly or explicitly in much
subsequent policy analysis (cf. Schick, 1969, 1971). Still today, in
many conventional areas of policy analysis the guiding outlook is
prevailingly technocratic. This is most clearly seen in the tendency
to detachment - that is, to "developing knowledge of society in order
that the knowledge can subsequently be applied to society" (
Torgerson, 1986, p. 35).
The second face of policy analysis
In the course of time, the imperfect results of policy-making
conducted on the Enlightenment model led to the first face of policy
analysis taking on the aura of an unfulfillable ideal. Gradually, a
second model - a second face, in Torgerson's terms - arose to
replace this unfulfillable ideal. If policy analysis in the first face
emerges as a victory of knowledge over politics, policy analysis in
the second face involves politics overwhelming knowledge.
In this second face, it becomes a truism that conventional policy
analysis conducted along technocratic lines is blind to political
reality. The policy community wrongly adopts the stance of political
neutrality, and by doing so suppresses critical questions that need
to be addressed. In this way, it is claimed that the first face of policy
analysis serves particular political interests - generally, established
interests vested in the existing political order.
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In a modern administrative state, policy analysis tends to project a
technocratic appearance, asserting the old Positivist belief that
somehow science will deliver those precise and workable solutions
that are required to perpetuate social progress. However, in the
second face policy analysts come to recognize that the reality
beneath this appearance is very different. For policy analysts, it
becomes evident that science is a political weapon with which to
secure particular political positions. While the rhetoric of policy-
makers may be technocratic, the reality is that politics has
overwhelmed knowledge (Torgerson, 1986, pp. 39-40).
How is this to be explained? According to Torgerson, in the second
face of policy analysis the process of analyzing policy issues is not
only meant to aid "the decision maker in choosing a course of
action, but also to help in persuading others of the justifiability and
wisdom of his choice. Here, the allegiance to reason suggested by
the apparent objectivity turns into an unconscious betrayal:
technocratic style and imagery become part of political rhetoric;
irrational claims and expectations are advanced under the banner
of reason. Politics wears the mask of knowledge". And with this, the
"old dream that reason could escape politics now appears as
political naivete of conventional policy analysis. The spell of
positivism is broken. The narrow, positivist conception of reason
apparently fosters an intellectual style that is insensitive to its own
nature and context - which is in another word, irrational" (pp. 39-
40).
The third face of policy analysis
The comprehension that policy-analytic techniques are not the
disinterested, objective tools that they might appear to be - that
they are, indeed, entrenched in a political process - begets the third
face of policy analysis. That is, the awareness that the practice of
policy analysis is rooted in deep-seated political choices.
In the third face, to be sure, the allegiance to reason does remain.
However, it is the meaning of reason that has changed, and with it
the meaning of politics. In this face, policy analysts acknowledge
that politics and knowledge are no longer deadly antagonists. On
the contrary, they are symbiotic. However, the idea of knowledge is
expanded through a recognition that contextual knowledge is both
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an end and a means of rational inquiry. Indeed, though knowledge
carries a commitment to an autonomous inquiry, reason is hardly
value free - rather, it carries a political commitment. So, contrary to
the common view of science being outside the political world of
policy making, in the third face it is viewed as an integral part of
policy making which is inherently political.
Increasingly, scientists are adopting the tools that have traditionally
been used by policy makers to justify their research in the name of
utility. Thus, scientists commonly argue and seek to persuade
others of the practical importance of their research. This is the case,
for example, in agricultural biotechnology, where claims concerning
the potential impact of new genetic technologies on third world
agriculture are strongly endorsed even by renowned scientists.
Agricultural biotechnology problems are re-framed as moral issues.
For example, it is common to hear such statements as, "Do not we,
the western people, wish to support the dying people in Africa?".
Surely, such statements endorse a moral good. This in turn
reasserts the need for agricultural biotechnology in the public eye
while also reaffirming and justifying the need for more intensified
scientific research (Garvin, Theresa and Eyles, John - The Sun
Safety Metanarrative: Translating Science into Public Health
Discourse in Policy Sciences Vol.30 No/2 1997 - page 65).
Ideally, scientists are rational, logical and objective, and policy
makers are politically motivated, reactive and subjective. However,
in the biotechnology policy arena, both scientists and policy makers
use metaphors, persuasion and argumentation as tools of the trade.
In this sense, both scientists and policy-makers are engaged in
essentially the same exercise. While scientists use policy methods
(persuasion, argumentation) to develop ways of supporting their
views, policy makers use scientific methods to justify decisions and
proposed actions. Even in the face of scientific uncertainty,
uncertainty is dismissed and actions are taken. By deeming
uncertainty certain, impetus is given for acting even where the
actions are inherently value-based. However, in modern agricultural
biotechnology, due to the awareness of the possibility of unknown
effects, such actions resonate with a precautionary principle to
control and anticipate any unknown effects (Torgerson, pp. 65-66;
cf. Roe, 1994 and Brandon 1984).
For Torgerson, the convergence of science and policy through such
pooling of methods is not inherently wrong. Rather, what is needed
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is an explicit acknowledgment that this is the case. Torgerson
argues that neither science nor politics should be given dominance;
instead, their symbiosis should be acknowledged and appreciated
(page 65-66). In this sense, the third face of policy analysis points to
a new representation of politics - or, more correctly, to the
resurgence of a classical practice. After all, politics has always been
a process of strategic manoeuvering in which knowledge (along with
other resources) has been used to further particular interests. In
Torgerson's view, the third face of policy analysis simply re-
discovers this classical view of politics by acknowledging the extent
to which scientific knowledge has become a crucial resource for
policy-makers and politicians. The correct response to this re-
discovery is surely to find appropriate ways of ensuring that debate
and disagreement take place within a space that allows for robust
and reasoned negotiation.
Discussion
Modern biotechnology policy is a challenging arena. Current
scientific insight is still contested. More often than not, deductions
are based on theoretical modeling and mathematical probabilities
rather than on firm knowledge of all the relevant natural processes.
While obviously useful, modeling and probabilistic reasoning are
obviously less clear-cut than specific forecasts and predictions
based on well-established knowledge. On the other hand, policy-
makers find themselves having to make clear-cut decisions.
Moreover, they also face the problem of legitimacy - that is, of giving
clear and compelling grounds for the decisions they make. As the
complexity of the decisions to be made increases, so policy-makers
tend to present their problems to scientists, who are asked to
propose potential solutions. However, since scientists do not have
access to straightforward scientific "truths" to substantiate
particular claims and positions, they are obliged to make
statements that are based on uncertain and ambiguous evidence. In
justifying these statements, they turn increasingly to the very
methods of persuasion that are traditionally used by policy-makers
and politicians. In this way, scientific uncertainty is more-or-less
subtly transformed into scientific certainty about risks or benefits.
With scientists contributing in this way to the process of
transforming uncertainty into certainty, the task of policy makers is
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made rather easier. Now, it is possible for them to paraphrase
scientific advice in order to provide apparently convincing
justification for the decisions they wish to take about modern
biotechnology. As new ideas or claims are advanced by the scientific
community, so they are taken up by the policy community, for
whom they become unquestionable facts sufficient to ground policy-
formation. Thus, scientific knowledge is politicized and socialized;
science is made to support and promote policy making and
governmental policy agendas despite the fact that its root science
itself is deeply ambiguous. In this way, the distinction between
science and politics within the policy making process becomes
unclear. Both the science that is used to support policy-making and
the policy-making itself become political and moral endeavors.
More and more, we witness broad-based problems that are beyond
the scope of the narrow, technocratic problem solving methods of
rational science. However, we still witness action-oriented policy
decisions. As actions are based on underlying values, in this way
modern biotechnology policy-making approaches Torgerson's "third
face" of policy making, where the relationship between science,
politics and policy making is not necessarily antagonistic. Instead,
the relationship becomes symbiotic - a necessary requirement for
solving broad based problems that are beyond the scope of the
narrow, technocratic, problem-solving methods of rational science
(Torgerson, 1986).
In modern biotechnology policy, we are no longer in a position
where policy analysis is preoccupied purely with technique
(technocracy/positivism) to the neglect of process. Instead, we are in
a position in which policy analytical tools are not the detached,
neutral devices that they appear to be. On the contrary, they are
deeply embedded in the political process. As Torgerson asserts,
"theory and practice of policy analysis are rooted in inherently
political choices (...). The key point is that the choice may either
inhibit or enhance the rationality of political life" (Torgerson, 1986,
p. 45).
Little wonder, then, that in the field of modern biotechnology (as in
other fields before, such as energy policy in the early 1970s), there
is a huge tension between what we may term the technocratic and
the participatory dimensions of policy analysis. For example, in
impact assessment we see broad-based social values and concerns
questioning the pace and direction of many aspects of modern
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biotechnology policy. In this context, specific and narrowly defined
debates have had a tendency to blossom into broader
considerations about the development of society as a whole. We
have witnessed disputes over the safety of modern biotechnology
which not only raise issues concerning the adequacy of conventional
analytical techniques, but also general questions about the
direction of modern biotechnology policies - the "hard path" versus
the "soft path". This development is not peculiar only to modern
agricultural biotechnology. At around the time that modern
biotechnology was born, a series of incidents such as Chernobyl had
signaled a burgeoning crisis providing powerful preceding debates
and questions that spilled over into the discourse about genetic
engineering. Modern biotechnology emerged in the wake of this
political disillusionment of the late-1960s and early-1970s. Since
these discourses were consequential, a brief account of some of
these debates is justified - which we shall now turn to.
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Discourses in the Science and Technology Policy Landscape
Enunciated in the 19th century and reaffirmed in the 20th century
by the drive for scientific management of industry and government,
the positivist and technocratic orientation of policy-making
processes was never more influential than in the mid-1960s. At this
time, a discourse of progress held that objective knowledge was the
key to the smooth operation of an efficient industrial civilization.
The paradigm of objective knowledge was, of course, science itself;
and at this time, there were few challenges to the idea that through
the observation of facts and the derivation of logical inferences from
facts, sure and certain solutions to social problems could be
obtained. In this sense, the discourse of progress held sway.
Starting in the mid-1960s, however, doubts began to arise about
this discourse of progress. Already by this time, problems in areas
such as civil nuclear power had cast a shadow over the more naive
versions of progressionism; and, as other problems arose - for
example, in relation to emerging awareness of the problem of
pollution in relation to the use of chemical insecticides in
agriculture (Carson, 1962) - so people began to challenge some of
the assumptions underlying the discourse of progress. Gradually,
alternative political discourses began to appear; discourses that
questioned the project of progress by, for example, questioning the
environmental costs associated with the continuing development of
science-based industry. Early debates around nuclear power plants
accidents, the effects of effluents from chemical agriculture, and
other forms of industrial pollution constituted an early challenge to
the accepted ways of conducting science and technology policy.
Modern biotechnology emerged in the wake of the political
disillusionment of the late-1960s and early- 1970s. At around the
time that modern biotechnology was born, a series of accidents and
incidents - Seveso, Bhopal, Chernobyl, etc. - signalled the
burgeoning crisis; and at the same time, they provided powerful
precedents for the critics of modern biotechnology - examples of
how apparently reasonable assumptions can easily turn out to have
disastrous social consequences. The following section is a
condensed account of some of these debates. It recapitulates the
environmental-ecological discourses of the past twenty-five years or
so, charting the gathering storm of debate about the credibility of an
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older, technocratic view of the role of scientific advice in policy-
making. Finally, a concluding summary of the debates
demonstrates the way in which, in the modern biotechnology arena,
almost everyone is dissatisfied with the status quo; the search for
better, sounder, more consensual decision-making processes is
well- nigh universal.
The Progress debate
The progress debate has put great emphasis on promoting the
potential benefits of scientific and technological advancement. The
debate depicts techno-scientific development as an endeavour that
can boost national economic growth, increase productivity, promote
international competitiveness, solve environmental problems, and
alleviate third world poverty. Its essence is the promise of
deliverance from human miseries and the achievement of a bright
future. In the 1960s arid early-1970s, public debate across Europe
about civil nuclear power was still dominated by the discourse of
progress. In France, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and
Denmark proponents of nuclear energy argued that this
comparatively new energy source would reduce dependence on Arab
oil, provide electricity too cheap to metre, and end the
environmental problems associated with the burning of fossil fuels.
At this time, opposition to nuclear power was widely ridiculed as
sheer irrationality or anti-scientific prejudice; it was seen as a
dangerous threat that could undermine the effort to further the
advancement of industrial societies. Comparing the intensity and
the impact of this debate in the various European countries, it
seems that in Germany 60% of the media debate was dominated by
the discourse of scientific progress - as compared to countries like
Denmark, Netherlands, or Sweden, where environmental opposition
contributed more significantly to media debate.
Environmental/ecological debate
Initiated by citizen groups, environmental debate has been marked
by the renunciation of crass materialism in favour of alternative
aesthetic, ecological and moral values. The social movements of the
early 1960s through to the mid-1980s served to put the issue of
threats to the integrity of the natural world on the political agenda -
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despite resistance from some industries. For example, in Denmark,
the late sixties witnessed an explicit revolt through which the
environmental debate came to be integrated into the alternative
political culture. In this process, environmentalism was developed
into a radical political-ecological criticism. Though in the 1970s
environmental debates came to be more specialized and many sided,
the early 80s witnessed an influx of professional and more
traditional organizations with different knowledge interests. But the
debate arose as a critical analysis of the relation between pollution
and society. And the debate introduced ecology as an alternative to
the reductionist and progressive science and technology policy path.
Albeit the complicated difficulties created by the social and
economic crisis, in Denmark, between 1974 and 1980s, the
environmental debate developed from a more diffuse eco-humanist
debate towards an explicit anti-capitalist political ecology debate
(Jamison 1997).
Gradually, environmentalism achieved greater credibility on the
International, stage such that with time even governments and
industries agreed on the need to take account of environmental
issues. For example, in Denmark in the 1980s the established
political culture came to accept the importance of environmental
problems and started to take active steps to deal with them. Soon,
the established parties and interest groups were attempting to out-
match one another in their environmental enthusiasm. In a way,
therefore, the oppositional groups that had first championed the
cause of the environment found themselves increasingly co-opted by
established interests and institutions, to the point where it was
sometimes difficult to discern the true origins of environmental
concern. While in Germany the 1980s witnessed fierce conflicts over
nuclear energy which mobilized powerful anti-nuclear and
environmental movements dedicated to shifting public policy into
what have been termed "soft energy paths", in Denmark the
discourse of ecological threat occupied a more central position.
Discussions on the deterioration of nature reached a new, more
serious levels with almost daily reports of environmental
catastrophes, scandals, conflicts and ever more frequent warnings
about global threats and dangers. This development went so far
that, in the 1980s, the environmental debate came to have the
highest priority in public opinion. For example, agricultural
chemicals came to be seen as an important cause of surface water,
river and lake pollution. Leaching of nitrates from agricultural land,
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for example, was blamed for eutrophication of some north American
lakes (cf Jamison 1996; 1997; 1998).
These developments, particularly in the Scandinavian countries,
fuelled wider debates about the environmental and health impacts
of industrialized agriculture. From about this time, attempts were
made by the Environmental Parties, the Societies of Conservation of
Nature and the general public to design alternative environmental
and agricultural policies. These attempts, together with increased
consumer awareness of ecological and organic products, spilled over
into the discourse about genetic engineering. For example, in
Denmark biotechnology was one of the first technologies to be
subject to a wider assessment prior to application. The subjection of
new technologies to a wider social assessment with a view to
preventing the emergence of environmental and other problems
emerged in the sixties and seventies. Given earlier experiences of
this kind, it was no wonder that from early on critics viewed genetic
engineering as an extension of industrialized agriculture that served
principally to boost the commercial interests of the big
conglomerates. This boost was seen as a further threat to the
environment, as well as to animal and human health. This was to
be a major argument during the resistance to genetically modified
maize in Austria and to Monsanto's genetically modified soybeans in
Denmark and Sweden in the mid-1990s (ibid.).
As the environmental debates progressed, so the better-organised
and established environmental movements began to be recognised
as having a certain political credibility. For example, in Germany
the Green Party emerged out of the environmental movement to
become a widely accepted part of the German political system,
participating in the governing of the federal states. Similarly, in the
UK vigorous environmental debate played an important role in the
arena of environmental science and technology, helping to develop
counter-expertise and using the available political structures (such
as public inquiries, Parliamentary Select Committees, Royal
Commissions, etc.) to influence policy. The 1990s have seen some
moderate sections of the environment movement becoming
increasingly well-established actors in the policy-making process. In
Denmark, in the 1980s through to the 1990s, there has been a
tendency for environmental groups to be placed in a position of
mediation between the established political culture and the
alternative ecological culture. Similarly, the Danish Green party that
was founded in 1983, with its traditional parliamentary strategy
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and the alternative cosmology, occupied a mediating position
between the two wings in the movement. This is contrary to the
greens' (or interest groups') experience in France, where
environmentalists have had a weak position in relation to the policy
process throughout the early-1970s and 1980s, while centralised
authorities - notably government, the scientific community, and
larger industries - have been pre-eminent in policy agenda-setting,
formulation and implementation (ibid.).
Nevertheless, even if environmentalism has become an almost
universal ideal, it is important to remember that it did not originate
with states, governments, or the industrial community. It was first
put on the agenda by groups who were motivated by fear of
technological risks or threats, and who worked in the teeth of
opposition from established commercial and political interests.
Within this debate, the industrial representatives, some government
advisers and some members of the scientific community attacked
the greens' and other interested public's assertions as sheer
irrationality or anti-technologism, an emotional response based on
poor understanding of the relevant science and technology. Or they
see the issues raised by the critics as interesting but outside the
scope of their teclmo-scientific assessments. Similarly, they see the
greens' assertions as dangerous threats to the continued advance of
industrial society. Many industrialists are angry that the critics
concentrate solely on the problems while ignoring the potential
benefits of these technologies, which could solve environmental,
social, political and economic problems. The common argument
used by industrialists at this time is that the marketplace should be
left to determine the need and the benefit of these technologies. At
the same time, they underline the need to establish infrastructures
that can manage and engineer better public understanding or
acceptance of these technologies (ibid.).
Fatalism
The debate about fatalism is closely connected to the environmental
and ecological debate. However, it was (or still is) typified by reactive
discourses of doom, mass ecological or environmental destruction,
the disappearance of civilization in a cataclysmic holocaust due to
the promotion of inappropriate or risky technologies, etc. Equally,
according to the debate, the nuclear, chemical, genetic and
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ecological hazards were (or are) seen to abolish the key supporting
pillars of the calculus of risks. This, it is argued, is because: first,
there is a trend towards the consideration of global risks
threatening widespread and often irreparable damage that can no
longer be limited, and hence the concept of monetary compensation
fails; second, following the worst imaginable accident, there can be
no provision for aftercare - the security concept of monitoring
therefore fails; third, accidents are not delimited in time and space;
and fourth, the normal standards of measurement - and, therefore,
of calculation of hazard and risk - collapse, causing incomparable
entities to be compared as calculation turns into obfuscation (cf
Beck 1995).
The crisis of credibility of techno-scientific rationality in policy
Making
The crisis of credibility of techno-scientific rationality in policy-
making has been marked by a call to address not only the benefits
of science, but also its limitations in relation to the resolution of
difficult social issues. Correspondingly, the debate is typified by a
criticism of purely technicalry-based policies, while underpinning
the need to integrate consumer, social, ethical, moral, feminist,
human and animal health concerns in the policy-making process.
For example, in Denmark in the early 1970s, the value-orientation
of technology was strongly emphasized by the rising environmental
movements. And this was typified by a statement in the first issue of
the Organization for Information about Nuclear Power (OOA)
magazine in 1974: "a nuclear power plant is not just a technical
installation. It is a factor that has social, strategic, moral and
ecological perspectives which affect every Dane. Therefore reactor
experts are not omnipotent in this issue" (Jamison 1990, 1996,
1997, 1998).
Partly, this crisis arose as a result of the inadequacy of science in a
period when scientific understanding critical to political and
regulatory decisions - has more often than not been shown to be
incomplete. Among the scientific community, the issue of scientific
uncertainty has been expressed in public in various adversarial
ways and with sparring experts giving differing data that tend to
cancel each other out. At the same time, however, the reductionist
policy communities who are still dependent on the positivist
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approach to policy making are unable to deal with such scientific
ambivalence in matters of grave importance - for example in the UK
in the face of the BSE scandal (in 1996).
Partly, also, this crisis can also be attributed to the loss of public
esteem in governmental, scientific or industrial authorities' claims
(based on scientific rationality) that everything is under control in
the wake of emergencies such as "mad cow disease" (cf Beck, 1995).
For example, in 1996, the announcement by the then British
Minister of Health that there was a probable connection between
new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) and Bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) brought to an end a decade of
governmental reassurances that on the basis of scientific evidence,
BSE could not be transmitted to humans. This scandal brought to a
head the growing crisis of public confidence in scientific advice
across Europe. Calls were made for the scientific and science policy
establishments to be reformed, in order to equip them for
alternative types of technology assessment and policy-making; that
is, types which integrated risk issues as major elements within the
policy process. Nevertheless, even though the critics had an anti-
technocratic aura, they did not deny the value and use of
technological or natural scientific knowledge as such. Rather the
contrary. They wanted the scientific production of knowledge to be a
tool which served democracy rather than a force that replaced it. In
Denmark, this is exemplified by the production of an alternative
energy plan in 1976 by members of the Organization for Information
about Nuclear Power (OOA) together with some university scientists
as an attempt to democratize the political role of science. In fact, the
OOA members were both local groups and professional-like national
secretariat as activists together with a built in network of contact
persons in the parliament, the state administration and among
scientists (Christianson, 1977).
Thus, as society has continually confronted threats resulting from
scientific and technological developments, public debate has
gradually de-constructed the myth of the preeminence of science (cf
Beck, 1995). As fear of risks has grown, not least in the face of
actual technological threats, there has been intense debate on the
need to mobilize alternative forms of expert advice to policy-makers
- that is, forms that will continue to use science, but in the service
of a quite different cause. For example, in Germany in the late-
1970s, new scientific institutes like "Oeko- Institutes" were founded
to support resistance to nuclear energy with scientific knowledge.
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This earlier institutionalization of the anti-nuclear and
environmental movements in Germany, Sweden and Denmark
paved the way for later opposition to modern biotechnology. In these
countries, the energy and experience gained in earlier political
protests were carried forward into the engagement with
biotechnology in the late-1980s and 1990s. In Denmark, for
example, NOAH, the Danish environmental activists who in a
dramatic way started the new environment movement in 1969
became a major actor in the conflict over biotechnology (Jamison
1996).
While these have been important trends in many European
countries, it should be remembered that techno-scientific rationality
has continued to have its advocates. For example, some members of
the scientific community have continued to view any and all
criticism of the role of science in public policy-making as
misconceived. In one notable case in 1997, a high profile French
described the French Government's decision to ban the cultivation
of genetically modified maize as, "scientific racism and genetic
determinism based on an erroneous concept of genetics" (Nature,
Vol. 385 p. 667).
Debates about public accountability
The mounting criticism of traditional science-based policy-making
has been accompanied by calls for greater openness and public
accountability. In Denmark, in the late 1970s, values stressing a
form of open democracy became essential amongst the
environmental movements in their confrontation with the
established political climate and its nuclear vision. The pressure for
public accountability was seen in the emergence of concern about
"transparency" in the policy- making process. By transparency in
this context, is meant not merely that what is done should be seen
to be done, but also that what is done is open to a wider range of
public interests and influences. Generally, as in German and
Netherlands, there have been calls for the gathering of new forms of
intelligence about the public's concerns and aspirations, and for
tighter links between policy-making and democratic processes.
Currently, in the UK and France, there is increased emphasis on
the need to explore new participatory processes such as "people's
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parliaments", "citizens' juries", "consensus conferences" and public
hearings, as ways of bringing public influence into the policy-
making and regulatory process. This is combined with demands for
the opening up of hitherto closed committees and expert advisory
groups, in order to make these more obviously accountable; and
there has been growing interest in the possibility of incorporating a
wider range of disciplines and forms of expertise (including
alternative and even "lay" experts) in policy-making processes. All of
these trends signal the expansion of democracy; all of them point
towards a growing tendency to make the representatives of science
and industry justify themselves in public (cf Schomberg, 1997).
In Denmark, this demand for transparency and openness had its
peak throughout the late-1980s and early-1990s. Particularly, it
was not until 1985 that the technology assessment moved from the
closed circles between politicians, specialists and professional
technology assessors, into a more public sphere where NGOs and
the genera] public more explicitly were involved in the process.
Indeed, in Denmark, the public debate about biotechnology like the
public debates about nuclear energy, was initiated by activists
rather than experts. And it was this debate that led to the
enactment of the world's first law on gene-technology and the
environment. In 1986, a technology assessment board, the
Parliamentary Technology Board was established with the
responsibility for assessing and informing about biotechnology.
Although the Technology Board played an important role in
organizing debates and initiatives of many different kinds, the
consensus conference is perhaps their best known contribution to
the development of methods for technology assessment involving the
public, The strong influence of consensus building in environmental
and technology policy processes and efforts has made it possible to
recognize the interests of a wider variety of national groups. But the
initiation of consensus conferences by the Danish Board of
Technology is an example of a regular means of providing citizen
participation in public debate and policy-making while the green
coalitions serve as mediators in the formulation and implementation
of public policies. Like the Netherlands, the Danish strong civic
culture of "people's enlightenment tradition", together with the
pressure from the environmental activist, has influenced the mode
of technology assessment, characterized by a relative openness to
public opinion and public support to information about critical as
well as positive aspects of new technologies. Today, this mode of
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public assessment is institutionalized in the parliamentary Board of
Technology, where a lot of effort is put into the further elaboration
and invention of new methods to involve the public in decisions
about new technology. This development has been observed by
many international observers as a democratic way of handling the
introduction of new technologies. This is contrary to modes of
technological assessment in Britain where as it were, there has been
a (relatively) limited scope for formal participation by environmental
groups or other organized civic interests in environmental or science
and technology policies (cf. Jamison, 1996). Even more clearly, this
Danish tradition is contrary to France where, throughout the last
two and a half decades, a technocratic elite has continued to set the
agenda for national science and technology policy.
Concluding Summary
The debates that have been described in this part of the thesis
reveal that the past two or three decades have witnessed a crisis in
traditional science and technology policy-making, In a sense, almost
everyone involved in this area has been discontented. Industrialists
have wanted the benefits of modern technologies to be fully tapped;
wThile greens have been frustrated that broader social concerns are
not integrated more closety into the regulatory process. Regulators
have been troubled by the fact that very often scientists do not
deliver single, clear answers to difficult and yet crucial policy
questions; while scientists have felt that governments expect too
much of them in the face of inevitable and intractable scientific
uncertainty. And as if all this were not bad enough, the general
public has also been dissatisfied about the failure of policy
processes properly to take into account general citizen concerns;
while politicians, industrialists and scientists in return have tended
to see the public as ignorant and irrational. It is in the context of
such widespread discontent that continuing attempts to engineer
public acceptance of new technologies - and to brush off the
responsibility for negative consequences of new technology when
these arise - have led to the collapse of public confidence in the
regulatory process as a whole. Small wonder, then, that as we
prepare for the new millennium many participants in the debate
about modern biotechnology believe that the issues we face will only
be successfully resolved by putting in place new, more soundly
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based debate and decision-making/ policy implementation
processes.
Integrative Summary
According to the theory of reflexive modernisation, under conditions
of reflexive modernity scientific knowledge is acknowledged to be
uncertain and open to contest. In particular, there is a general
awareness of the unawareness of side-effects that can accompany
the introduction and application of new technologies - this
awareness has become the motor of social changes rather than the
instrumental linear rationality. Because science has failed to predict
rare events with any great accuracy, within reflexive modernity
reductionist models become utterly inadequate tools for science and
technology policy-making; and scientific and technological modes of
policy assessment cease to be driven b}^  economic interests or the
imperatives of international competitiveness. It is because of this
development that, within reflexive modernity, there is a crisis of
public confidence in science accompanied by calls for the
integration of sociological approaches within the science and
technology polic}^ process; in short, under the condition of reflexive
modernity more than merely technical issues force themselves into
public debate about science and technology. As this happens, so
pressure builds for the democratisation of science and technology
policy-making. The theory of three faces of policy analysis warns
that, in any policy analysis, we should not be blind to the symbiotic
relationship that may exist between science and politics. More
particularly, the theory warns us that such symbiosis may
undermine democracy within the policy making and policy
implementation processes , as science becomes politicised and/or
politics comes to wear the mask of knowledge. According to the
theory of the three faces of policy analysis, more often than not in
science and technology policy-making or implementation processes,
science and politics may support one another in a form of mutual
dependence that frustrates efforts aimed at democratising the
science and technology policy arena. And finally, the section science
and technology policy landscape claims that, as it is now, everyone
involved in this area of public sector is discontented by the status
quo and the section proposes that the issues we face will only be
successfully resolved by putting in place new, more soundly based
debate and decision-making/policy implementation processes.
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Thus far, the thesis has laid down a conceptual and theoretical
framework. The concepts and the theories that have been described
will be used in the next section as tools for conceptualizing and
ascribing meaning to the Danish mode of implementing law 288 (on
gene-technology and the environment) and its subsequent revisions.
Throughout the analysis, the thesis will explore the extent to which
the Danish mode of implementing law 288 (and it's subsequent
revisions) is an example of a policy implementation process under
conditions of reflexive modernity. In line with this, the thesis will
analyse how science was fed into the polic)^ implementation process
and, particularly, the relationship between science and politics.
Finally, with a view to considering the implications of the case study
for current sociological theories of decision-making in sceptical
contexts, explicitly (with reference to the reflexive modernization
theory and the theory of three faces of policy analysis), the thesis
will analyse:
• how risk was conceptualized and treated throughout the policy
implementation process;
• the risk issues that were taken into consideration throughout the
policy implementation processes;
• how the Danish government dealt with scientific uncertainty in
the policy implementation process;
• the mode of technology assessment that was applied in the policy
implementation process (reductionist/technocratic or
participatory);
• the key interests that informed policy decisions;
• the key issues that were taken into account in the policy
implementation process;
• how the policy implementation process dealt with public concern
and public criticism of gene technology;
• how science was fed into the policy process and particularly, the
relationship between science and politics; and
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the explicit and/or implicit basis for the responsible authority's
recommendation to exempt these applications/notifications
under the terms of law.
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Chapter 3
Regulating the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Plants in
Denmark: The Case of Danisco's Round up ready Sugar and
Fodder Beets
Introduction
This chapter analyses the policy implementation processes involved
in the regulation of modern agricultural biotechnology. It considers
the wa3' in which the Danish government responded to a series of
release and market applications, later notifications submitted by the
largest plant breeding company, Danisco, in respect of new
genetically modified varieties of sugar beets and/or fodder beets.
The analysis is grounded in contemporary sociological and policy
science theories concerning the nature of policy-making processes
under the conditions of "reflexive modernity". And it is based on a
close reading of a large number of documents (notification
documents; risk assessment reports; minutes of meetings or
telephone conversations; internal correspondence documents or
material amongst the competent authorities: correspondence
documents or material between Danisco and the respective
competent authorities; exemption documents; annual reports on
most of the release research; parliamentary reports; parliamentary
debates; press reportage; exemption documents; laws; statutory
orders; EU Directives, etc) produced in response to Danisco's
release and market notifications between 1988 and 1997. Within
this period. Danisco submitted not less that six deliberate release
notifications (and not to mention several addendum notifications)
and one market notification.
In the course of my research, 1 found myself flooded with hundreds
of documents that seemed almost impossible to analyse. However,
since the first objective was to identify the key features of the policy-
implementation process that were involved in this particular case -
a number of questions were formulated as criteria for reviewing the
large volume of empirical evidence. These questions included: How
did the competent authority characterise and deal with the
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notifications? What were the key steps in the policy-implementation
process? What administrative and legal procedures were employed
in the assessment of the notifications, and what influence did these
formal structures have upon the course of the policy process? How
did the policy process identify and resolve the key questions to be
addressed? What resources (evidence, etc.) were deployed in
answering these key questions? What kinds of arguments were
deployed in the evidence, and how were they evaluated? Who were
the key actors in the debate? How did they frame the issues, and
what arguments did they deploy?
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section recapitulates
the administrative and legal procedures employed in the policy
implementation process. In addition, it sketches out the delegated
roles and responsibilities of the competent authorities (at the
administrative level) who have been entrusted with providing advice
to government. The thesis shows how the legal and administrative
frameworks implicitly or explicitly circumscribed certain aspects
while influencing course taken by the policy implementation
process.
Debates about modern biotechnology have been dominated by
discussions about risk. Consequently, risk assessment has been
seen as a crucial element within effective biotechnology policies. In
the next section, the thesis considers the risk aspects of the policy
implementation process. The principles, rationale and benchmark of
the risk assessments involved are all considered. The thesis
delineates the issues that were deliberated on during the risk
assessments, and assesses the conclusion that was drawn by the
competent authorities and a conclusion that was similar in all the
notifications. The chief paradigms of the risk assessment that was
similar in all the notifications are characterised. The argument is
made that the presumptions incorporated in the risk assessment
process itself actually determined the kind of questions that were
asked, the kind of answers that were obtained, and hence the kind
of policy advice that was offered to the government.
The next section reviews the value and political orientations of the
key participants in the policy implementation process. And how
these values are persistent in all the notifications' deliberation.
These include the Danish environmental activists, other interested
organizations, political parties and the government. For each
participant group, the thesis characterises their rationales, their
66
frames and their actual position on the development of genetically
modified sugar beets and/or fodder beets in Denmark. Here, it is
argued that basic interests and ideologies determined the frames,
rationales, and the policy advocate of all the key participant groups.
The general conclusion of the analysis is that throughout the policy
process the Danish government consistently maintained a wholly
supportive stance towards the development of modern agricultural
biotechnology, and this was in spite of the limitations of scientific
knowledge about short- and long-term effects of the release of
genetically modified organisms into the environment. Faced with a
potentially sceptical and risk-averse public, the Danish government
developed a sophisticated policy infrastructure that - while it gave
every appearance of being well-informed, cautious, careful and
responsible - actually by doing so, the government facilitated the
continued development of agricultural biotechnology in Denmark.
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Regulating the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Crops in
Denmark
In response to the risk debate of the 1980s (where
environmentalists had succeeded in branding GMOs as an atypical
danger), a Danish Green Parliamentary majority enacted a law on
Gene-technology and the Environment (law 288 of 4 June 1986).
This made Denmark the first country in the world to adopt a law on
gene-technology and the environment.
The aforementioned law banned any release of the genetically
modified organisms or cells. This included any release — be it for
industrial production, non-industrial production (such as in an
individual household, for example, private gardens or private
greenhouses) or for research purposes. This was stipulated before
any transgenic plants were ready for field release.
The law was designed to prevent hazards. Hazards that had not yet
been documented. In fact, the Danish government had stipulated
that there was a lack of experience with the release (of the
genetically modified organisms or cells). For example, during a
parliamentary (enquiry) debate that took place before the law was
enacted, the Minister of Environment was asked what mechanisms
she was going to put in place so as to safeguard the highest security
to the environment, ecology, human or animal health. The Minister
answered:
"Are there hazardous environmental, ecological, bio-diversity, animal or human health
risks that might accompany the use of genetically modified organisms? Genetically
modified organisms are alien to our world. We do not have any history or basic
experience that we can build upon ... We have to take into consideration any negative
environmental or ecological impacts that may accompany this technology. Otherwise, if
the worst comes to the worst, we might do irretrievable damage to the environment or the
eco-system ... Thus, it is the government's position that we should put in place a public
regulatory mechanism to control the genetic engineering development" (my translation,
my italics)54.
Similarly, the government indicated that the then existing natural
science knowledge of the accompanying effects, could not be
considered as adequate for predicting and hence evaluating the
respective impacts — for example to the environment. For example,
in a statement sent to the various competent authorities and/ or
other agencies, the Danish Environment Protection Agency, stated
that:
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"we lack experience with the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms or cells
into the environment. The existing natural scientific knowledge on the effects that would
accompany a deliberate release of the new genetically modified organisms into the
environment cannot be considered adequate for predicting environmental consequences
that may accompany such a release"(my translation)55.
For this reason, the government decided that risk assessments can
be undertaken in accordance with the internationally recommended
(OECD) guidelines56. The OECD guidelines recommended that, with
specific reference to agricultural and environmental applications,
Member countries should:
"a) use the existing considerable data on the environmental and human health effects of
living organisms to guide risk assessments;
b) ensure that recombinant DNA organisms are evaluated for potential risk, prior to
applications in agriculture and the environment by means of an independent review of
potential risks on a case-by-case basis ;
c) conduct the development of recombinant DNA organisms for agricultural or
environmental applications in a step wise fashion, moving, where appropriate, from the
laboratory to the growth chamber and greenhouse, to limited field testing and finally, to
large-scale field testing;
d) encourage further research to improve the prediction, evaluation, and monitoring of
the outcome of applications of recombinant DNA organisms"07.
This position could have easily been misinterpreted and thus to
mean that according to the Danish government, genetically modified
organisms were potentially hazardous, unmanageable and at that
unwanted in Denmark. However, law 288 §'11, line 3, stipulated
that the Minister of Environment (or the one that has been
delegated such authority) could under special circumstances
exempt a given application from the law and hence grant permission
for such a release.
Soon after its enactment, the law was reproached by proponents of
modern biotechnology, particularly the biotechnology industries as
untenable. And the regulation was unjustly satirized for implying
that GMOs were congenital^ hazardous. Surely, the government
was wholly aware that these perceptions must be accommodated if
the government was to encourage biotechnology investments and/
or economic competitiveness. This is clearly exemplified by a
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statement made by the Minister of Environment during the
parliamentary deliberation of Danisco's initial notification:
"We hear so many times that the environmental demands are blocking industrial
development due to the slow and tedious process of undertaking environmental risk
assessments; ...we often hear the complaints that the law is very restrictive. It should
be;...but I think we should annihilate the myth that the Ministry of Environment delays
industrial activities. It does not. We are willing to co-operate with the industries" (my
translation)58.
And though the government was also committed to ensure that the
advances in scientific knowledge v/ere constantly taken into account
and that regulatory control was based on potential risks, the
interests of the industrial community remained paramount
throughout this period. For example, during the deliberation of the
release notification in 1992, the government in one of its internal
note stated that:
"Danisco controls approximately 10-15% of the world sugar beet and fodder beet
market. The doubling of the market would involve a 3-4 times increase of the current
profit. A decisive factor for this will be the development of transgenic sugar-beet and
fodder beet with tolerance to Round up and rhizomania virus. Danisco estimated back in
1989 that the new transgenic variety would bring home a revenue of hundreds of
millions;... The gene technology and environment law is aimed at protecting the
environment and thus it's stipulation is restrictive; but this should be relaxed as long as
the acquired experience shows that the release will be safe (my translation)50.
When in 1991 the European Commission adopted the EU-Directive
90/220 on Gene-technology and the Environment, in accordance
with the Directive, Denmark revised the 1986 Gene-technology and
the Environment law to adopt the stipulations of the above EU
Directive. The government successfully proposed a 1991 revision
that transposed an approval procedure (Law, 356/91 on Gene-
technology and the Environment). Justifying this change, regulators
argued that sufficient experience had been gained to ensure safety
and that the risks had now become manageable.
The Environment Ministry decided to build up its in-house expertise
— rather than establishing a special advisory committee. During the
parliamentary negotiations (of the gene-technology and
environment law), the then Minister of Environment promised that
with the first application for release — the Minister would submit a
statement to the parliament. The statement could initiate a debate
in the house for discussing the principal aspects related with the
respective case. And before the Minister made a final decision on
the application, the application was to be submitted to the
Parliamentary Environment and Planning Committee (Folketingets
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Miljø- og Planlægnings Udvalg — hereafter FMPU) for a political
orientation. Through this Ministry-Parliament dialogue, Danish
politicians implicitly shared the responsibility for the value
judgments in risk assessment, and such judgments were made
more accessible to public scrutiny.
In accordance with the EU Directive ( 90/220/EEC), the Danish law
(L356/91) on Gene-technology and the Environment stipulates the
demands on the information that the applicant is obliged to deliver
(about the modified plant). It also stipulates the demands on the
side of the concerned government authority's time scale for
deliberating the notification while notifying other EU member
states.
Administrative Procedures
In accordance with Law 356/91 on Gene-technology and the
Environment, it is forbidden to release transgenic plants or
organisms into the environment. This is either for research purpose
or for marketing without first — notifying the Minister of
Environment and Energy.
Thus, if an organization plans to release or market a given
transgenic plant — the organization in question must submit a
release or market notification to the Minister of Environment (later,
when in October 1994 the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry
of Energy were merged, the notifications were to be submitted to the
Minister of Environment and Energy).
The Danish Environmental Protection Agency (Miljøstyrelsen)
hereafter EPA was given the overall responsibility for administrating
and co-ordinating the risk assessment procedures for purposes of
policy advice. The Danish National Forest and Nature Protection
Agency (Skov- og Naturstyrelsen — hereafter SNS) was given the
responsibility of overseeing the ecological risk assessments'
competent authority. The National Food Agency
(Levnemiddelstyreisen — hereafter NFA) together with the Danish
Institute of Toxicology were appointed as the competent authority
for conducting toxicological risk assessments. The Ministry of
Agriculture together with the Danish Plant Directorate
(Plantedirektoratet — hereafter MA and PD respectively) became the
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competent authority for evaluating any accompanying agricultural
impacts. And EPA together with the Danish Institute of
Environment Research (DMU) oversees the effects of resistance and
effects of Round up use. (Throughout this analysis, I will sometimes
refer to these agencies as the (so called) competent authorities or CA
as it is commonplace in the policy jargon).
Similarly, EPA sends a summary of the notification to the rest of the
EU member states and to local interest or affected organizations. On
the basis of the competent authority's evaluation and the hearing
answers from the interest organizations — EPA draws up a
recommendation of approval (or rejection) for the Minister of
Environment and Energy. As mentioned beforehand, before the
Minister makes a final decision on the notification, the notification
and the draft approval document are submitted to the
Parliamentary Environment and Planning Committee (Folketingets
Miljø- og Planlægnings Udvalg - hereafter FMPU) for a political
orientation.
Law 356/91 (on Gene-technology and the Environment) stipulates
that the competent (government) authority should answer the
concerned organization within SO days (after the submission of the
notification). If the given authority demands additional information
(to be delivered by the concerned organization), the time that the
authority is awaiting this information is not really considered by the
law.
If one of the EU member states demands supplementary
information to the information the summary statements (or the
government has some comments on the given release), there is a
respite of 30 days. Similarly, the Danish interest organizations are
given 30 days to give their comments while stating their position.
According to Højland and Svart, if the responsible government does
not respond within the deadline (90 days), the notifier can interpret
this as an approval. This is the reason why the given releaser
notifies rather than submits an application of deliberate release (or
marketing) to the governing authority (see the figure one below)60.
However, it should be noted here that this is the Danish competent
authority's interpretation of the EU Directive - a common problem
with how the different Member States interpret the scope and
meaning of the EU Directive. For, actually, § 5, line 1 of Directive
90/220 states clearly that:
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"any person, before undertaking a deliberate release of a GMO, or a combination of
GMOs, for the purposes of research and development, or for any other purposes than for
placing on the market must submit a notification to the competent authority".
And §6, line 4 of Directive 90/220 states that:
"The notifier may proceed with the release only when he has received the written consent
of the competent authority, and in conformity v/ith any conditions required in this
consent".
figure one:
Virksomhed:
Anmeldelse:
Indstilling til ministeren:
Resume af anmeldelse:
FMPU:
IFT:
SNS:
PD:
MST:
Interesseorg:
Ministeren:
EU:
dage:
i alt:
Notifier
Notification
Statement (recommendation) to the Minister
Summary of the notification
Parliamentary Environment and Planning Committee (Folketingets Miljr-
og PlanlFgnings Udvalg)
VFD Veterinary and Food Directorate (Institutet for Fødevaresikkerhed og
Toxicologi.
The Danish National Forest and Nature Protection Agency (Skov- og
Naturstyrelsen)
Danish Plant Directorate (Plantedirektoratet)
Danish EPA ( Miljøstyrelsen)
Interest organizations.
The Minister of Environment and Energy
EU
days
Altogether
(Svart, Hans Erik and Højland, Jan Grundvig. Genmodificerede planter - en trussel mod dansk natur? I:
Regulering og Status. In Urt, 21. Årgang nr. 4. Nov. 1997. (my translation).
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Marketing
With the marketing (in the EU), the given concern chooses the land
it wishes to hand in the notification.
The country where the notification is submitted has 90 days to
deliberate on environmental, agricultural, animal or human health
risks. If the deliberation is positive and as such the given country
supports an approval — the country sends the notification to the
EU-member states. And a recommendation that the transgenic
plants should be approved for marketing in the Common Market.
The rest of the member countries have 30 days to state their
position. If only one country objects the approval, the case is
handed over to the EU Revision Committee that is set up by the EU
Commission. Here, the Commission produces a provisional draft
(decision) that is voted on. With a qualified majority's vote (to the
Commissions' draft approval) — the marketing is hereby approved. If
there is no qualified majority, the Commission at once presents the
Council with a proposal to the arrangement that would be meet. The
Councils decision also is to be based on a qualified majority. See the
figure below.
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figure two
Indstilling til
ministeren
Virksomhed:
Anmeldelse:
Indstilling til ministeren:
FMPU:
MST:
Interesseorg:
Ministeren:
EU:
dage:
i alt:
Notitier
Notification
Statement (recommendation) to the Minister
Parliamentary Environment and Planning Committee (Folketingets Miljr
og PlanlFgnings Udvalg)
Danish EPA (Miljøstyrelsen)
Interest organizations.
The Minister of Environment and Energy
EU
days
Altogether
(Svart, Hans Erik and Højland, Jan Grundvig. Genmodificerede planter - en trussel mod dansk natur? I:
Regulering og Status. In Urt, 21. Årgang ur. 4. Nov. 1997. (my translation).
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Evaluation of a Notification
In accordance with Law 356/91 (on Gene-technology and
Environment), the responsible government and the releaser should
ensure that the release (of the genetically engineered organisms
either for research or for the commercial production) does not result
into any unwanted impacts — either on the environment, the
ecology, the agriculture nor on human or animal health.
As stipulated by the above law, before any release is undertaken, an
ecological, agricultural, environmental and human/animal health
risk assessment of the effects that could follow such a release must
be carried out. Thus, the given firm in its notification letter — must
expound on the effects and the risks that may accompany such a
release. The releaser must also establish all the necessary
information for evaluating the planned research. If need be, the
project proponent should provide supplementary information for the
assessment of the given case. The law with accordance to the EU
Directive 90/220 stipulates that ecological, toxicological,
agricultural and environmental risk assessments must be
submitted by the applicant for the purposes of deliberation.
Similarly, the Directive stipulates that the concerned governing
authority has 90 days for deliberating the given notification while
informing the other EU member states.
The Pre-cautionary Principle
In accordance with Law 356/91 on Gene-technology and
Environment, all release trials should be evaluated partly, on step
by step principle and partly, on case by case.
The step by step procedure implies that the release should occur
gradually in a selected area in the laboratoiy to a confinement area
in the small-scale field trial. During the first few steps of the field
release trials, it is demanded that isolation measures should be put
in place to confine the genetically modified plant and the inserted
genes from the surrounding environment. If there are no observed
(adverse) differences between the modified and the non modified
plants, the research can then proceed to the next step. And if the
following step also shows that the genetically modified plant does
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not differ from the non-genetically modified plant, the trial can
proceed to the large-scale release with lesser and lesser confinement
measures and finally, the procedure can proceed to the market
approval step.
Every step in this process shall be evaluated and approved before
the concerned releaser can proceed to the next step. This process is
meant to ascertain that the genetically modified plant differs from
the non-modified plant only by the inserted traits. Similarly, the
process should generate knowledge that is necessary for evaluating
the following step.
The case by case evaluation procedure implies that every case is
handled in isolation. Therefore, it does not relax the handling of a
given case just because there was an earlier case similar to the one
in question or that a different plant has the same inserted
characteristics as an earlier approved plant.
Though the law was generally welcomed by the opponents of modern
biotechnology, the precautionary principle was attacked as pretentious. Take for
example the adoption of the OECD instructions on the process:
"of progressively decreasing physical containment, by which micro-organisms and higher
organisms are developed routinely for agricultural and environmental applications - i.e.
research in the laboratory, research in microcosms and other contained environments,
small field testing, and large field testing, allows a logical, incremental step-wise process
whereby safety and performance data are collected. In this development process, the
organism is characterized and carefully obssrved at each stage and a prediction can be
made of its behavior in subsequent less confined stages of development"61.
The opponents argued that in the procedure, there is no definition
of a step, evidence for safety nor environmental harm and that the
law only provides the procedures for defining these terms in
practice. Most notably, this adoption of the precautionary principle
was denigrated in 1989-1990 when Danisco made its first field
release application and a risk assessment - even before the firm had
carried out a green house research (see table 1). And the
government was criticized for deliberating and approving the first
deliberate release even before the greenhouse research and its
result were complete. The critics satirized the risk assessment
procedure as specious while incrementally relaxing crucial safety
demands or procedures. By contrast, the Danish biotechnology
industries and the proponents of modern biotechnology denigrated
the procedure as slow, time consuming and tedious. And for that
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reason - arduous while deterring the development of the
biotechnology industries in Denmark02.
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Evaluating Risks
According to Jan Grundvig Højland and Hans Erik Svart - the
Forest and Nature Protection Agency's Competent Authority - risk
assessment of the effects that may accompany the release of
genetically modified plants is a field that is very young while based
on a limited basic experience and yet, still under development. For
this reason, according to Højland and Svart, in actual
implementation processes, problem formulations (for example the
ecological ones) are often very complex and do not necessarily give a
single and meaningful answer. This is for example the actual
impacts that ma)' accompany a release in a given ecosystem and its
surrounding environment. Because of this, according to Højland
and Svart, the role of the competent authority is only to throw some
light on all the impacts that may accompany a given release- be it to
the environment or ecology while trying to develop some measures
that may mitigate any unwanted consequences63.
In accordance with the law on gene-technology and the
environment, the following elements must be taken as a benchmark
for each and every risk assessment:
• Identifying the characteristics of the genetically modified plant,
that is:
1. Information of the non-modified plant (habitat, spreading biology
and its interaction with the ecosystem).
2. The genetic modification (the inserted gene, donor and vector).
3. A comparison of the genetically modified plant and the non
genetically modified plant, that is the changing of the plants'
interaction with the ecosystem.
• The information on the release
1. The objective and the extent of the release
2. The geographic placing and the duration of the release
3. The information of the ecosystem where the release was to take
place
• The environment of the release area, that is:
1. A description of the ecosystem of the release area
2. Information of earlier releases in the same area or other
ecosystems.
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• The interaction of the aforementioned (bullet) points 1-3
• The ecological risk assessment should include the following
effects:
1. Survival, spreading and establishment of the genetically modified
plants
2. The transfer of the genetic modification to other plant
3. The change of the genetically modified plant's biotic and a-biotic
interaction
4. The use of the genetically modified plant
5. The loss of genetic diversity
• The ecological risk assessments procedure:
1. The identification of all the potential effects of the genetically
modified plants
2. Consequences of the identified risks
3. The possibility of realizing these risks
4. An evaluation of the consequences of these risks
5. A total risk assessment64
The Criteria for Risk Assessments
As it evident from the above elements, the benchmark of the CA's
risk assessment is the non-genetically modified plants' biology. This
knowledge is then compared with the inserted genetic
characteristics.
Thereafter, according to Højland and Svart, the nature of the
genetically modified plant is compared with the non-genetically
modified plant. This is for example the phenotypic and the genotypic
characteristics; competitiveness and their ability to establish
outside the planted area together with the plants possible effects on
the food chain65.
Phenotype:
Here the CA evaluates if the genetically modified plant differs from
the non-genetically modified plant. This is for example the plant's
size, the flowering duration, yield and the percentage of the
germinating seeds66.
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Competitive ability:
Here, the CA evaluates if the genetically modified plants have a big
competitive ability in the eco-system than it is common with non-
modified plants. This is for example, if the inserted characteristics
might make the modified plants survive in low temperatures or
resist diseases or viruses.
Ability to establish:
This is divided into two types. The ability of the genetically modified
plant to establish in nature or the transfer of the inserted traits to
other related species. For example, the CA evaluates if the
genetically modified plant can spread to other areas outside the
research or the cultivated area. And if so, what aspects might
influence its competitive ability - such as the presence of a cross-
pollination partner where the modified trait would be transferred
from the cultivated plant to related wild species.
Impact on the Food Chain:
This is evaluated on the basis of the knowledge of the non-
genetically modified plants' role in the food chain and the possibility
of the inserted gene's characteristics changing this aspect.
According to Højland and Svart, the dimension of the evaluation on
the single plant is naturally dependent on the knowledge of the
respective plant's ability to establish (in the Danish nature) and the
knowledge of it's possibility to cross-pollinate (with it's related (wild)
species). Another aspect that they deem meaningful is whether the
respective (plant's) risk assessment is meant for research or for
marketing (ibid).
Release Research:
The objective of the evaluation here is to ascertain that the
genetically modified plant or its gene does not spread to the
environment. Through different confinement measures, the
spreading of the genetically modified plants and its gene from the
research area is reduced. This is done in different ways depending
on the reproductive biology of the given plant. For example, a
physical distance is ensured between the wild species and the
cultivated plants that could become a crossing partner. Another
alternative is to surround the genetically manipulated plant with a
buffer zone or releasing a sterile plant. These measures are meant
to minimize any possibility for cross-pollination between genetically
modified plants and other related species or non-genetically
modified plant of the same species — argue Højland and Svart (ibid).
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Moreover, according to Højland and Svart, it is the responsibility of
the CA to ensure that certain mechanisms are put in place for
monitoring the research area. Similarly, the CA must ensure that
with time - the research produces crucial information for the
understanding of the transgenic plant's ability to survive or
germinate in the future. Besides the confinement measures, with
time, it becomes necessaiy to release the modified plant in its
natural habitat in order to garner information on its ability to
tolerate winter. Garnering such information is deemed crucial for
purposes of future evaluations and most notably, for analyzing
future market notifications (ibid.).
Marketing:
According to Højland and Svart, as in field release approval, in a
market notification, the CA evaluates the risk assessments that the
releaser has undertaken in connection with the development of the
given genetically modified plant. Some of the questions that they
raise are for example: Is there any possibility that the genetically
modified plant is different from the non-modified plant? Has the
releaser carried out assessments on whether the inserted
characteristics are meaningful for the plant's possibility to establish
in the natural plant's habitat? Is there (for example) assessment of
the effects of the inserted characteristic that falls short of what is
expected of them? What effects could the inserted characteristics
have on the food chain?(ibid.)
For the risk assessments of a marketing notification, as a starting
point and like in the release notification, the CA evaluates whether
the species in question can hybridize with wild species — even if it's
on a limited frequency. This is important because if so - this implies
that spreading would occur before or beside the release. In this
case, the important question then is - can the (new) inserted
characteristics involve unwanted effects67.
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The Case of Danisco's (DDS) Round up Ready Sugar/Fodder-beet
In accordance with the law on gene technology and the
environment, between 1989 and 1997, the Danish plant breeding
company, Danisco (hereafter Danisco, DDS, releaser or applicant) -
and later, in a joint venture with the Danish company, DLF-
Trilifolium - made no less than six deliberate release notifications to
the Minister of Environment and Energy for the exemption to
release (and finally market) Round up ready sugar beets and/ or
fodder beets. The sugar beets and/or fodder beets were engineered
to resist the weed killer Round-up (produced by Monsanto
Company, St. Louis, USA) — a herbicide that is recognized by the
Danish regulatory authority and the rhizomania virus. Most of the
releases were carried out on Danisco's (Maribo Frø) plot in Holeby,
Nykøbing68.
According to Danisco, the Round up ready beets (and later fodder
beets) had been transformed using the Agrobacterium tumefaciens
plasmid pMON 17204. According to Danisco, the plasmid contained
both right and left border sequences. Four genes were placed
between the borders: two coding for glyphosate tolerance (cp4 epsps
gene from Agrobacterium sp. strain CP3. and gox), one, a colour
marker [uidA) and the last coded for kanamycin resistance {nptll).
Sequences necessary for replication and selection (streptomycin
resistance) of the plasmid were placed outside the borders 69.
Initially, the deliberate release research involved only a limited
number of genotype. Throughout the release research, Danisco
wanted to assess how genetically modified sugar or fodder beets
expressed themselves in comparison with non-modified sugar or
fodder beets. Besides, DDS wanted to assess the modified sugar
beet and/or fodder beet's degree of tolerance to round-up. However,
in the 1997 market notification, Danisco wanted to produce and
handle Round up ready fodder beets70.
According to Danisco, the research was designed to enable the firm
to assess the possibility of producing genetically manipulated sugar-
and or fodder beets while also developing the firm's improvement
process. Similarly, with the research, DDS wanted to assess if there
were any prospects in, or the appropriateness of an incessant
investment in the genetic engineering technic and the adjacent
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technology. Moreover, DDS hoped that the research would procure
useful information that could be used for the future evaluation of
risks that would accompany the release of genetically modified
plants71.
The first few deliberate releases involved only genetically
manipulated sugar-beet. As from January 1993, Danisco together
with another plant breeding company, DLF-Trolifolium started to
make parallel deliberate releases with genetically modified fodder
beets . The fodder beets were also sequenced to code tolerance to
round up72.
By February 1997 (together with the marketing notification), the
releaser had made no less than 6 deliberate release applicatiosn/
notifications and 1 market approval notification (see table 1) in
Denmark.
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THE CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS FOLLOWING THE
DELIBERATE RELEASE APPLICATIONS/NOTIFICATIONS.
DATE
04-06-1986
27-12-1988
17-05-1989
24-05-1989
30-06-1989
30-06-1989
18-12-1989
07-02-1990
12-02-1990
EVENT
The Gene technology and the Environment law
(Law 288) was enacted.
Maribo Frø submitted the 1st application to
release genetically modified sugar-beets in a
small scale field release research.
The Minister of Environment delivers a written
statement about the 1st deliberate release
notification to the parliament.
A parliamentary debate based on the Minister of
Environment's statement about the 1st release
notification.
Parliamentary Environment and Planning
Committee submitted a report commenting on
the Minister of Environment's statement on the
deliberate release research.
The Minister of Environment conditionally
exempted Maribo Frø's 1st notification. The full
exemption was to be determined by the results
of the Maribo Frø's on-going greenhouse
research results and other risk assessment
results.
Maribo Frø submitted a risk assessment of the
1st notification on the Minister's demand.
The first release application was given a full
exemption.
Maribo Frø submitted a comparative assessment
report of the results of the greenhouse
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23-04-1990
23-07-1990
31-10-1990
02-11-1990
01-02-1991
21-02-1991
18-02-1991
05-04-1991
02-05-1991
contained use research. The greenhouse
research was carried out between 1989 - 1990.
EU Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate
Release of Genetically Modified Organisms is
enacted.
Maribo Frø submitted its 2nd application to
make a small scale deliberate release research
with genetically modified sugar beet in the
summer 1991. The notification included the
deliberate release of non-flowering sugar-beet in
the field and flowering beets in a tent.
A report on a research that compared Round Up
with other herbicide was submitted by the
Danish Plant Directorate to the Danish
Environment Protection Agency.
Maribo Frø submitted a report on the results of
the 1st release research to the Danish
Environmental Protection Agency.
Proposal to revise law 288 on gene technology
and the environment in accordance with the
stipulation of the EU Directive 90/220/EEC on
the deliberate release of genetically modified
organisms.
The 1st parliamentary deliberation of the
proposal to revise law 288 with reference to EU
Directive 90/220/EEC.
Maribo Frø submitted an annexe to the 2nd
application to the Danish Environment
Protection Agency.
The Minister of Environment exempted the main
2nd application.
The Parliamentaiy Environment and Planning
Committee submitted a report concerning the
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07-05-1991
14-05-1991
22-05-1991
06-06-1991
11-10-1991
20-12-1991
02-03-1992
20-03-1992
06-05-1992
revision of law 288.
The 2nd parliamentary deliberation of the
proposal to revise law 288 in accordance with
the EU Directive 90/220/EEC.
The 3rd parliamentary deliberation of the
proposal to revise law 288 in accordance with
the EU Directive 90/220/EEC.
The Danish Environmental Protection Agency
exempted annexe to the 2nd notification.
The enaction of the revised law (The Gene-
technology and the Environment Law 356/91.
The enaction of Statutory Order no. 685 that
delegated the responsibility of overseeing the
deliberate release research notification to the
Danish Environment Protection Agency. And
Statutory Order no. 687 establishes that the
applicant will pay a fee of 200.000 Danish
kroner for the release notification.
Maribo Frø submitted the 3rd notification for a
large scale deliberate release research in
summer 1992 to the Danish Environmental
Protection Agency.
The Danish Environmental Protection Agency
submitted a draft report on the stipulated
demands for any deliberate release research
notification.
Maribo Frø together with DLF-Trilifolium
submitted an addendum to the 3rd notification
to the Danish Environment Protection Agency.
The content was a notification about the release
of another beet root (fodder beet) in parallel with
the sugar-beet's 3rd release research.
The exemption of the 3rd deliberate release
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30-11-92
11-12-1992
30-03-93
22-11-93
November 1993
15-04-94
02-05-94
01-09-1994
12-12-1994
notification together with its addendum.
Maribo Frø submitted a 4th deliberate release
notification to release genetically modified
sugar-beets and fodder-beets to the Minister of
Environment.
Statutory order nr. 1098 on the exemption of
the release research and marketing of the
genetically modified organisms was enacted.
Exemption of the 4th deliberate release
notification.
Maribo Frø in corporation with DLF-Trilifolium
submitted a five year and 5th deliberate release
research notification (with a view to test the
commercial viability) to the Danish Environment
Protection Agency. The applicant wanted to
release both genetically modified sugar-beets
and genetically modified fodders.
Public Hearing hosted by the National Food
Agency
The EU Commission Directive 94/15/EU
concerning the first time adaption of the
technical developments of Directive
90/220/EEC on the deliberate release of
genetically modified organisms was enacted.
The Minister of Environment exempted the five
year and 5th release notification.
Statutory order no. 1098 is revised.
Addendum notification to the 5th release
notification to test the use of Round up in sugar
beets and/or fodder beets in order to procure
the information necessaiy for the notification of
the registration to use Round up in beet root
cultivation.
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14-12-94
24-03-1995
21-02-97
10-03-1997
24-02 to
25-03-97
26-09-97
07-10-97
Addendum notification for a new locality so as
to test the commercial candidate in different
soils.
The exemption of the 12-12-1994 and the
14-12-94 addendum notifications.
Danisco; DLF-Trilifolium and Monsanto Europe
S.A submitted a market approval notification.
The Minister of Energy and Environment
informed the Parliamentary Environmental and
Planning Committee about the market
notification.
Public Hearing concerning the market
notification.
The Minister of Energy and Environment
exempted the market notification.
The case was handed over to the EU
Commission
Table I.
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As shown in table 1, initially, Danisco (Maribo Frø) made a small
scale deliberate release research application. As it can be seen from
the table, the release research was exempted by the Minister of
Environment even before the greenhouse research was complete.
This was against the OECD step by step and case by case principle.
The second deliberate release research was similar to the first one.
In both cases, the plants were placed in the isolation tents or paper
pots. The third and the fourth release research were a continuation
of the 1990, 1991 and 1992 releases and with the same genetic
sequences. Similar mitigation measures were put in place.
However, as from the 3th notification - in parallel with the transgenic
sugar-beet releases - Danisco together with DLF-Trifolium started to
release a number of Roundup Ready fodder beets. The transgenic
fodder beets shared the same botanical characteristics with Round
up ready sugar beet and they had also been sequenced to code
tolerance to Round up. As time went by, the releaser expanded its
research and in fact by winter 1993, the releaser made a five-year
notification.
In all the above notifications, the releaser delivered ecological,
agricultural, environmental, toxicological, human and animal health
risk assessments to the Minister" of Environment and Energy. The
competent authority (see the section "Administrative procedure")
evaluated each notification on the basis of this information. In the
early part of this research, the competent authority demanded the
research procedure to be adjusted. It is interesting here to note that
the competent authorit}^ was more stringent in the initial phase of
the deliberate release research. For example, the CA demanded that
the plants should be planted in paper pots or that the modified
crops should be distanced from the control plants or other non-
modified plants of the related species. However, with each
development, the competent authority relaxed their demands. For
example, even after the green house and the first release results had
shown that preventing pollen leakage with the use of isolation paper
pots or a buffer zone was impossible - the competent authority went
ahead and exempted the following release notification (and only with
some minor plant distancing modifications). As the release research
moved to a large scale deliberate release, and most notably to the
market approval notification - the competent authority relaxed their
demands even more. This could have been because the competent
authority had amassed more knowledge that was competent enough
to ease the procedure. Or it could have been because there was no
passionate opposition from the greens. There was also no
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considerable intense public and media attention as it was during
the initial phase of the release research. For example, as it can be
seen in the table, the government exempted a five-year deliberate
release notification in 1994 which did not create any considerable
public attention as it would have been expected.
Apropos, there were more public debates in the initial notification
and the greens were more passionately involved. Nevertheless, as
time passed, the public or the interested organizations (that were
initially actively opposed to the deliberate release) seemed to have
relaxed. By the time Danisco made a market notification, it is
interesting to note a feeling of despair or calmness among the
greens. For example, though NOAH expressed its concerns on the
consequences of marketing transgenic fodder beets due to its
effects on increased pesticide use and its pollution to groundwater,
there was a tone of acceptance in their statement to the Minister.
For example, in its statement to the Minister, NOAH indicated that:
"it is irresponsible and litigant against health or against cautious principle to exempt the
marketing of the genetically modified fodder beet... thus said, NOAH does not support
such an exemption ... but if the transgenic fodder beet is exempted for marketing, the
beet should be labelled as a genetically modified product" (my translation and my
italics).73
It seems obvious that by the time the deliberate release research
reached a large scale release and better still - the marketing phase,
the opponents had a relaxed or a desperate attitude to the whole
thing. This could be because they had amassed much more
knowledge than they had in the initial phase or it was simply a
feeling of helplessness or powerlessness. Indeed, even after Minister
of Environment and Energy exempted the market approval
notification, there was no considerable public outcry as it would
have been expected in a country where more than 69% of the
population is against agricultural biotechnology. And this is even
more intriguing when compared with the public outcry that followed
the importation of Round up read)' soya in 1996.
Here, as I have indicated earlier, it should be noted that with the
revision of Law 288, with accordance to the stipulation of the EU
Directive 90/220 EEC, application {ansøgning) became notification
{anmeldelse)74. By definition, according to the Danish competent
authorities' interpretation of Directive 90/220, this implies that if
the notification got lost somewhere during the mail delivery process
and thus, the notifier does not get any written or spoken response
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from the responsible authority within 90 days, the notifier has the
right to proceed with the research.
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Concrete Risk Assessments
As a benchmark for evaluating all the deliberate release and
marketing notifications (for the Round up ready beets) - knowledge
and experiences with non-genetically modified sugar beets and/or
fodder beets together with conventional agricultural practices were
used as the criteria for risk assessments. Here, the so called
competent authority (hereafter CA) made comparative analysis of
the Round up ready sugar beet and/or fodder beets with unmodified
sugar- and or fodder beets. As indicated earlier, the aim was to
assess if the Round up ready sugar- and or fodder beets had
acquired some unexpected biological characteristics due to the new
genetic construction75. This comparative analysis was undertaken
with non-flowering sugar beets and/or fodder beets, flowering
sugar beets and/or fodder beets — in the greenhouse, in the small
scale release and in the large scale deliberate release research
through to the market notification76.
Alter the experiences with the first release generation (and later the
following generations), in evaluating the risk assessments (for
example the 1990 and the 1991 applications/ notifications), the CA
referred to the experiences with the earlier release generations (for
example, the 1989-90 release). With this information, all the CA
claimed to have amassed a lot of information and knowledge that
was crucial and compelling for a qualified risk assessment77.
After the results of the first release research, in the following
applications (later notifications), the releaser and all the CA claimed
that a comparative analysis (of the results of the former generation
of the Round up ready beets and the non-modified beets)
documented that Round up ready sugar beets and/or fodder beets
resembled non-modified sugar beets and/or fodder beets with
regard to all observable and analytical conditions or
characteristics78.
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Identified Risks
In evaluating ecological risks (in all the notifications) that would
accompany the various releases, DDS and the Danish CA evaluated
that, in Denmark, within the Vulgaris, Beta vulgaris (sugar beet)
had been documented to cross-pollinate with the wild Beta
maritima (sea-beet). And the latter is wildly growing around the
Store-Bælt area79.
Equally, the CA indicated that the cultivated sugar beets and/or
fodder beets cross-pollinate easily with other related species. And in
Denmark, according to the releaser and the CA, there has occurred
hybrids of sugar-beet and the wild sea-beets. Moreover, they
indicated that sugar-beet cross-pollinate with other related species.
This is for example with the red-beet, Mangold (mangel (-wurzel)),
fodder beets, petal beets (bladbede) -- to name but a few. Some of
these related species, especially the red-beet -- are consumed by
human beings80.
Evaluating the risks that could accompany the spread of the
inserted traits from the research area, in almost all the evaluations,
the National Food Agency and the Danish Institute of Toxicology (IT)
stated that generally, plants can spread their genetic material
through cross-pollination, seeds' germination or through vegetative
organ formation (active or passive). By this, the plant could
establish itself outside the research area. For example, sugar-beet
has no vegetative organ formation — but sugar-beet organs splits
and each part forms a basis for a new sugar-beet plant. Time-wise,
the sugar beets and/or fodder beets could spread when the planted
seeds remain in the research area and after the end of the research,
they germinate and at that constitute the risk of spreading.
In this way, it was evaluated that it was obvious that there was a
possibility for the transference of the inserted traits to near related
species. Hence, its establishment was evaluated as possible.
In addition to this, the notifier and all the CA evaluated that,
depending on the climatic conditions and the variety of the sugar
beets and/or fodder beets (with respect to the plant's genetic
combination), sometimes, within the first year of the sugar or fodder
beets' growth, the plant can develop reproductive plants - the so
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called bolting plants. As long as the bolting plants' produce hefty
pollen, there could occur pollen and/or seed that could spread from
the cultivated field.
Similarly, the applicant and all the CA evaluated that the spread of
the sugar- and or fodder beet seed via water was possible81.
Moreover, it was evaluated that the genetically modified beet root
might develop a competitive ability against other species82.
In the same vein, DDS and all the CA evaluated that sugar- and or
fodder beet can spread over a short distance. This is for example
during the mechanical soil handling, via (huge amount of) surface
water flow (on the field) or by animals (especially by the birds).
However, they evaluated that the major cause for spreading is when
huge amounts of the produced seeds are harvested, transported,
processed and distributed.83
Evaluating the possibility of the spreading of Round up ready sugar
beets and/or fodder beets via small animals, all the CA deduced
that the removal of the whole plant by small animals (such as mice)
was to be expected. Moreover, the removal of the small plants by
birds could not be excluded.81
Besides this, according to DDS and the SNS, sugar- and or fodder
beet interaction with the surrounding environment is well known.
For example, insects, nematodes and mammals' fodder on the
leaves and the roots of the sugar- and or fodder beet. For example,
fodder beet is attacked easily by fungi and viral diseases. And it can
also interact with the surrounding plant species.
Better still, the evaluation of the results of the first generation of the
field trials (1989-90) showed that there was pollen slip even after
mitigating the research area with isolation tents. Here, DDS
evaluated that 660 seeds were produced that could germinate under
good field conditions. During the 1990/91 evaluation, the SNS
assessed that the degree of the effectiveness of the mitigation
measures showed that pollen leakage (as expected) was reduced
considerably. Nevertheless, despite the confinement measures that
were put in place, pollen leaked from Round up ready plants to the
control plants was unavoidable. Furthermore, approx. 0,5% of the
germinating seeds of the sterile control plants (that were placed
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outside the buffer zone) were formed via fertilization with pollen
from the Round up ready beets.85
During the deliberation of the 1994 release notification (of the
plants that were undergoing the flowering stage), SNS and the
Danish Institute of Toxicology (IT) stated that experience had shown
that it would be extremely difficult to obtain 100% pollen isolation.
And there was therefore a risk that the inserted traits might spread
to the nearest related species such as sea-beet - via introgression86.
During the deliberation of the later notifications, SNS and IT
evaluated that, experience had shown that it would be extremely
difficult to obtain 100% pollen isolation. And this was especially so
during large scale deliberate release trials carried out under normal
agricultural conditions. For this reason, SNS evaluated while stating
further that there was therefore a risk that the inserted traist could
spread to the nearest related species87.
Reviewing Round-ups possible health effects, the Danish
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) together with the Danish
Institute of Environmental Research (DMU) claimed that research
had documented that round-up could cause skin and eye
irritations88.
According to EPA/DMU, though glyphosate v/as the most commonly
used herbicide, it was commonly argued that the weed killer was
carcinogenic and that it could affect animal reproduction
(negatively).89
And according to EPA, glyphosate had been evaluated to be
poisonous to algae that impede in small doses while acute poisoning
offish was evaluated as possible90.
Evaluating the effects of the use of Round up ready beets, the
Danish Plant Directorate (Statens Plantsavlskontor) indicated that,
with time, any consistent use of a given herbicide may create a
natural selection in the existing wild flora. Therefore, there could
form a population of weed plants that could develop resistance
against the applied herbicide or herbicide groups. This is a common
phenomenon in areas that practice a partial crop-rotation (maize
cultivation in a certain land year after year was mentioned as a case
in point). Besides, weed resistance over a certain herbicide could
develop in a field where a given herbicide is applied to different
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plants during the crop-rotation. This involves an added and more
partial use of herbicide in question91.
Moreover, it was evaluated that with time, the fallen plants from the
past years -- resistant to a certain herbicide could grow and become
a weed problem. Similarly, it was evaluated that the cultivated
sugar beets and/or fodder beets do not normally occur in the wild
nature with the exemption of the so-called weed-root. With low
frequency, the weed root can occur in cultivated Round up ready
beet fields or the immediate adjoining area.
However, according to the Plant Directorate, how far a certain
herbicide may directly cause the reduction of the natural
occurrence of flora (naturally) depended on the extent the given
herbicide is used, the approved aim and the approved use.
In all the notifications, the above risks were identified, their degree
of risks v/as estimated and it was agreed that these risks were not
only negligible but they were actually common place, known and
accepted in conventional agricultural practices. However, it was
evaluated that in any case, if sufficient mitigation and control
measures were put in place, the risks could be managed and this
was actually possible with ordinary mitigation measures. However,
the risks that could be expected to result from the inserted
characteristics were unknown and at that assumed 92.
For this reason, in essence, in the actual risk "assessment", the CA
mainly addressed the issue of how to develop risk mitigation
measures than making risk assessment. Thus, the gist of the
procedure was how to put in place sufficient; satisfactory and
convincing control and mitigation measures. The risk assessment
procedure became a sheer risk control and mitigation
exercise/negotiation rather than an actual risk assessment
procedure. This is what I would like to term as risk control and risk
mitigation paradigms. And as if this were not enough, more often
than not, the CA quoted what the notifier deemed as qualified safety
or mitigation measures -- as the evidence for safety for purposes of
policy advice.
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Controlling and Mitigating the Identified Risks
ECOLOGICAL RISKS
The Bolting Problem:
In the initial (first three field release research) releases, SNS
evaluated that since the crops were only undergoing the vegetative
phase, the bolting problem would be addressed by monitoring and
removing the bolting plants.93
In the later notifications, the notifier and SNS evaluated that, it is
possible to control the bolting plants (and hence mitigate the spread
or the establishment of the modified traits) with the use of ordinary
farm practice measures.94 For example, this could be by spraying
other weed killers (other than round-up), hand weeding or through
mechanical handling95.
Similarly, the notifier and SNS argued that the bolting plants in
the surrounding Round up ready beet field or the research area
could be removed and destroyed easily.
Cross-pollination:
SNS and the notifier claimed that better physical confinement
would serve as a sufficient mitigation measure for alleviating the
cross pollination problem. In the initial phase, SNS proposed that
Danisco should develop a pair-crossing isolation tents; the use of
the isolation paper pots or a buffer zone to mitigate cross
pollination. According to SNS, this would reduce the spread of
pollen that could leak out during watering or spraying. And that the
isolation tents should be removed from the exposed plants only after
the plants' seeds had ripened and thereafter the removal of the
transgenic plants from the research area9b.
Danisco planted hemp plants around the research area to serve as a
buffer zone97. And the notifier claimed that they had many years of
experience with such mitigation measures during their ordinary
seed production. And that during these procedures, the buffer zone
mitigated any cross-pollination with advancing pollen. Further,
Danisco claimed that hemp buffer zone had been documented to be
effective enough for assuaging pollen spread via weed. This is so
because hemp plants grow very fast, they are tall while growing
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very closely. With this measure, it was argued, the release research
could alleviate any spread of pollen. And that if such a prerequisite
was maintained, there was a good balance (maintained) between the
demand for confinement and the most possible natural conditions.98
Similarly, SNS and the notifier claimed that further pollen spread
would be eliminated by developing additional technical methods for
mitigation. For example - an increased physical distance ".
In evaluating the degree of isolation measures that were needed
during the release of geneticalry manipulated plants that were to
undergo the flowering stages (for example the 1994 notification) -
and whether the use of isolation paper pots or the buffer zone were
efficient for alleviating cross-pollination (from the research area), the
notifier claimed that the distance between the flowering Round up
ready beet plants and the nearest wild sea beet was minimum -
7km. Moreover, they argued that the distance between the research
area and the nearest flowering beet plants (that were found in the
DDS's own green house) was around 200 m west and 1000 m east
of the research area. Similarly, DDS claimed that greenhouse
research had shown that cross-pollination with the advancing
pollen was reduced by the presence of a buffer zone.100
In the 1994 notification (it was the first time that the released beet
root plants were going to flower), the CA insisted on the importance
of distancing Round up ready beet plants from other related species.
They pointed out that there was a need to establish an isolation
distance that was greater than 1000 m (DDS had planned a
distance of 100m distance). I01'102'103.
Together, DDS and CA evaluated that the magnitude of pollen slip
could not (in all probability) involve any unwanted ecological risks.
Weed Problem:
In all the notifications, SNS evaluated that in any circumstance,
Round-up ready plants could be combated or alleviated with other
weed killers104.
Spread via water or animals:
It was evaluated that in the initial releases, the seeds would be
planted in paper pots and hence they could not spread outside the
research area. However, the CA did admit that such physical
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confinement measures would be difficult to maintain in an actual
field release research (conditions)10".
However, according to SNS, since the beet is a heavy entity, it would
be unlikely that Round up ready sugar beet and/or fodder beets
would be spread via animals. Better still, according to SNS, sugar
beet and/or fodder beets are highly sensitive to injuries and hence
would die on such an encounter100.
The spread of seed by water was evaluated as possible though rare.
And that for any establishment and germination of sugar- and or
fodder beet seeds, a special (sowing) bed was a crucial prerequisite
for its germination. This is because sugar beets and/or fodder beets
are very sensitive to external factors, and cannot out compete the
competition from other plants107.
Other forms of spreading:
It was assessed that, inasmuch as the cultivated sugar beets and/or
fodder beets were only undergoing the vegetative phase (a year old
crop) the risk for spreading from the cultivated land was negligible.
This is because the first year's sugar beet and/or fodder beet plants
normally would freeze down and die during winter (in Denmark as
they are not frost resistance).
Above all, SNS evaluated that the implemented mitigation
measures would effectively deter the establishment and the
spreading of the inserted traits to the surrounding nature or
environment. And hence, the releases would not involve any
unwanted effects to the Danish eco-system108.
TOXICOLOGICAL RISKS
In assessing the toxicological risks that would accompany the
release of Round up ready sugar beets and/or fodder beets, in
almost all the notifications, the National Food Agency and the
Institute of Toxicology (IT) evaluated that, pollen has been
documented to spread outside the research area. In principle, this
might result into the occurrence of the inserted traits outside the
research area. For example, sugar beet cross-pollinates easily with
other related species. In this way, it was evaluated that there was a
possibility for the transfer of the inserted gene material to other
related species109.
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However, IT evaluated that the probabilities of Round up ready
beets cross pollinating with, for example, red-beet was very low.
This is because it takes flowering red-beet to be near the research
area and partly that the seeds of the red beets are used for sowing
the next season. In such a case, the red beet seed would be tested
in the laboratory before they were sown during the next season.
As DDS's research had shown that there was pollen leakage from
the research area, according to IT, although the probability for
spreading was considered very low, this meant that in theory, there
was a possibility that outside the research area, there might grow
some plants that could have the inserted traits. Consequently, the
product of the inserted gene and its health consequence was of
importance110. However, according to IT, the risk for the spreading of
the transgenic characteristic outside the research area was very
small. And if worse comes to worst such that there occurred Round
up ready plants outside the research area, according to IT, there
was no cause for alarm that this would have toxicological or health
problems. This is because edible plants that cross pollinate with
sugar beets and/or fodder beets were not consumed by human in
Denmark111.
Comparing Round up ready beets with non genetically modified
beets, in the market notification, the Veterinary and Food
Directorate (basing their argument on the research done by the
applicant) evaluated that — Round up ready beets were no different
from non genetically modified beets other than the tolerance to
glyphosate. Consequently, the VFD concluded that there were no
anticipated health risks that could accompany the marketing of
Round up ready beets. Nevertheless, the Directorate stated that this
evaluation did not consider glyphosate residue that would follow
eventual spraying nor the use of Round up ready beets for human
consumption.
Evaluating the effects of the EPSPS enzyme (during the deliberation
for the 1997 market notification), the Veterinary and Food
Directorate argued that the enz3'me had been evaluated before (in
connection with genetically modified soy beans). According to the
Directorate, analysis had indicated that the enzyme was not toxic or
allergic. Therefore, the enzyme was evaluated to constitute zero
risks to human or animal health112.
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Considering the effects of Round up ready sugar beets and/or
fodder beets on animals that would feed on the beets, the
Directorate and the notifier claimed that various laboratory research
with mice had shown that there was no difference between mice
that were fed with genetically modified beets and mice that were
feed with non genetically modified beets113.
Reviewing round-up's possible health effects to human or animals,
the Danish Environment Protection Agency (EPA) together with the
Danish University of Environmental Research (DMU)) claimed that
research had documented that though Round-up could cause some
skin and eye irritations, this posed a very low risk to human and
animal health114.
Similarly, EPA/DMU, evaluated that glyphosate was the most
applied weed killer. Though it was commonly categorized as
carcinogenic while affecting animal's reproduction (negatively),
researchers (with mice) in USA had documented that glyphosate
was not carcinogenic and that it did not have any negative effects on
animal reproduction 115.
In characterizing the market notification, Danisco and the CA stated
that the notifications were for exemption for production and
handling of Round up ready beets (and especially fodder beet was
meant for animal feed). Therefore, the notifications did not cover the
exemption of Round up read}r beets as a product for human
consumption.
ENVIRONMENT AND AGRICULTURAL RISKS
Evaluating the environmental consequences that would accompany
the use of round up, the Danish Environment Protection Agency
(EPA) together with the Danish Institute of Environmental Research
(DMU) argued that when glyphosate is sprayed on the soil, it breaks
down considerably into micro-organisms. The veracity of the break
down does not depend on the dosage, the climatic conditions nor
the type of the soil but rather on the soil's micro-biological activities.
Glyphosate breaks down into aminomethyl-phosphorous acid
(AMPA), which further breaks down to substances and later to
carbon dioxide and other inorganic combinations. Besides,
glyphosate and AMPA bind well with soil particles. As such, there
was no risk of leaking or penetration to water areas or to the ground
water. Transport to the water areas could occur through the
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movement of the soil particles by water surface flow or by wind. In
the water, partly, this would bind with the sediment and there
would occur a breakdown that for a great part would be caused by
micro-organisms116.
The effects of glyphosate to the living habitat, according to the
Danish Environment Protection Agency (EPA), were expected to be
poisonous to algae that impede in small doses. However, the
substance was not poisonous to invertebrates such as shrimps or
crabs or water flea117 nor the larvae's development or oysters. Any
acute poisoning of fish was evaluated as very low and it could not be
expected to affect fish or mussel. With this, EPA/DMU concluded
that glyphosate could have no negative effects on bio-accumulation,
on birds or their breeding capacity nor on earthworms.
With reference to the parliamentary action plan (to reduce the use of
chemical substances in agriculture), EPA/DMU evaluated that, for
an effective weed control, it would be necessary to spray 2-3 times
with Round-up. Besides, Round-up has a smaller percentage of the
chemical dose than the (then) used herbicides. Therefore,
scientifically, the use of Round-up would not affect the quantity of
the used chemical nor the handling frequency. In line with this,
EPA/DMU argued that sugar-beet cultivation area in Denmark
consisted of a small part of the Danish agricultural area.
Consequently, the added effect to the overall chemical use in
agriculture was minimal.
Evaluating the effects of Round-up on flora and fauna, EPA/DMU
claimed that the necessity for the closeness of weeds with weed
associated insects did not occur in the Danish fields118. And in
assessing the effects of Round up on animal life, EPA/DMU argued
that a prerequisite for the presence of animal life in the arable land
was dependent on the presence of particular plants. However living
places such as fences and field hedges were indispensable but not
sufficient for maintaining a stock of animal species that are today
returning to the arable lands. Consequently, EPA argued that there
were no possible dangers to flora or fauna119. However, EPA
underlined that in case that Round up ready beet fields were
increased, then of course -- the situation would be different120.
Evaluating the effects of the use of glyphosate resistant sugar-beet
(and the risk of a natural selection), the Danish Plant Directorate
argued that sugar-beet in Denmark was generally grown under crop
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rotation. Thus, there is a difference of 3-5 years before sowing
sugar-beet in the same field. For this reason, the risk of weeds (by
natural selection) developing tolerance to glyphosate in Denmark
was minimal. And that the risk of unintended transfer of
glyphosate-resistance gene from genetically modified plant to
naturally occurring plants was very small. This is because the only
natural possibility for cross- pollination was with Beta maritima.
However, Beta-maritima in Denmark is a rare plant that is common
only around the Storebælts area. Moreover, cross-pollination
between sugar-beet and sea-beet is only found in the Kalundborg
area121.
In all the notifications, the Danish Plant Directorate evaluated that
overall, provided the stated reproductive isolation measures,
confinement and monitoring procedures were implemented
effectively — the use of Round up ready beets posed no risk to the
Danish environment nor to the Danish agriculture. And more
importantly, the knowledge that would be procured from the DDS
research would form a basis for the evaluation of future releases of
genetically modified plants. Nevertheless, there was the possibility
of the development of a built-in tolerance to a given herbicide that
would follow its consistent use. Consequently, the Danish Plant
Directorate underlined that more far-reaching impacts could occur
in the future (if this trend continued). Hence, all the notifications
should be evaluated from case to case - with accordance to the
respective needs123.
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The Competent Authorities' Statements for Policy Advice
As we have seen in the above description, the releases were
progressively studied. This was in the greenhouse, in the small scale
release research (with various mitigation measures — such as
planting the plants in paper pots, planting wind-breakers, planting
sterile male plants, vernalization, removal of bolting plants,
distancing the modified plants from the near related species,
planting non flowering plants, etc. etc.) and in the large scale
release research under normal agricultural conditions. And
information was accumulated from all these releases as a basis for
forthcoming evaluations123.
After the experience with the initial release research, all the CA
stated that enough information had been garnered which accounted
that Round up ready sugar beets and/or fodder beets were similar
to non genetically modified sugar beets and/or fodder beets other
than the tolerance to glyphosate. In all the notifications, for the
purpose of informing the decision-making process, all the CA
argued that Round up ready beets could not spread or establish in
the wild nature. For example they argued that, the knowledge
accumulated had progressively accounted that flowering sugar beets
and/or fodder beets could be released and with adequate mitigation
measures, no adverse effects could be anticipated. In all the
notification, all the CA concluded that Round up ready beets could
be released or marketed without causing any adverse effects to the
Danish ecology or environment124.
Basing their assessments on the tests that had been done to test
the phenotypic characteristics, the CA stated that Round up ready
beets have no significant difference with non modified sugar- and
or fodder beets with reference to bolting, plant height, root and the
thickness of the stem, the size of the leaves, seed production and
the percentage of seed germination.
As such, according to the CA, Round up ready beets lie within the
range of the genetic variation that is common with unmodified
beets. And based on this, the CA stated that it cannot be expected
that Round up ready beets constitute the ability to compete or
establish in the nature than it is common place with non modified
beets125.
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Like the unmodified sugar beets and/or fodder beets, it was argued,
Round up ready beet seeds could be spread via water, but this is
rare. Moreover, establishment and germination of these seeds
demand a special sowing bed as the seedlings are very sensitive to
external factors, and cannot out compete the competition from other
plants. And beets, it was argued, are weak competitors for light,
nourishing food stuff and water126.
As the non-modified beets, in all the notifications, Round up ready
beets were evaluated to interact well with surrounding plant
species. However, beets have a limited competitive ability against
other species and they do not have any characteristics that would
encode them to establish as a weed on the cultivated area. It was
also stated that, in the various release trials, Round up ready beets
did not exhibit any increase in invasiveness or to possess other
unknown weedy characteristics. It was also stated that Round up
ready beets had no selective advantage — compared to other beet
varieties (except tolerance to glyphosate). In line with this, the CA
stated that Round up ready traits would not confer any selective
advantage to other related species either in un-managed areas or in
cultivated fields -- except where glyphosate is used 12?.
Similarly, it was stated that research had documented that there
was no link between herbicide resistance trait and any superior
invasiveness or competitiveness of any group of the plants. And that
inasmuch as sugar beet and/or fodder beets plants were not
commonly present in the surrounding natural environment, then
like non modified beets, Round up ready beets have a very limited
chance of establishing or having a competitive ability compared to
natural plant population.
Moreover, it was stated that, inasmuch as the Round up ready beets
were cultivated on their vegetative stage (as a year old crop) — the
risk for spreading from the cultivated land was negligible. This is
because the first year's beet plants would normally freeze down and
die during winter (in Denmark). This is because they are not frost
resistant. If worse comes to worst, the CA stated, it was possible for
farmers to control bolting plants with ordinary farm practices. This
is for example, by using other weed killers (other than glyphosate),
hand weeding or mechanical handling.
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Evaluating other factors that might influence Round up ready sugar
beets and/or fodder beets' survival in the wild nature, the CA stated
that the main part of the beet root that is sowed 5cm underground -
may germinate. And a down ploughed root can wait 10 years for
germination or even longer. However, it is rarely that the beets
survive after a crop yield and they rarely emerge as weeds.
Moreover, it was stated that a number of factors are decisive for the
sugar beets and/or fodder beets' survival ability. This is because the
beets are a two years growing plant, they are very sensitive to frost
and have a limited competitive abilit}r against other species. In line
with this, the CA stated that sugar beets and/or fodder beets are
sensitive to handling mechanisms and other weed killers that are
used for other plants128
Particularly, the CA stated that better physical confinement and
distance isolation are a sufficient mitigation measure against cross
pollination. And with the development of a pair crossing research
procedure — eventual pollen leak (during watering or spraying)
could be alleviated. The establishment of a buffer zone around the
research area was seen as a sufficient way for reducing any (further)
spread of pollen. With the above measures as a prerequisite, the CA
stated that in this way, there was a good balance (maintained)
between the demand for confinement and the most possible natural
conditions. And that in all probability, pollen leakage would not
involve any ecological risks129.
Evaluating the spreading ability, the CA stated that sugar beets
and/or fodder beets hybridize with sea beet within a distance of a
100 meter ~ but to a very limited extent. In line with this, the
release trial showed that there was no hybridization between sugar
beets and/or fodder beets and the related (wild) species. What's
more, that there was no observed formation of hybrid seeds within a
distance that was more than 25 meter from the planted area.
Though the applicant did not deliver the results of the seed
spreading trials (during the marketing notification!), the CA stated
that this was not a problem because sugar beets and/or fodder
beets did not have any special seed spreading mechanism and
often, it spreads only in the immediate surrounding area of the
mother plant130.
Evaluating the ecological impacts that may accompany the
hybridisation of Beta vulgaris and its wild relatives, the CA stated
that the effects of hybridisation between Round up ready sugar
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beets and/or fodder beets and its wild relatives are low and
equivalent to what is common place with non modified sugar beets
and/or fodder beets. And an unintended spread of round-up
tolerance traits to sea-beets or to weed beets would after all not
have an unintended effect on the environment or create fear for a
dramatic change of the composition of flora in the affected areas.
According to the CA, Round-up tolerance traits would not give these
plants any selective advantage, as there will be no positive selective
pressure in the environment. On the contrary. The presence of such
a resistance gene would be a disadvantage for the species. This is
because incidentally - such a condition would involve an added
charge on the plant metabolism that would involve a limited
competitive ability. If worse comes to worst, the CA stated, Round-
up tolerant plants could be mitigated (combated) with other weed
killers131.
Moreover, the CA stated that natural barriers exist that reduce the
efficiency of cross-pollination. For example, flowers must be
sexually compatible, receptive to pollen and close to pollen source.
And that pollen concentration drops dramatically with distance132.
Evaluating the spread of transgenic beet seeds via animals, the CA
stated that beet is a relatively heavy entity that has not developed
characteristics in any form for animal spreading. Moreover, it was
evaluated that sugar beets and/or fodder beets are very sensitive to
any external influence and as such would die from such an
encounter.
Moreover, it was evaluated that cultivated beets do not normally
occur in the wild nature. The only exception is the so-called weed-
root. With low frequency, the weed root can occur in the cultivated
beet fields and in the immediate adjoining area. And if they occur,
the CA stated, these weed beets could only be a problem to farmers
who have them as weeds in their fields. And as weed roots have
been documented to be sensitive to other weed killers (like the
cultivated sugar beets and/or fodder beets), if for some reason they
occur outside the cultivated field, the CA stated, farmers can easily
destroy them with suitable weed killer133.
With reference to cold tolerance, the CA stated that the bulb of the
genetically manipulated beets (if left on the field) cannot survive
winter periods with much success. Better still, the CA stated that
research under freezer temperature had shown that there was no
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difference in the survival of genetically manipulated plants and non
modified sugar beet and/or fodder beet plants.
Evaluating the effects of the CP4 EPSPS gene, the CA stated that
Round up ready beets and the varieties contain only the CP4 EPSPS
gene. And this gene does not modify the characteristics of the
varieties - except tolerance to glyphosate. The CA stated that the
above line does not differ from other varieties in its capacity to
establish, to persist and to reproduce. And that Round up ready
beet is stable both genotypically and phenotypically. Moreover, the
CA stated that it was improbable that Round up ready beet could
have any impact on other organisms in the environment134.
Weighing the saponin content, the CA stated that saponin in line
A5/15 compared well with saponin in control plants. They stated
that there were no significant differences in contents of saponin in
root and top between transgenic beets and the control plants in the
year 1995 and 96. They also stated that the magnitude of the
differences (that was evaluated) within the 7 locations was small
and variation in levels among locations was considerable. According
to the CA, these differences could be explained by a strong influence
of agronomic and climatic conditions (variability among locations on
saponin concentrations') 1J5
Evaluating the effects of Round up ready sugar beets and/or fodder
beets on animals that would feed on them, the CA stated that -
various research (in the laboratory) had documented that there was
no difference between mice that were feed with genetically modified
beets and mice that were feed with non genetically modified beets
(ibid).
On all the risk assessments, the C A concluded that genetically
modified beets were no different from traditionally grown beets in
terms of flowering, plant height, size of root or stem, size of leaves,
seed production, ability to germinate, cold tolerance or the ability to
establish.
In considering Round up ready beets and their overall effect on the
use of herbicides, the CA stated that the introduction of Round up
ready plants in agriculture would significantly reduce the quantities
of herbicide use. However this would be dependent on the crop type,
the country, the available data and the assumptions made. In
general, the CA stated that glyphosate tolerant beet offers the
no
potential to reduce the quantity of herbicide used in sugar beet
and/or fodder beets' production by 1500 to 3000 g/ha. Here the CA
stated that it is hypothesized that a market of 20 - 40% would allow
a significant reduction in conventional herbicide use. The CA stated
also that herbicide volume reduction was of environmental
significance if the intrinsic safety profile of the active ingredient is
not taken into account136.
Similarly, the CA stated that glyphosate is recognized by the
scientific community as an environmentally benign herbicide. And
for this reason, the CA stated that the use of Round up ready fodder
beet would enable farmers to use Round up herbicides for effective
weed control while receiving the benefits of Round up's
environmental safety characteristics. According to the CA, Round
up ready traits would positively impact the current agronomic
practices. This was, among other factors — allowing farmers to use
an environmentally benign herbicide, enhanced flexibility in weed
control, less use of pre-emergent root herbicides, and providing a
cost effective weed control measure as compared with other
competitive products approved for use - for example in fodder beet
cultivation137. All this considered — along with the herbicide volume
reduction, the CA argued that there will be reductions in amount
and frequencies of herbicide use when herbicide resistant beet
replaced traditional sugar beet and/or fodder beets in crop rotation
and this practice will fit well with the concept of a Sustainable
Agriculture133
In characterizing the market notification, the C A mentioned that the
notifications were for the exemption for production and handling of
Round up ready beets (and with the fodder beets as for animal feed).
As such, the notifications did not cover the exemption of Round up
ready beets as a product for human consumption.
In all the notifications, the CA concluded that though the new
inserted trait had not changed the possibilities for hybridization
with wild relatives, Beta maritim a is only wildly growing in
Denmark, and it is estimated that the spread of glyphosate
tolerance trait to Beta maritima will involve no ecological
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consequences
In conclusion, in all the release notifications, the CA stated that the
given control and mitigation measures would address any
unwanted ecological, toxicological, agricultural or environmental
i l l
effects that could accompany the release of Round up ready beets -
hence they endorsed all the deliberate releases. And so was the
market notification where the CA stated that the product could be
placed on the Community market with no risk to human or animal
health, agriculture, ecology or the environment.140
So far, we have looked at the C A's evaluations and their respective
statements to the Minister of Environment and Energy for purposes
of policy recommendation. As I said earlier, once the notifications
had undergone the CA's scientific risk assessments, the
notifications were also deliberated by interest organizations and the
parliament for political and value judgements. So, before I analyze
and discuss this development, let us now turn to the political
deliberations.
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Political and Value Judgements
The Danish Green's and the Interest Organization's Assessments
In the initial application, the Danish greens stated that the
necessary research (development work) on the biological and
ecological population was not established — yet. And it is this kind
of research that could procure decisive knowledge crucial for
evaluating risks that would accompany the deliberate release.
However, according to the greens, in the future, there could occur
some sound research contribution that could only be compelling if
unaffected by economic interests141. Until then, according to the
greens, it was professionally unjustifiable (irresponsible) to exempt
the deliberate release of transgenic plants with the current
knowledge base. For this reason, for the greens, the decision-
making procedures for granting the permission for the releases were
denigrated as totally inane142. This position was maintained by the
greens throughout. For example, during the deliberation of the
market notification, the "Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark"
stated that:
"it is improper to exempt the marketing of Round up ready fodder beets because they are
risky to animals that will eventually eat them. In addition, the commercial cultivation of
transgenic fodder beets would be risky to the environment due to the overall cumulative
effects of the use of pesticides" (my translation)143.
And the "Foreningen af Danske Biologer" stated that:
"the Association is worried about the overall change of fanners behaviour and the
probable high consumption of weed killers with the accompanying danger to the
groundwater. Such a diverging environmental effect as far as we are concerned is as
important as the direct environmental effect. However, if the product is exempted for
marketing, it should be labelled as genetically manipulated" (my translation and my
italics) .
Moreover, the greens maintained throughout that the knowledge
that was the basis for evaluating the effects of the release of Round
up ready beets was based on a very limited scientific resource145.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the possibilities for the
establishment, spreading and the competitiveness of the genetically
manipulated beets in the nature was based on assumptions and
uncertaint}^46. This was because there was no documented
knowledge of the expression of the genetically manipulated plant in
the nature and as such the evaluation of the risk assessment was
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not scientifically sound or sufficient. Besides, the greens underlined
that though the competent authority did possess a complex
knowledge of the non modified beet's characteristics — this
knowledge could not be used as a criterion for evaluating a complex
plant with a totally different life history, possible cross-pollination
and spreading characteristics147. And thus for the greens, the CA's
risk assessment were unconvincing and invalid, let alone to be a
source of knowledge for policy advice.
Moreover, according to the greens, there lacked a clear cut
judgement and questioning as to whether there were, indeed, any
societal gains in having the genetically manipulated plants. This
also included the need to question if Round-up was a better
herbicide or less dangerous than the chemicals that were already on
use. Particularly, the green activists were concerned on the farmers
overall dependence on a particular kind of herbicide and the
patented seeds and how this would, in the long term, force farmers
to be dependent on a particular technology and the respective
producer. Consequently, the greens underscored the need for a
public debate. A debate that would discuss whether the Danish
society wanted and desired genetically manipulated organisms in
their environment and if so, the society was to stipulate the
demands or the rules that the given releaser was to adhere to148.
Specifically, the greens criticized the initial release notification for
failing to adhere to the OECD step by step and case by case
(recommended) release procedure. According to the greens, the
results of the different steps were of great importance with respect
to the risk assessment aspects. The greens also found it inapt that
the competent authority had evaluated the need to carry out the
necessary research that was crucial for the evaluation and the
decision-making — as comprehensive and time consuming. From
this, the greens questioned the frames and the rationale of the risk
assessment — used by the competent authorities' and therewith
what determined the choices of these criteria for the risk
judgement149.
Remarking on the cross-pollination aspects after the experience
with the first release research, the greens observed that however
small a transfer it was, this was a signal that considerable transfer
of the transgenic gene was there and possibly out of control. This
observation was an evidence that with time, the spreading and the
establishment of the transgenic gene was to be expected150.
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In line with this, in the initial notification, the greens questioned
why it was necessary to release transgenic beets in Denmark (and
especially sugar-beet) that otherwise should be grown in Italy.
According to the greens, to release transgenic sugar-beets in
Denmark would involve an added risk for the system to go out of
control. This would mean that with time — the beets could grow
wildly in the Danish Environment, naturally151.
During the market notifications, the greens stated that it was
improper to permit the marketing of Round up ready beets as this
would involve a risk to the animals that will eventually eat these
beets. Additionally, they saw this as a risk to the environment and
so was the overall effect of the use of the Round up ready beets152.
In all the release notification (and so was the market notification),
the greens were worried about the overall change of behavior of the
farmers and the danger of Round up to ground water pollution that
rnay result from the increased use of Round up 153. Such a diverging
environmental effect (as far as the greens were concerned) was as
important as the direct environmental effect. However, in the
market notification, the greens indicated that if the product was
exempted for marketing, it should be labeled as genetically
manipulated. Nevertheless, the greens concluded that it would be
irresponsible and litigant against health and against cautious
principle to exempt (for example) the marketing of Round up ready
fodder beets. And on this ground, they rejected all the
notifications154.
Other interested organizations such as the County of Copenhagen
evaluated that the cultivated beets can cross-pollinate with sea-beet
and the risks of the eventual spread of the glyphosate trait are
problematic from an ethical perspective. With respect to nature, the
spreading of the gene to the sea-beet, they claimed, would hardly
have unintended effects as the gene will not give these plants a
selective advantage. Rather the contrary155.
The agricultural organizations argued that Round up ready beets
had neither (unwanted) health nor" toxicological effects. On the
contrary, the cultivation of glyphosate tolerant fodder beet would
involve a meaningful reduction of the use of weed killers and the
handling frequency as compared with traditional beet cultivation.
However, the organizations indicated that there can eventually crop
115
up an environmental problem if several crops within the same crop
rotation were engineered to resist the same weed killer. But such a
problem cannot be (at the moment) a basis for overruling the case.
However, they underscored the need for the agriculture, chemical
and plant improvement organizations — in cooperation with the
government - to stipulate some guidelines for an eventual criteria
for developing and cultivating herbicide tolerant crops156.
Some interest organizations evaluated no ecological impacts that
would accompany the use of Round up ready beets. Rather the
contrary. For them, the cultivation of Round up ready beets would
significantly reduce the use of herbicide in the Danish agriculture157.
Organizations such as RISØ evaluated that, probably, Round up
ready beet are crops that would involve the reduction of herbicide
use. And that Round up was less risky to the environment when
compared with other commercial herbicides. Though the tolerance
to Round up may probably spread to other related wild species such
as sea-beet, this would probably not involve environmental risks as
there is no use of Round-up on the naturally occurring sea-beet.
The cross-pollination and back crossing between the cultivated beet
and the related species will eventually involve the transfer of the
inserted traits that confer glyphosate tolerance. This would imply
then that Roundup should not be used as a weed killer for weed
beets. But this will only be a problem in Southern Europe (for
example France) where the weed beet is recurrent. Thus, RISØ
evaluated that the main disadvantage with the use of the above
Round up ready crops will be the development of Roundup tolerance
weed beets158.
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The Government's Deliberation
Generally, in the initial notification, the Minister of Environment
(who bears the supreme authority on the notifications) saw the
development of the genetic engineering technology as a move
towards a direction that involved a number of benefits but maybe
also a number of risks159.
"Seen in a wider perspective, the Western society is in a threshold of a new development,
a development that could mean a technological and economic breakthrough — of
significance for Denmark" (my translation)160.
In addition, the Minister of Environment saw the entire genetic
project as involving a number of possibilities. This is for example,
replacing chemical industry with a new more environmentally
benign bio-industries that could reduce environmental problems as
we know them. Well used, argued the Minister, the genetic
engineering technology could promote a more sustainable industrial
development:
"well used, genetic engineering will promote an industrial environment that is based on a
sustainable development. Therefore, it is my position that we should exempt this concrete
application because I am clearly sympathetic I o the fact that the Danish industries are
heading towards a more environmentally benign industrial production. Otherwise, such
endeavors would only occur in other places without the Danish people having any
influence whatsoever" (my translation)161.
With respect to the fear that genetically engineered plants would
increase herbicide use, in the initial application, the Minister stated
that:
"The concrete case involves a whole new research and development area ... A
development that we shall research on ... while hoping and expecting that in this
development, we shall find a way for solving a number of social problems... Thus, this
leaves a considerable obligation on the part of the authority to ensure that gene
technology is applied reasonably... Consequently, the exemption of Danisco's deliberate
release application will be a small step towards this direction .." (my translation)162.
Better still, for the Minister, the release was to be treated as a
principal release research and as an opportunity for carrying out
research that could provide information that would be useful
(especially for the competent authority) in the evaluation of future
release notifications.
Ethically, the Minister was sympathetic to the fact that there were
fear about the effects of this technology and this was ethically
justifiable. Nevertheless, for the Minister, this was as a result of the
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bad experiences that the society had experienced with older
technologies. Thus, it was important to spell-out how much those
feelings were owing to the lack of knowledge and the comprehension
of the new16".
As the bio-project and the pervasion of its impact are yet to fathom,
the Minister underscored the need for public debates and
orientations on the possibilities and consequences of the entire
genetic project.
On the concrete case, ecological wise, the Minister argued that there
were no anticipated negative effects with respect to the
establishment of Round up ready beets or traits in the nature. With
respect to cross-pollination, toxicological, the use of herbicide and
its effects on the flora and fauna, the Minister stated that there were
zero unwanted or unexpected consequences. However, the Minister
indicated that the situation would be different if the beets'
cultivation would increase in size or if the genetic engineering
technic opened other possibilities for the use of Round-up in corn
cultivation164.
With respect to agricultural effects, the Minister stated that the
risks for a natural selection of the weed plants and sensitivity
towards round-up were considered to be minimal. However, the
Minister underlined that if the same weed killer was sprayed on a
number of crops in the same field (for example, during the crop-
rotation) — there was a high possibility that the weed would develop
a resistance against the given weed killer. Consequently there was a
need to evaluate from case by case with the future notifications.
Concludingly, in the initial application, the government (Ministry of
Environment) envisioned no possible environmental, ecological,
agricultural or toxicological risks that would accompany the release
of Round up ready beets — hence the government's sympathy165.
"Any unwanted ecological, toxicological, pesticide use and the environmental impacts
that would follow such a deliberate release would not be dangerous " (my translation)166.
And the government maintained this position throughout the
deliberate release research notifications to the market notification:
"the product can be placed in the Community market without any risk to human health,
ecology and the environment".167
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Party Level (Negotiation) Politics
During the parliamentary negotiations, there was a general
unanimity on the need to support the deliberate release research
amongst the majority (the Conservative Party, the Social Democrats,
the Danish Liberal Party, the Socialist People's party, the Social
Liberals and the CD) and so with the minority (the Progressive
Party). The support for the release research was based on
international competitiveness; economic; sustainable development;
technological progress and industrial support - rationales168.
International Competitiveness;
According to the majority, there was a need to support the genetic
engineering research in Denmark. If otherwise, other organizations
in other countries would continue with the research and the Danish
society would have no influence on the security and control of the
research with reference to the environmental aspects169.
Moreover, the majority argued that Denmark had to liberalize its
genetic research stance as quickly as possible. Otherwise, in a
couple of years, Denmark would become a free land museum
irrespective of its strong bio-industries or the well functioning
agriculture, at the moment.
In line with this, for the sake of the Danish industrial'
competitiveness, the majority wanted the Danish industry and the
agricultural sector to be given the opportunity to research and
exploit the genetic technic. They postulated that the genetic
engineering technic was the future for the Danish industrial and
agricultural sector (ibid).
Environmental Arguments:
With reference to the Danish governmental action plan on the
reduction of the use of chemical agricultural tools (for controlling
pests, diseases and weed), the majority saw the genetic engineering
technology as a clean technology. A technology that could promote a
more sustainable agriculture — by substituting the use of
chemicals. Therefore, the support for the release of Round up ready
beets in Denmark — as a part of the Danish Environmental politics
was seen as compelling. Besides, from the Danish environmental
politics' perspective, a clear majority alleged that the genetic
119
engineering technology could be a general tool for realizing these
environmental objectives (ibid.).
According to some members of the majority, Danish industries are
among the world leaders in the genetic engineering research. This is
a development that Denmark should maintain and the industries
should have a lenient environment for executing the necessary
research. Moreover, the Danish society should support and control
the security of the research activities -- and this was only possible if
the companies operated in Denmark.
Evaluating the notifications (from an environmental perspective)
and the security measures therewith, the majority stated that they
were satisfied with the CA's assessments. In line with this, they
claimed that the research was in harmony with the OECD
precautionary principles of evaluation. Commenting on the use of
round-up, the majority asserted that one would wonder if Round-up
could be so effective and at the same time harmless. Nevertheless,
they did trust the CA's statement that Round-up was benign to the
environment, animal and human health. Moreover, they asserted
that they believed that there must have been valid assessments and
thorough considerations behind these statements (ibid.).
The members of the socialist people's party did not actually support
this assertion. According to the socialist people's party, though the
debate was discussing Round up ready beets' notifications, they saw
the perspective as scaring. Therein that - Denmark was following a
development path where instead of reducing the quantity of
herbicide use — it was in the process of developing plants that could
bear enormous amount of herbicides and at that - be able to spray
recklessly. According to the socialist people's party, the research
could in itself be of no negative consequences. However, they
foresaw a future that would be dominated by this type of
agriculture.
Similarly, the Socialist People's party saw the outlook as appalling.
They foresaw a future where agriculture in the industrial and
developing countries' becoming more and more dependent on some
multinational companies that patented both the resistant gene and
the weed killers. This trend, they argued, was not a sustainable
development — rather, the contrary (ibid.).
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From a nature and environmental perspective, the social democrats
did also question the effects of the development of the herbicide
resistant plants — seen from a Danish environmental (objectives')
perspective. So, though the social democrats were satisfied with the
suggested security provisions (for the concrete notification), they
were hesitant on the longer term consequences. For them, in the
longer term, the genetic engineering technology would counteract
the efforts of the government to reduce the use of pesticides (ibid).
The social democrats, found it decisive that the parliament and the
Minister's attestation on the DDS release research were a view only
for the concrete notification. This is because longer term
overspecialization of a certain weed killer could result into a natural
selection and growth of weed plants that are not sensitive over the
herbicide. Though, the statement continued, it is hardly a big
problem in Denmark as there are 3-5 years in between, before
sugar-beet is grown in the same field, there can be an additional
problem as long the same resistance is developed in a number of
different crops that are grown in the same field during the crop-
rotation. Consequently, there was a need to evaluate closely the
effects of the genetic engineering technic case by case. Thus, the
social democrats asserted that their approval for the concrete case
was in no way binding nor creating a precedence for future
notifications. Responding to this critic, the Minister agreed that
there could occur resistance against round-up in the longer
perspective if applied sufficiently long and therefore it would be
necessary to evaluate what was happening. However at the moment,
they could only evaluate the concrete or case to case170.
With the initial notification, for example, the social democrats found
it awkward that the Minister wanted to give a final approval even
before the greenhouse research had been finalized. The social
democrats very well understood that the DDS desperately wanted to
know if the government would approve the research. Besides, they
also understood that the Environment Minister was out considering
the importance of sending some signals to the Danish industry. Of
course they had their sympathy, however, this did not excuse that
the approval should be given before the greenhouse results were out
and the DDS would not get an)f further whether one procedure was
preferable than the other. In line with this, the social democrats
found it absurd that the final statement should be given before they
knew the final results of the greenhouse research. The correct way
to do this, according to the social democrats, was to consider the
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application once the greenhouse research data was on the table.
Consequently, they panned the Minister for negotiating the approval
beforehand rather than awaiting the final results from the
greenhouse research. With reference to the critic on the
awkwardness of the negotiation for approval before the greenhouse
results were out, the Minister said that this Avas something she had
thought over before. However, there had been so many times it had
been argued that the environmental demands were blocking
industrial development while consuming a lot of time during the
negotiation of the environmental demands of a given project. The
Minister found it calling to have things moving and in one way or
another the government should give signals to the Danish industry
that - if they came up with an application, even when there was
some missing information (research), the government was willing to
negotiate (ibid).
When she wished this, this was because there had been uncertainty
on whether one could get such an approval or not. The law was
restrictive and it ought to be restrictive and it was the right of the
companies in giving the signals that they can count on getting an
approval, if the rest is fine (ibid).
According to the Minister, there was also a myth that the
environmental authority was making it impossible for the Danish
industries, however, this v/as not the case and they wanted to show
that the government was willing to co-operate with the industries. It
was important that the Danish industries are environmental
sensitive, but this - according to the Minister, was only possible
through good and genuine co-operation (ibid).
Belaboring the point on the lack of a competent ecological
assessment on the DDS notification, the socialist people's party
indicated that Denmark should ensure that there are sufficient
ecological expertise for evaluating the technological development.
According to the socialist people's party, this was an objective that
was stressed in the parliament when it was negotiating the
biotechnological R&D program. Therewith, ecological research was
named as one of the contributing area that the parliamentary
majority supported171. According to the socialist people's party, by
this, the government consciously transgressed the parliamentary
decision and at that failed to support an area where the
development clearly had demonstrated a need for it.
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In line with this, the socialist people's party (SF) indicated that it
should be ensured that the biotechnological industries supported a
sustainable development while protecting Danish bio-diversity.
However, according to the SF, there was no guarantee that the
private companies would support such an endeavor and the DDS
release was a case in point. Private companies, according to SF,
would naturally be driven by economic imperatives and this was
more or less the case. Therefore, it was obvious that it was only the
public research institutes that could ensure that the development
would be towards the right direction172.
Economic aspects:
According to a clear majority, the Danish companies should have a
hospitable environment for undertaking their research or
production activities. If otherwise, these industries would move their
research activities abroad, together with the eventual production.
This would mean that Denmark would miss the respective economic
profits and the added employment opportunities173.
Comparing the Danish industrial environment with the other Nordic
countries, a clear majority postulated that the Danish industries
were subjected under (very) stringent rules and regulations. This
made the Danish industrial initiatives more arduous than it was
with the neighboring countries. This was posited to be one of the
causes for economic problems amongst the Danish biotechnological
indus tries.
From an international politics perspective, the social democrats
found it absurd that Denmark was being involved in sugar-beet
production. This was an area that other countries were spending a
lot of resources for its production and had better climatic
possibilities for production and hence profiting more than Denmark.
Patent:
According a clear majority, stringent genetic engineering rules and
regulations were inauspicious to the Danish industrial scientific
endeavor. In the longer term, claimed the majority, the Danish
industries' possibilities for patent accumulation would be obscure.
In a couple of years, this would imply that the Danish farmers
would be forced to buy seeds' year after year from foreign firms
patenting these plants. This was only because the Danish
government had failed to promote a friendly industrial environment
for developing agricultural technics at the right time.
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Technological Progress:
For many years, according to the majority, people have tried to
develop plants by more primitive measures. This attempt sometimes
resulted into incidental genetic combination and sometimes one
could cross undesired genetic composition. The traditional
improvement technic had the same goals as the genetic technic.
However, these methods demanded a lot of time and sometimes
made it impossible to cross the species barrier. Nevertheless, the
genetic engineering technic is a goal directed activity that could
change the organisms genetic characteristic in a goal directed
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manner .
In addition to this, the majority argued that nature improvement
activities have been going on for a long period of time. These
activities, support and the development therewith — had boosted
the living standards — especially in the western world. The majority
argued that as a result of this endeavor — the poverty in the
Western world was a bygone phenomenon. Consequently, genetic
engineering should be seen and supported as such175.
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Concluding Discussion
Following the public pressure for greater transparency and
accountability in biotechnology policy making, in the mid 1980s the
Danish Government responded with legislation that specified
stringent controls on the release of genetically modified organisms
into the environment. The Gene Technology and the Environment
Law (law 288 of 1986) gave the Ministry of Environment
responsibility for policy in this area. This decision embodied the
implicit judgment that gene technology was not so distinctive that it
required the creation of entirely new governmental and policy-
making institutions for purposes of regulation. However, previously
separate administrative sections were brought together and some
units or agencies were appointed whose purpose was to give some
central direction to policy.
The Danish Government adopted the use of traditional
administrative regulatory strategies - regulation by means of legal
rule, with wide administrative discretion and close working
relationships between regulators and those subject to regulation.
From this, we may infer that the policy relied upon the traditional
assumption that command and control by administrative rule was
the appropriate way to deal with the main problems.
In this thesis, we have seen that, throughout the implementation
process, the Danish green activists with their post-materialist
ideologies characterized "Roundup ready" sugar beets as an
irreversible danger and a threat to the balance of the ecosystem
whose potential negative impact was unpredictable. The green
activists claimed; that the pervasive use of Roundup ready plants
would encourage the further industrialization of agriculture, thus
supplementing the "pesticide-treadmill" with a "genetic treadmill" -
that is, a perpetual dependence on a series of genetic fixes; and that
it would lead to even greater agricultural intensification.
According to these critics, the entire project was a form of
technological determinism that transgressed nature at the same
time that it subordinated life to a commercial-technological
domination. Thus for the green activists, Danisco and the
proponents of Roundup ready plants were imposing their own
implicit model of nature and society. And according to these critics,
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the risk problems went beyond physically measurable effects, and
even beyond side- effects of desirable effects. Moreover, for the green
activists the engineering of plants to tolerate Round up or other
herbicides represented a perpetuation of farmers' dependence upon
herbicides (and the respective agrochemical concerns) while
aggravating weed problems. And for the greens, socio-economically
speaking, this was unacceptable.
Similarly, throughout the risk assessments, the green activists were
dissatisfied with the scientific basis for anticipating any
environmental harm from Roundup ready plants. They applied
incompatible cognitive frameworks and, in effect, disputed the
plausibility of knowledge-claims about the risks' uncertainty. In
addition, the green activists argued that Roundup ready plants'
behaviour in the wild might be unpredictable, by virtue of the
genetic modification process and/or the genetic novelty that it
helped to generate. In particular, they warned that inserted genes
might inadvertently confer a selective advantage, by analogy with
the behaviour of some non- indigenous organisms when they enter
a new environment. In the same vein, they expressed great concern
that Roundup ready plants (like other genetically modified plants)
might reduce the biodiversity of natural populations.
By contrast, proponents of Roundup ready plants believed that
risks encompassed some features that were regarded as benefits.
This was the case, for example, with the issue of molecular-level
repair of supposed genetic deficiency. Roundup ready plants were
defended merely as plants with corrected genetic deficiencies, thus
supplementing or improving natural processes. Roundup ready
crops, the proponents claimed, would provide greener choices for
society through environmentally-friendly products; and the
technology was celebrated as "value-added genetics". They argued
that modern biotechnology was only going to realize the
cornucopian potential of nature through natural methods; and that
Roundup ready beets, like other modified plants, would only
strengthen vulnerable crops against external threats which in turn
would protect society from demographic-economic disruption.
It is clear from this that the Danish biotechnology policy arena was
a controversial area of public regulation with an uncertain science
that was feeding into the policy process. But between 1988 and
September 1997, Danisco submitted no less than six successful
field release notifications and one successful market notification.
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How did the Danish government justify and legitimize all the release
approvals and the acceptance to put the genetically modified fodder
beet on the Community market?
In addressing this question, a number of issues need close
attention. On the face of it, both the original law 288 and its
subsequent amendments appear to be strict. The original virtual
ban and subsequent revisions elaborate and time-consuming
deliberation processes can be interpreted as a policy opposed to the
development and application of modern agricultural biotechnology
in Denmark. However, this was all symbolic. It was symbolic
because, though the 1986 law introduced a virtual ban, under §11,
line 3 of the law the responsible minister was given considerable
power of discretion. In individual cases, proposed releases could be
exempted from the ban. The grounds for such exemption were not
made clear. This became apparent when the Minister of
Environment approved the first notifications for field trials without
any reference to the special circumstances that warranted this
particular decision. Subsequently, as we have seen in this chapter,
between 1988 and September 1997 Danisco submitted no less than
six successful field release notifications and one successful market
notification for approval. As we have seen in the case study,
although the competent authority presented risk as a scientific and
technical problem, the criteria for safety claims were based on
value-laden assumptions rather than on strictly scientific grounds.
This effectively shielded the regulatory procedure from the focus of a
democratic scrutiny.
Similarly, the law gave the Ministry of Environment and its
bureaucratic machinery considerable powers of discretion - for
example, over how to conceptualize risks, how to define adverse
effects, and how to develop the appropriate expertise for risk
assessment. By exercising its discretion in areas such as these, the
Ministry of the Environment effectively marginalised other
categories of risk and other approaches to risk assessment. For
example, one set of issues that were marginalised in this way were
the possible health effects on humans of consuming dairy and meat
products derived from animals that had been fed on Roundup ready
beets. Another set of issues marginalised in this way were wider
social concerns such as socio-economic risks. Such concerns were
often raised by the greens; but the fragmentation of responsibility
within the policy-making process meant that, legally, such issues
could be left unaddressed.
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The Ministry of Environment and its bureaucratic machinery
fragmented the risk problem into separate administrative
procedures - environmental safety, food safety, agricultural safety,
ecological safety and herbicide usage. In this way, the competent
authority operationalized the law granting release and market
approval, while deferring awkward uncertainties about how to
predict and avert some plausible effects such as socio-economic
risks. Better still, it seems clear that the different agencies shared
the same belief system. This is because, for example, although
scientific disputes had originally influenced the establishment of
safety legislation, when the administrative machinery defined the
relevance of technical knowledge it selected and preferred scientific
statements that claimed that there were no risks envisaged from
such field releases over scientific statements that supported the
existence of environmental risks. In this way, the regulatory process
not only selected and integrated technical knowledge; it also set the
policy discourse, the policy agenda and the policy paradigm. The
regulatory process created an environment for ignoring or assuming
recognizable issues of social risks and concerns. From this, one
could hypothesis that the regulatory process and the selection of
expertise constituted a part of a scheme for determining what
counted as evidence and how potential contradictory information
was to be interpreted and reconciled.
There was a selective definition of risks throughout the policy
implementation process. For example, health risks that would
accompany the consumption of daiiy products derived from animals
fed with genetically modified fodder beets were overlooked. Though
partly this was because the applicant kept stating that the
notifications did not involve the exemption of Roundup ready plants
for human consumption, the potential chain effects of such
activities had been exemplified by the BSE crisis. But the policy
process's definition of risk managed successfully to overlook this
risk aspect. And through this, evaluators avoided having to assess
potential long term risks within the food chain. Similarly, the
administrative machinery was not set up to assess or deal with the
complex interaction of soil micro- organisms, and how they may in
return interact with surrounding plant species within a given
habitat. In this way, a host of potentially important ecological
questions were marginalised. In spite of the precautionary approach
of the competent authority and its administrative procedures, the
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implementation of law 288 (and its subsequent revisions) shrugged
off some tangible risks in this way.
In line with this, selective attention was built into the policy process
from the outset. This was reflected in the high priority accorded to
human and animal health and ecological and environmental issues,
and the low priority accorded to wider social concerns. Though the
regulation of genetically modified organisms was made with a
societal purpose, the need to make a cost-benefit analysis that
addressed the socio-economic impacts of this technology was
overlooked.
As stipulated in the gene-technology and the environment law, the
responsibility for the provision of information about the nature of
the process being regulated rested more with the releaser than with
the regulatory agencies themselves. It was the releaser who provided
the bulk of the information on safety. This could be taken to imply
that, implicitly, it was the releaser who both carried the burden of
evidence on safety and effectively established both the procedures
and the criteria for what would count as a sufficient precaution for
purposes of approval or exemption. Throughout, it was the releaser
who presented the evidence on safety, proposed the confinement
measures to be adopted, and responded to any further requests
from the regulators. The releaser often proposed tight control
measures, which in turn were meant to reduce uncertainty. In such
ways, the releaser provided the means for regulators to defend the
releaser's safety claims. However, what this sharing of information
meant implicitly was that the polic}^ process came to be dependent
upon a particular source of information and understanding and
upon a particular type of expertise. This in turn created a shared
network of actors who favoured the same policy strategy. Little
wonder that the release was treated as a principal release research
and as an opportunity for canying out research that could provide
information that would be useful (especially for the competent
authority) in the evaluation of future release notifications. Though
this argument was stated by Danisco throughout, it was also
accepted by the competent authority and the government. This
sharing of information created a close link between Danisco and the
bureaucracy, and this in turn weakened the force of democratic
scrutiny within the regulation process.
The competent authority quoted and trusted as scientifically valid
the applicant's statements concerning the precision of their
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techniques; and they did this without questioning any of the
techniques per se. Of course, this is because the regulators did not
possess better knowledge or a higher understanding of the
techniques being used than the applicant - who in this sense
occupied a most powerful position. This inequality of knowledge and
expertise between regulator and applicant is an extremely common
feature of the science and technology policy arena, especially when
policy involves the regulation of cutting edge research. Governments
generally do not have sufficient economic resources to enable them
to keep abreast of industrial cutting edge research in order to
procure knowledge that may be crucial for the independent
validation of applicants' statements. An example will illustrate how
current scientific research can be relevant to the implementation of
public policy for science and industry. A recent article in the
scientific journals Nature and Nature Biotechnology has shown that
instead of the strategy of manipulating genes by inserting the
desired gene or genes into DNA within the cell nucleus (as the
releaser in question had done), it is possible to insert the gene or
genes into chloroplast DNA through homologous recombination176.
This can mitigate the problem of "genetic pollution", because
chloroplast DNA is inherited maternally. (Clearly, maternal
inheritance of trans-genes would alleviate the problem of cross-
contamination of crops by means of pollination.) It is arguable that
knowledge of this technique is highly relevant to the task of
undertaking informed risk assessment and developing appropriate
genetic pollution abatement measures. If the responsible authority
and the releaser had chosen, they might have been able to use this
technique to develop a more compelling safety protocol than the one
actually applied.
Throughout, the Government maintained that there were anxieties
that the release of the genetically modified plants could involve
potential risks not only to human health but also to the
environment. They claimed that there could be a risk that the
widespread use and release of genetically modified plants could
upset the delicate balance existing in nature or even have longer
term evolutionary impacts. Such language appropriated a post-
materialist image of a fragile nature, as opposed to materialist
images of a resilient, perfectly adapted nature. The language of
possible or relative risks also complemented biotechnology
regulation as a precautionary instrument for conceptualizing and
managing uncertainties about risks. This helped to legitimize and
justify the exemptions. The Danish Competent authority never
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identified a risk in the conventional sense. They never assessed
Roundup ready beets as potential causes of specific harms, with the
prospect of a possible ban on release. At most, the competent
authority acknowledged familiar and yet manageable risks and
uncertainties about unintended effects that might constitute or lead
to environmental harm. However, these uncertainties were deemed
to be manageable if not as entailing zero risks.
In various ways, the competent authority acknowledged
uncertainties about how to conceptualize risks that might have
accompanied the release of the genetically manipulated plants, as
well as uncertainties about how to demonstrate safety and how to
define safety. They sought ways to make the predictive uncertainties
manageable, for instance by restricting the spread of transgenic
material through physically distancing the plants. Such measures
helped the competent authority make a convincing case that the
releases for which exemption was sought were adequately designed
to prevent potential harm.
In evaluating the potential agricultural, ecological, environmental
and health effects that might accompany the release of Round up
ready beets, the competent authority relied extensively upon general
statements concerning the acceptability of minimal impacts rather
than upon detailed technical risk assessments. This reliance was
necessitated by the fact that the competent authority was not in a
position to identify the actual risks that were involved in these
particular releases. Scientifically speaking, as indicated by the
Nature and Forest Agency's competent authority, the field in
question was - and still is - relatively under-developed. For this
reason, evaluation was only based on a very limited array of
scientific evidence. But what is striking in this case is the extent to
which the competent authority was able to use normative
acceptability criteria as a sufficient basis for declaring all the
identified risks safe because they were sufficiently well-known
(familiar, commonplace), sufficiently minor (low impact, negligible)
and sufficiently manageable. For example, the initial field release
was approved even before the greenhouse research was complete. At
this stage, there was absolutely no scientific evidence concerning
the characteristics that were crucial for evaluating the possible
establishment and spread of the modified sugar-beet. Instead, the
evaluation was based exclusively on earlier experience and
knowledge of non-modified beets. Better still, the Minister of
Environment gave the exemption without stating what - in
131
accordance with the law - were the special circumstances particular
to this case. For trial releases, regulators avoided dealing with or
clarify the uncertainty issue by maintaining the argument that,
since the Roundup ready beets were only planted in paper pots,
they were in reproductive isolation. Confinement seems to have
been required mainly in order to address uncertainty regarding the
possible extent of general environmental or ecological risks, rather
than out of a need to control specifically identified risks. In ways
such as this, the regulators ended up bargaining risk control and
mitigation strategies. The regulators mainly negotiated compliance
rather than enforcing standards.
It Avas also commonplace among regulators that, in evaluating the
potential effects of Roundup ready beets, greater knowledge about
the ecological background was deemed important. In the
complementary route toward familiarity, the competent authority
sought to ascertain a standard baseline. In doing so, they compared
the potential effects of Roundup ready beets with an acceptable
norm - for example, reference to normal agricultural practices. Past
experiences with conventional agricultural practices were taken as
an acceptable baseline for evaluating Roundup ready beets. The
regulators often cited analogies to documented effects in nature and
in agriculture. For example, they argued that Roundup ready beets
can be assessed by taking into account normally accepted levels of
risks - such as accepted levels of risk in conventional agricultural
practices. However, throughout the deliberations it was not clear
what was the competent authority's criterion for defining what they
meant by "conventional agricultural practice". This is crucial
because different groups interpret this item differently. For example,
an organic farmer and a traditional farmer would have difficulties in
agreeing what is a conventional agricultural practice.
Similarly, in evaluating the spread or transfer of the resistant gene,
the competent authority argued that any spread or transfer of the
Roundup gene could be controlled by the use of existing
management strategies such as the use of other herbicides.
Implicitly, this official rationale set a normative baseline for the
future: if genetically modified crops were to become tolerant to
several herbicides, such an effect would be acceptable provided that
biotechnology research and development could apply a new
combination of herbicide and herbicide tolerant crops for controlling
weeds. But by so doing, the competent authority formulated norms
that defined the acceptability of potential effects. These norms
132
accepted the "genetic-herbicide treadmill" scenario which underlies
the self perpetuating problem of definition of biotechnology R&D.
Within this logic, new products may offer benefits by solving
problems caused by previous products; conversely, undesirable
effects are rendered acceptable by future technological progress.
With time, the competent authority claimed that enough knowledge
had been amassed. This knowledge served to underscore the
argument that Roundup ready beets were similar to non-modified
beets. In this way, they were familiar. Although familiarity was
mainly with reference to the safety of the crop and not the
familiarity with the inserted gene, due to its practicability, the
familiarity principle was used to structure discussion about whether
regulators have adequate knowledge and experience for judging the
safety of the Roundup ready beets and for managing these risks.
Familiarity as the point of departure proved to be an attractive
benchmark because it not only reduced uncertainty in the
evaluation of individual cases but also accommodated diverse
meanings. It was used to argue that the effects of genetically
manipulated plants were adequately predictable. It was said, for
example, that their components were familiar, and that no unusual
effects were observed in the green house, in the small-scale field
trials, and again that parallel research had resolved some
uncertainty. The familiarity benchmark served as an implicit policy
instrument for reducing uncertainty and defining evidence of safety,
and for portraying Round up ready beets as normal products.
Although the familiarity benchmark was originally proposed for
enhancing the predictability of potential effects, it could also have
implied their acceptability. Implicitly, the familiarity benchmark was
equated with acceptability and thus with safety. Safety judgments
came to be dependent on normative and contentious accounts of
nature, and on a criterion of relative, familiar and acceptable risks.
Familiarity bred acceptance of normal and manageable risks. And
control and mitigation paradigms held sway. In sum, when the
competent authority evaluated risks, these risks were abstracted as
uncertainties in diverse ways. But in general, the gist of the
regulation was to defy or overcome uncertainty about whether
Roundup ready beets posed any risk. This was done through the
dominant approach to the problem, which accepted and reinforced
the biotechnological problem formulation, i.e. the molecular-level
agronomic control. By so doing, the Danish regulation was
biotechnologized. This endorsed, justified and legitimized modern
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agricultural biotechnology; and because of this, modern agricultural
biotechnology happened in Denmark.
Similarly, the Danish Government viewed the notification of
biotechnology in agriculture as part of a more general technological
breakthrough; it was a small step in the direction that could
procure new tools for solving social problems. Besides, it was also
seen as a possibility for procuring useful information that would be
decisive for the evaluation of future release notifications. Similarly,
the Government hailed biotechnology as a technological
breakthrough with enormous economic potential both for Danish
industry and for Danish society in general. In line with this, the
Government viewed biotechnology as supplemental to and
improving of natural processes that could boost the agricultural
sector. It was also acclaimed as a greener technology that was
crucial for Danish environmental politics because it was
environmentally benign.
Generally, the majority of the Danish politicians were very positive
and enthusiastic about genetic engineering in general and in their
attitudes towards Danisco's Roundup ready beets notifications in
particular. Their value judgments were based on economic
imperatives in the main; on the view that the technology was of
great economic potential for Danish industry and for the wider
society as a whole. Moreover, the majority of the Danish politicians
saw the technology within an older framework of improvement, as
enhancing productivity and efficiency through technology. However,
unlike much older technology, agricultural biotechnology was more
goal-oriented; as such, it was to be treated as a form of
technological progress that was decisive for Danish agricultural and
industrial production. Furthermore, gene technology was evaluated
as a tool for international competitiveness. The view was adopted
that, without this technology, Denmark would eventually become
little more than a museum.
In line with this, a clear Parliamentary majority evaluated the
technology as more environmentally benign and as a tool for
realizing Danish environmental objectives. Consequently, the need
to promote research and development activities in this direction was
generally recognised. This was so if Danish companies were to
acquire scientific patents. Without these, Danish society would
become dependent on organizations in other countries that were
able to accumulate such patents from their scientific endeavour.
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Thus far, I have set out a theoretical perspective which serves as a
background for analysing the challenges that are prevalent in the
science and technology policy landscape. I have discussed risk
issues, the problems of scientific uncertainty, non-knowledge, and
unawareness in science and technology policy. I have also
articulated the different relationship between knowledge and
politics, and furthermore a different assessment of reason and its
place in public policy. I have also shown how the political
disillusionment and debates of the late-1960s and early-1970s
spilled over to the modern biotechnology debate. In this empirical
chapter, I have assessed how the Danish government implemented
the gene-technology and environment law in practice. The chapter
has claimed that the Danish government demonstrated a greater
willingness to act than to actually solve the problem; for this reason,
it is hypothesized that the legislation regarding field release of
genetically modified organisms was adopted more for symbolic than
for practical reasons.
Similarly, the chapter claims that there was a selective attention to
some risk issues at the same time that other risks were
marginalised; that the risk assessment was more a normative than
a scientific assessment; that there was a close link between Danisco
and the bureaucratic machinery, which shielded the procedure from
fully democratic scrutiny; and that for the Danish government risks
were uncertain, yet familiar, manageable and thus acceptable.
Finally, reviewing the entire case study, the chapter claims that
throughout the policy implementation process the Danish
government consistently maintained a wholly supportive stance
towards the development of modern agricultural biotechnology, and
this was in spite of the limitations of scientific knowledge about
short- and long-term effects of the release of genetically modified
organisms into the environment. But faced with a potentially
sceptical Danish public, the Danish government developed a policy
infrastructure that - while it gave every appearance of being well-
informed, cautious, careful and responsible - actually facilitated the
continued development of agricultural biotechnology in Denmark.
Thus far, the question: "what light does the case study throw on
current sociological and policy science theories of decision-making
in sceptical contexts?" - merits my attention.
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Therefore, the following chapter will be an integrative concluding
discussion which draws out the lessons that can be learned from
the case study and the light this may shed on current sociological
and policy science theories of decision-making in sceptical contexts.
This will be done by relating the case study to the theoretical
framework.
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Chapter 4
Integrative Concluding Discussion
This final chapter draws out the lessons that can be learned from
the case study. It does this by relating the case study to the
theoretical orientations described in the first part of the thesis.
Here, the key question is: what light does the case study throw on
current sociological and policy science theories of decision-making
in sceptical contexts?
The thesis has outlined the characteristics of modern agricultural
biotechnology as a policy issue. In summary, it has shown that
modern agricultural biotechnology policy is a regulatory policy that
has much in common with other environmental policies; that is,
agricultural biotechnology policy consists of measures that seek to
control legitimate economic activities in the public interest. There is
a complex technical core to agricultural biotechnology policy; but its
aim is to facilitate useful industrial activity without incurring
obvious harms, such as: a genetically polluted environment, an
unbalanced ecosystem, or detrimental effects on animal or human
health.
The thesis has shown that modern agricultural biotechnology policy
has been shaped by structural changes in patterns of social
organization and social relations in so-called late-industrial society.
In late-industrial society, rising living standards have changed the
public's outlook on innovations in science and technology that are
perceived to carry risks. At the same time, rising educational levels
have fostered a public that is both better informed and more readily
critical of new developments that are perceived to threaten existing
standards of living and established life styles. Late-industrial society
is also an information society; increasingly, the rapid circulation of
information has helped focus public attention on internationally
significant events including debates about the nature and social
significance of new technologies.
Late-industrial society is a society that possesses a "post-material"
value system. Within such a value system, the avoidance of
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unnecessary risks and the protection of the environment are both
accorded a relatively high priority. The risk-averse nature of post-
materialism fosters a general scepticism about new developments
that appear to threaten either the natural or the human world. For
this reason, post-material values are associated with a general crisis
in the credibility of science and political institutions. Agricultural
biotechnology policy-making in Denmark has had to operate in the
context of this crisis of credibility.
The thesis has suggested that the policy process has experienced
persistent difficulty in dealing with the risks that may be associated
with advances in agricultural biotechnology. Although scientific
advice has been of crucial importance in assessing the nature of
and extent of these risks, such scientific knowledge has frequently
been both limited and contested. Dealing with scientific uncertainty
is inherently difficult; but the situation has been made even more
problematic for policy-makers - first, because particular interest
groups in the debate have sought to use the authority of science to
bolster their (very different) positions; and second, because the
resulting disagreements within the policy-making process have been
aired in the context of an increasingly sceptical public.
The theory of reflexive modernisation argues that late-industrial
society is at a stage in its life where scientific knowledge is
uncertain, contested and cannot go unchallenged. This is true, and
we have seen it prevalent in the case stud}'. However, uncertainty is
inevitable in science and technology assessments - especially with
those assessments that are dealing with cutting edge technology.
Thus, what is interesting is not uncertainty per se, as this is well
known in theory and in practice. Rather, what is interesting is how
the policy process deals with this uncertainty. In the case study, we
have seen that, on enacting the Gene-technology and the
Environment law, the Danish government stipulated that there was
a lack of experience with the release of genetically modified
organisms and cells. More particularly, the competent authority
acknowledged that the currently available scientific knowledge of
the accompanying effects was not adequate for predicting any
accompanying impacts — for example on the environment. Further,
it also clearly stated that plants' genetic modification was a very
young field. Consequently, risk assessments had to be based on a
limited amount of experience gained while the technology was still
under active development. Thus, the government and the competent
authority acknowledged the uncertain nature of the scientific
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knowledge. The greens exploited this acknowledgement, by insisting
throughout that on the contested nature of the scientific advice that
was being used by policy-makers. Yet, despite this dual
acknowledgement of the uncertain nature of the relevant scientific
knowledge, the government exempted all of Danisco
applications/notifications under the terms of the Gene-Technology
and the Environment Law. How can this be understood? In the case
study, it is apparent that it was the meaning and the interpretation
of scientific uncertainty by the government and the competent
authority that came to play a crucial role in the risk assessments,
and thus in the formulation of public policy. The competent
authority acknowledged uncertainties about how to conceptualize
risks that might have accompanied the release of genetically
manipulated plants, as well as uncertainties about how to define
and demonstrate safety. However, it is striking that for Danish
Danisco, the competent authority and the government uncertainty
was first made controllable and manageable, and then found
acceptable. In other words, what was crucial in the policy-making
process was the way in which predictive uncertainties were made to
seem controllable - or at least, controllable enough for the purposes
of approval. The management of scientific uncertainty took many
forms. For example, physical procedures employed for this purpose
included the growing of genetically modified plants in paper pots,
and the physical distancing of Round up ready plants from other
related species with which they could cross pollinate. These were
both physical techniques used to persuade regulators that risks of
genetic pollution had been adequately contained. In addition to
these physical procedures, other techniques of risk evaluation were
used to overcome uncertainty. For example, as time went on it was
claimed that enough knowledge had been amassed to confirm that
genetically modified beets were similar to unmodified beets. In this
way, the characteristics of the modified beets were argued to be
uncertain but familiar. Familiarity was regularly used to structure
discussion about whether regulators had adequate knowledge and
experience to judge the safety of Round up ready beets. For
example, it was argued that the effects of Round up ready plants
were uncertain but adequately predictable. It was said, for example,
that their components were uncertain but familiar. In such ways,
the familiarity benchmark served as an implicit policy instrument
for defining evidence of safety or acceptability by portraying the
Round up ready beets as normal products. Implicitly, familiarity
was equated with acceptability and thus with safety. Safety
judgments came to be dependent on contentious accounts of
139
nature, and on a criterion of uncertain but relatively familiar and
thus acceptable risks. Familiarity bred acceptance of uncertain but
normal and manageable risks. While the reflexive modernisation
theory is surely correct, therefore, in stressing the importance of
scientific uncertainty, this thesis demonstrates that even under the
conditions of reflexive modernity actors may find ways of
successfully domesticating such uncertainty in the interests of
modernist (i.e., unreflexively science-based) policy-making.
Similarly, the reflexive modernization theory argues that science
and technology policy are driven by economic interests or the
imperatives of international competitiveness (Beck 1998). In the
case study, Danish Danisco Sugar openly stated that one of the
reasons they were undertaking research on genetically modified
crop plants was in order to assess the economic potential of gene
technolog}^ in agriculture. In various Parliamentary discussions,
considerable sympathy was expressed with this ambition. This is a
tricky affair in late-industrial society, where we witness aggressive
industrial competition at the global level. Worse, science and
especially cutting edge technology requires large investment costing
billions of Kroner that only big industrial concerns can afford.
Governments generally do not have sufficient economic resources to
enable them to undertake such expensive cutting edge industrial
research. For this reason, they find themselves in a situation where
they have to cooperate with industries. On the other hand,
industries are generally set up to generate profit, and this cannot be
achieved without investment - which more often than not involves
the deployment of risky technologies. In the case study, we generally
see economic concerns prevailing; throughout, they crucially inform
the outlook of both industry and government; and they crucially
inform the policy-making process. This fits well with one of the
reflexive modernization theory's main point that when economic
interests prevail, objectivity and dispassionate assessment of
evidence go out of the window. Governments find themselves caught
up in a situation where they are forced to support and cooperate
with industries in order to further the economic interests of the
nation. There is nothing inherently wrong with opening markets or
areas of expansion with promise for the future. However, what is
problematic for policy where critical values are at stake is that, with
economic interests to the fore, it is very hard for the policy process
to ensure reasonably objective and dispassionate technological
assessments.
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Further, the reflexive modernization theory raises the issue of the
awareness of the unawareness of side-effects that can accompany
mega-technologies becoming the motor of social changes in late-
industrial society - rather than the instrumental linear rationality
(Beck 1997). In the case study, we clearly witnessed this appearing
to be one of the motors of the Danish policy process. For example,
the Danish Gene-technology and Environment law was designed to
prevent hazards - hazards that had not yet been documented. In
fact, the Danish government stipulated that there was a lack of
experience with the release of genetically modified organisms or
cells. It said that the then existing natural science knowledge could
not be considered as adequate for predicting the accompanying
effects - for example to the environment. Thus, risks could only be
abated by adopting the OECD precautionary principle. Why did the
Danish government implement the OECD precautionary - bearing in
mind that the precautionary principle was not a clear mandate for
policy practice but a mere recommendation? In the case study, most
notably the 1989-1990 field release application, the risk
assessments were carried out even before the greenhouse research
was complete. Worse, the government deliberated and approved the
first field release even before the greenhouse research and its result
were complete. When the Minister of the Environment was asked by
the critics why they were deliberating on the field release even
before the greenhouse results were out, the Minister replied that
"the OECD precautionary principle was a recommendation rather
than a rule." Moreover, during the 1990 and 1991 field release test,
there was pollen leakage from the research area causing cross
pollination with the test plants of a related species. According to the
OECD precautionary principle, the next step should only be carried
out if the earlier release research gave evidence of safety. Yet the
Danish government exempted the following research notification,
even after the previous research had shown evidence of pollen
leakage and transfer. Why did the Danish government apply the
precautionary principle at the outset, and then not follow its
guidelines in the course of subsequent events? Here, it should be
noted that the precautionaiy principle itself provides no definition of
a step, or of safety, or of environmental harm. It is the law that
provides the procedures for defining these terms in practice. As we
have seen, the Danish Gene-technology and Environment law gave
the competent authority the power of discretion. It was the
competent authority that defined what was a step and what was a
sufficient precautionary measure. Then what, we may ask, was the
purpose of invoking the precautionary principle in the first place?
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One could hypothesise that the invoking of the precautionary
principle was principally a symbolic move designed to demonstrate
a commitment to a responsible policy of regulation in the face of a
critical public.
In addition, the reflexive modernization theory argues that there is a
crisis of public confidence in science or governing authority, and
that there is a need to integrate a sociological approach in the policy
process (Beck 1997). In the case study, critics of Round up ready
plants, especially the greens, kept insisting that the scientific base
of the competent authority and thus the government was based on
an uncertain and contested science. Thus, for them scientific
evidence had no more substantive merits than sociological evidence.
In the case study, we clearly saw the government downplaying
social issues to the advantage of natura), science and economic
issues. For example, the Council of Nature Conservation was
sympathetic while endorsing the need to integrate social concerns.
As an example, the Council wanted the government to consider the
question of whether Danish society needed Round up ready beets in
their environment or not. The government circumscribed this issue
for economic and international competitiveness concerns while
keeping the argument firmly on the terrain of science. In part, this
move reflected the Danish government's political construction of
knowledge. The political and administrative systems paid more
attention to some forms of information than they did to others, not
because of the intrinsic merits of the preferred forms of evidence but
because the selection was influenced by the background and the
disciplinary specialism of the policy community together with their
perceptions of legitimacy. The argument that "social needs" should
be part of the decision-making process is interesting, not least
because it is a clear departure from both the "reductionist"
approach and the market approach. A key point here is that the
concept of "social needs" is a euphemism that allows all sorts of
alternative political values to be imported into the policy process.
Hence, one could hypothesise that it is in order to keep these values
out of the policy process the Danish government rejected this
approach.
Moreover, the reflexive modernization theory argues that more than
merely technical issues force themselves into the debate under the
conditions of "reflexive modernity". And that in late-industrial
society, reductionist models are utterly inadequate tools for science
and technology policy design, for science has failed to predict rare
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events with any great accuracy (Beck 1997). In the case study, these
issues were openly recognized and stated by the competent
authority, the government and other interested groups. If this
recognition is taken as a criterion for assessment, then, in
Denmark, we appear to be dealing with a classically late-industrial
society. Yet in the case study, we found evidence that in the policy
process the policy instiuitions successfully restricted the debate to
largely technical grounds. This evidence contradicts the reflexive
modernization thesis. However, it should be noted that in the case
study the Ministry of Environment and its bureaucratic machinery
were given considerable powers of discretion. This was the case, for
example, over how to develop the appropriate expertise for risk
assessment. By exercising its discretion in areas such as this, the
government choose a scientific approach as the guiding policy
outlook. By so doing, it effectively marginalised the legitimacy of
other categories of risk evidence and other approaches to risk
assessment - for example, the wider social approach. This can
plausibly be justified on the argument that modern agricultural
biotechnology is inherently technical and thus, for an informed
policy advice, the competent authority had to heavily rely upon
science at the stage of identifying and framing the characteristics of
Round up ready beets, let alone determining the possible answers
crucial for policy advice. Undeniably, scientific knowledge is crucial
in science and technological policy, especially those policies that
deal with an inherently cutting edge scientific and technological
problem. Nevertheless, where the problem arises here is that in this
case the scientific knowledge could only be delivered by Danisco. We
saw in the case study that the responsibility for the provision of
information about the nature of the process being regulated rested
more with the releaser than with the regulatory agencies
themselves. It was the releaser who provided the bulk of the
information on safety. Implicitly, then, it was the releaser who
carried the burden of evidence on safety and effectively established
both the procedures and the criteria for what would count as a
sufficient precaution for purposes of approval or exemption.
Throughout, it was the releaser who presented the evidence on
safety, proposed the confinement measures to be adopted, and
responded to any further requests from the regulators. Of course,
this was because neither the regulators nor any other interested
party (including the greens) possessed better knowledge or a higher
understanding of the applied technique than the releaser. In this
sense, Danisco occupied a most powerful position. Due both to lack
of suitable opportunities for research and to lack of resources, the
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critics did not possess more powerful information than Danisco; the
critics could not afford to undertake a parallel research that could
procure competent knowledge equal or superior to that possessed
by the releaser. If, as is commonly argued, knowledge is power, then
it must be said that here we witness inequality in the policy process.
Even though other interested and affected actors were integrated in
the polic}' process, the releaser possessed more knowledge and
expertise (hence power) than the regulator or critics. Thus what is
interesting here is that even though the policy process tried to
integrate other actors and other concerns, by choosing to base its
assessments principally on scientific grounds it effectively left
Danisco in the most powerful position. Had other -for example,
social-economic - grounds for policy-making been chosen, it is
arguable that a very different relationship of relative power among
the competing interest groups would have been established.
The reflexive modernization theory have pointed to the need for
more democratic policy processes, in which other social needs and
concerns are taken into consideration alongside technical and
economic issues. In the case study, the government argued for
greater public participation. During the deliberations, various
politicians underscored the need for public debates and orientations
on the possibilities and the consequences of the entire genetic
project. Yet, as we have seen, international competitiveness and
economic needs took precedence over social needs. Hence, one
wonders if the government really wanted greater "public
participation" in the Danish policy process. One could hypothesise
that the government symbolically supported this so that they could
be seen as legitimate representatives of "the public". The policy
process lacked transparent and participatory structures that are
necessary in order to rebuild public trust and confidence. This failed
to foster a sustained, healthy and constructive dialogue among the
affected and interested groups while accepting and integrating what
the reflexive modernization theory terms "ambivalence" into the
policy process.
The section of the thesis that is concerned with discourses in
science and technology policy landscape rehearses those discourses
that have become important in science and technological policy
arenas while becoming a guiding outlook for policy design. It argued
that these discourses were prevalent from the late-1960s through to
the 1990s, especially following experiences such as nitrogen
leaching and eutrophication from chemical use in agriculture and
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nuclear power plants accidents. The case study shows how the
Danish government sought to comprehend the importance of these
developments in agricultural biotechnology policy-making. For
example, in the Danish biotechnology policy process, public
pressure forced the government to draw on inter-ministerial in-
house expertise, with a public consultation and a parliamentary
debate that were put in place to incorporate environmental,
economic and social values in the policy process. During the
deliberation of the notifications, the regulators asked all the
interested bodies for advice while granting public access to every
aspect of the regulatory discussions. In the deliberation of release
notifications, universities, independent researchers, industry,
pressure groups and other interested bodies were heard as a part of
the consultation. On the face of it, therefore, this seems to be
consistent with the reflexive modernization theory's views on the
nature of science and technology polic}^ under conditions of reflexive
modernity and on the need to accept a wide range of "players" in the
policy process. Further, throughout the policy process the Danish
government maintained that there were anxieties that the release of
the genetically modified plants could involve potential risks not only
to human health but also to the environment. They claimed that
there could be a risk that the widespread use and release of
genetically modified plants could upset the delicate balance existing
in nature or even have longer term evolutionary impacts. Again, on
the face of it, the Danish government's language seemed to
appropriate a post-materialist image of a fragile nature, as opposed
to materialist images of a resilient and perfectly adapted nature
which again seems to endorse the reflexive modernization theory's
world view. Moreover, the language of possible or relative risks
complemented the regulation of modern agricultural biotechnology
as a precautionary instrument for conceptualizing and managing
uncertainties about risks. As indicated earlier, Danisco often
proposed tight control measures that were meant to protect it from
considerable public suspicion and to rebuild public confidence; to
calm criticism while curtailing any public scrutiny. From the above
developments, it is evident that both Danish industry and the
Danish government had recognized the "reflexive" nature of the
political environment in which they were operating, together with
the need to set up a strategy that would deal with this reflexivity. It
seems that they read the importance of integrating these concerns -
a lesson learnt from preceding experiences, for example, during the
campaign against civil nuclear power plants by the green coalitions
in the 1970s through to the mid-1980s. From these experiences,
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these traditionally powerful institutions construed that in well
educated, well-informed and relatively affluent societies like
Denmark, society can afford to be risk-averse. So, in justifying the
need to develop risky technologies, these decisions must be
negotiated, discussed and justified.
On the other hand, one could read these same developments as a
sign of recognition on the part of the Danish government that there
is a general crisis of public confidence in science, industrial and
political institutions, and that the sheer scale of this crisis makes it
less and less possible to ignore its importance. Such recognition, it
could be argued, would indicate the need to put in place policy
infrastructures to curtail public scrutiny and rebuild public
confidence, while at the same time maintaining the status quo. We
have seen in the case study that the Danish government did not
have any compelling scientific evidence to support the exemption of
the research, and yet it held on to a scientific approach as the
principal criterion for policy advice even though the relevant
scientific knowledge was uncertain and contested. We have seen,
also, that the government seemed willing to incorporate social
issues into the policy process, and yet it gave priority to purely
economic imperatives. Further, the government integrated a wide
range of interested actors into the policy process, and yet it
successfully marginalised their concerns. For all of these reasons,
one could argue that the Danish government connived to prevent
the public from really seeing what was happening. Yet this symbolic
"reflexive" aura helped the government to appear as if it recognized
broad based social issues and concerns; and this appearance in
turn helped to facilitate modern agricultural biotechnology in
Denmark.
Thus far we have seen that the reflexive modernization theory has a
certain limited usefulness in the analysis of modern agricultural
biotechnology policy. In the case study, we see Denmark as a classic
late-industrial society whose policy process seems to incorporate all
the key characteristics of a reflexive modernity. We witness the
awareness of scientific uncertainty; the awareness of the
unawareness of possible side-effects; the awareness of the need to
integrate social approach in the policy process; and the awareness
of the need to democratize the policy process - all of which are
prevalent tendencies under the conditions of reflexive modernity.
However, in the case study it is only the greens who may be said to
truly operate within the terms of such reflexive modernity.
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Certainly, the government and the industrial community are aware
of their reflexive political environment; but while they symbolically
acknowledge this fact, they simultaneously work to keep the policy-
making process resolutely modernist. The reflexive modernization
fails to capture the capacity of governments and industries to resist
the tendencies inherent in reflexive modernity. Partly, this is
because the theory is very general while keeping its discussions
and analysis at a very abstract level. For the reflexive modernization
theory, reflexivity is an important and unavoidable tendency in late-
industrial society. The theory never takes into consideration how
traditionally pre-eminent institutions in late-industrial societies
may recognize and adapt to the developments it describes while still
maintaining their powerful positions. As we have seen in the case in
question, all the elements of a "reflexive" policy process seem to be
present in the Danish policy process; but they are present only as a
facade. Behind that fa?ade are to be found the hidden agendas of
traditionally powerful institutions, which have found ways and
means of coping with their reflexive" environment while
maintaining the status quo.
The theory of "three faces" of policy analysis has raised the issue of
the symbiotic relationship between science and politics in policy
making. Particularly, the "third face" of policy analysis argues that
in the policy making and implementation process, science support
politics and politics support science. In the case study, we have
seen that the political and administrative systems paid more
attention to a scientific approach than a social approach - and this,
not because of the merits of the scientific evidence, but because the
selection was influenced by the background and the disciplinary
specialism of the policy community and the perceptions of
legitimacy. However, by so doing, the government downplayed the
sociological evidence to the advantage of the natural science
evidence. In this way, politics supported science while endorsing the
powerful position of the industrial interests in the policy process.
Further, we have seen that the competent authority and the
government treated the release research as a principal research and
as an opportunity for carrying out research that could provide
information that would be useful (especially for the competent
authority) in the evaluation of future release notifications. This
argument helped to justify the exemption itself in the face of a
critical public. By this means, the policy process supported science
by making it possible for Danisco to continue with the research and
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science supported policy by providing it with scientific knowledge
(power). For example, the government could have chosen to say that
Danisco Sugar could not continue with the research because the
risks and the knowledge were uncertain. They did not do this, partly
because they also had interests in this technology. Science and
scientific development were dependent on political decisions and
politics was also dependent on scientific knowledge as a source of
power. Neither could do without each other.
Similarly, we have seen that scientific knowledge that was crucial
for an informed policy decision was usually limited, uncertain and
contested. However, in the risk evaluation, as in many policy
orientations that deal with cutting edge technology, the Danish
competent authority found themselves having to make clear-cut
decisions that were based on uncertain knowledge. At the same
time, the authority faced the problem of legitimacy - that is, of
giving clear and compelling grounds for policy advice that they gave
to the Minister of Environment. The competent authority did not
have access to straightforward scientific "truths" to substantiate
particular claims or positions - for example the safety claims. To
overcome this problem and in order to justify their statements, the
competent authority turned increasingly to persuasive methods in
order to further what they believed but could not verify
scientifically. For example, as I have indicated above, the competent
authority kept arguing that the release was to be treated as a
principal release research and as an opportunity for carrying out
research that could provide information that would be useful
(especially for the competent authority) in the evaluation of future
release notifications. Though unscientific in character, this
argument helped to justify the exemptions in the face of a critical
public. On the other hand, we have seen earlier that safety
judgements were dependent on contentious accounts of nature, and
on a criterion of relative risks. Risks were evaluated as familiar,
controllable and manageable; and these risks were argued to be
common in conventional agricultural practices and thus acceptable.
These inherently value-laden and thus normative arguments were
used to justify and legitimise the exemption of the notifications -
even though the competent authority could not prove safety claims
scientifically. In this way, though the competent authority was
supposed to be neutral, scientific and objective, it turned to political
tools - such as persuasion - to promote its belief as it could not
verify this belief scientifically. For example, in the case study it was
mentioned that a scientific article in Nature had showed
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scientifically that it is possible to alleviate genetic pollution through
inserting the desired genetic characteristic into the cell chloroplast
rather than the cell nucleus. As the chloroplast is only inherited
maternally, this means that the inserted characteristics cannot be
transferred through cross pollination. This is an example of an
objective and a scientific proof of safety which the authority did not
possess. On the other hand, we saw the government and a number
of politicians quoting the statements of the competent authority as
"scientific evidence" of safety. Many times during the various
deliberations, the government stated that the competent authority
had evaluated the notifications as safe and that the evaluation was
based on the latest scientific evidence. In doing so, the government
was arguing that their decision to exempt the given notifications
was based on scientific evidence of safety. But we now know that
this was not so. What is interesting here is how a technocratic style
became a part of the Danish government's political rhetoric; a
rhetoric in which politics wore the mask of knowledge.
As the theory of "third face" of policy analysis indicates, the
convergence of science and politics where science further politics
and politics furthers science, or the pooling of methods where
science uses the tools of politics while politics wears the mask of
knowledge, is not inherently wrong. Politics has always been a
process of strategic manoeuvring in which knowledge (along with
other resources) has been used to further particular interests. What
is needed is rather an explicit acknowledgment that this is the case.
And this endorses the need for a new representation of politics. This
means that the Danish competent authority and the government
need to acknowledge publicly the extent to which scientific
knowledge has become a crucial resource for policy makers and
politicians, and how science is dependent on political decisions
while increasingly using political and normative tools to persuade
others of the justifiability of claims that cannot be verified
scientifically. The correct response to this rediscovery is to find
appropriate ways of ensuring that debate and disagreement take
place within a space that allows for more robust, transparent and
reasoned negotiations.
So far, I have tried to delineate key developments in the science and
technology policy landscape - both in theory and in practice. I have
shown that there are various challenges and developments (in
theory and in practice) that needs to be taken into consideration by
both social scientists or policy analysts. But the field of
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Biotechnology is changing so fast. In fact, by the time of delivering
this thesis, there are various revolutionary, indeed, intriguing and
sensational technological, scientific and political developments that
are taking place. Nevertheless, we still have key problems that need
to be addressed on science and technology related-risks, and
particularly during policy formation and policy implementation
processes if we are to improve the current situation. Better still, it is
a truism that we must learn from our past mistakes or experiences
lest history repeats itself. For that reason, the final chapter -
though outside the scope of this thesis - is a perspective based on
my own reflections (and should only be seen as such) and it deals
with the question: how could we put in place better, sounder and
more consensual decision-making processes (in the future) .The next
and final chapter will draw up four suggestions.
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Chapter 5
Perspective
In the inception phase of this thesis, I found myself taking a
categorical stance in relation to agricultural or food biotechnology:
"Let us stop this technology; it is risky, it is not useful, it is not
morally acceptable, and it should not be encouraged!" With time, I
realized that the more I knew about the technology, the more I
found myself confused. Gradually, I came to realize that I was
starting to be much more careful about what I was saying -
depending on who I was talking to! For example, I recently attended
a couple of "Future Food' debates in the UK. The first, in
Manchester, was very one-sided because the audience was made up
almost exclusively of greens who were opposed to food
biotechnology. In the second, in Leeds, I sat next to somebody who
was categorically opposed to food biotechnology. Lost in my own
thoughts, I found myself saying, "I hope the debate will be more
interesting and thought-provoking today". In response to this
comment, my neighbour said, "So, you are here for fun?" The
question came to me as a surprise, and without thinking I reacted
defensively. I told him, "I am a researcher and I am only interested
in the differing arguments raised by the opponents and the
proponents of food biotechnology". (Unfortunately, it's mainly the
opponents who attend public debates such as these). I continued,
"Mainly, I am interested in evaluating the basis of their differing
arguments". In response, my neighbour continued, "Even as a
researcher, can }^ ou manage to be a neutral and objective observer
without taking a position?". Again, I set out to defend myself. I said,
"My problem is that the more I know what is going on, the more I
realize that there is so much that I don't know, and that both the
proponents and the opponents of this technology don't know". I
continued to explain that, as far as I could see, the categorical
positions of both the proponents and the opponents were interest-
and value-based; so that in the end, it all boiled down to a political
disagreement rather than a scientific assessment of the risks and
the benefits of the technology. Suddenly, I knew that I was not
merely saying this to satisfy my neighbour in the debate; rather,
this was what I really felt about the issues. I realized that what was
151
interesting about the food and agricultural biotechnology policy
landscape was the issue of non-knowledge; that is, the fact that
there is so much that we simply do not know. Immediately, I found
myself explaining to my neighbour that one of the reasons I did not
want to take a position was because I felt that there was so much
that I do not know. In reality, I can see the remarkable benefits that
this technology may bring if things go well; but at the same time, I
can also see tangible risks that this same technology may pose (like
everything else) if things go wrong. As I discussed this issue with my
neighbour in the debate, we both agreed that "non-knowledge" was
inherent in debates about agricultural biotechnology. The question
for both of us was, therefore: what should we do with this "non-
knowledge"?
In this thesis, I have argued that ignorance, uncertainty and
indeterminancy ("non-knowledge") are endemic in scientific
knowledge - however competent that knowledge may seem to be. In
one sense, this is well-known in both theory and practice. What is
at issue here then is: hov/ should we deal with this non-knowledge
in view of the facts: first, that we can never know what we do not
know; but second, that in any event policy decisions must still be
taken? Of course, the answer will always depend on who has raised
the question. Most members of the scientific community would
naturally say that we need more research. For industrialists, on the
other hand, the issue of non-knowledge is generally of less interest.
This is because industrialists are normally entrepreneurs who are
willing to take risks as long as there are tangible rewards (in the
form of potential profits). Depending on what is at stake politically,
policy makers may not want to hear benefit/cost talk along the lines
of "on the one hand this, and on the other hand that". For purposes
of policy-formation, pol^-makers need clear cut and
straightforward rather than qualified and provisional answers. Little
wonder, then, that policy makers are prone to exaggerate the power
and the scope of scientific knowledge for purposes of policy
formulation. What is wrong with such exaggeration is that it
discourages precisely the kind of social discourse about scientific
knowledge that could condition how we use this scientific
knowledge to best effect in society. There is no doubt that we need
to search for more and better knowledge that would lead to better
decisions. But from a market point of view, it is not the
thoroughness, but the transparency of the decision-making process
that is crucial. More knowledge would not make any significant
difference if it does not end up with different decisions. Thus, it is
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obvious that what we need is to search for better ways of coping
with non-knowledge in the process of science and technology policy-
making. But all things considered, it is the willingness to say no
now and then that counts and not the basis on which a yes is given
every time.
Central to this task is the role of democratic discussion in the
course of which society can evaluate particular technologies.
Appropriate questions to be asked in such discussion include: who
in the society needs or desires the technology in question? Is it
risky? Do we want to take the risk? Who is willing to take the risk?
Is it morally and socially acceptable? Should it be encouraged? And
so on. If a significant number of people in a society do not want to
go on with a particular technology but an industrial interest
nevertheless persists with it, then, if things go wrong, government
must find a way of distributing fairly and equitably the
responsibility for it. For example, government could legislate to
make industries responsible for the full impact of new technologies.
For example, there could be a legal stipulation that no industry may
undertake risky research without appropriate insurance (as in the
case of accident) to cover the full cost of any potential harm because
the release and use of GMOs may create unnecessary and high
risks for which full responsibility must be taken. Rules to allocate
liability and compensation in the event of damage would provide
incentives for environmentally responsible actions. They would also
be consistent with the current trend of applying the "polluter pays"
principle. Of course, such insurance might not be invoked in the
event of a catastrophic accident that destroyed the world as we
know it today. However, the requirement for such insurance would
be extremely costly; and few industries would continue with risky
research without weighing the consequence in financial terms.
Industries will always understand market language, and this sort of
provision would make them much more careful and responsible in
any decisions that they made. For the general public who
supported such a technology, their responsibility should be
exercised via the price and market mechanisms. In other words,
social externalities would be internalized in the price of goods in the
market. Given the global nature of the market-place, such a
mechanism would only be really useful if it were agreed upon at the
international level. It would hardly be either fair or effective if it was
implemented in only one country such as Denmark. Indeed,
implementation at the national level in Denmark alone would distort
Danish industrial and economic competitiveness at the
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international level; and it would also tend to encourage risk-taking
science and technology-based industries to move operations to other
countries with less stringent regulations. However, this practical
objection does not invalidate the more general point that we need to
put in place some mechanisms that will make the industrial
community more cautious, careful and responsible in the
implementation of new technologies.
Similarly, it is commonly argued that, in a representative
democracy, public opinions should be represented by the people
who are elected by the public. If this is so, then in my view the
conventional administrative procedures of science and technology
risk assessment fail to represent public interests adequately. These
procedures delegate the core power to one government ministry,
within which the key policy advice agencies are also located.
Naturally, one would expect that any given ministiy together with
its advisory agencies should have key interests to protect. For
example, the ministiy may be dependent on the scientific knowledge
produced by particular industries. As a result, however, neither the
ministry nor its advisory agencies may wish to be seen by the
industrial community as the "bad guys". Here, it should also be
noted that most of the employees in the ministry who are charged
with collecting and assessing relevant evidence will be natural
scientists; and as such, they may be - as it were, by the nature of
their profession - blind to wider moral and social concerns. Little
wonder, then, that social and cultural aspects are poorly
represented in science and technology policy advice. I believe that
there is a need for a risk assessment procedure that cuts across
various ministries within the governmental structure. For example,
the ministry of culture and the ministry of social affairs should also
share the risk assessment responsibilities with other ministries
such as agriculture and health. This would enable the social and
the cultural policy interests to be better represented than they are
today in most science and technology risk assessment procedures.
Of course, this would create considerable political problems due to
the differing policy priorities in these areas of the public sector; and
by the same token, it would also make the decision-making
procedure much more tedious and slow. However, it would have the
benefit of moving important moral, ethical and social concerns to
the heart of the risk assessment process. This in turn would help
policy-makers to lay the conditions and the boundaries of scientific
knowledge in relation to moral and social knowledge. There is no
doubt that this is highly desirable when we are dealing with
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decisions that rely upon expert advice in areas of substantial non-
knowledge.
Moreover, it is clear that though the problem that is at issue in the
agricultural biotechnology policy arena is very political, the risk
assessment procedure as it is now is very technocratic and expert
oriented. In general, the experts answer as to what is acceptable
environmentally, ecologically or in human and animal health terms
is divorced to the social-economic question or answer. In the risk
assessment and particularly the decision-making process around
each single release and marketing notification, there should be a
direct involvement of citizens and consumers where a more
comprehensive range of arguments can be heard and be taken into
account. Social economic effects that would follow the release or the
marketing of genetically modified crops should be at the heart of the
risk assessment. That is, there should be an assessment of who, for
real, would benefit from such a project, e.g. farmers or the
biotechnology industries. This is an important criteria because if the
given industry has a patent for the genetically modified crop, this
would imply that farmers would not be allowed to sow seeds
harvested from their own farm. Rather the contrary. Farmers will be
forced to buy the patented seed each and ever}' sowing season from
the company that patents the modified seed together with the
patented herbicide or pesticide. This would imply that farmers
would be forced to buy seeds' year after year from firms patenting
these plants thus incurring new expenses each and every season.
This would kick out some farmers from the business. Because of
this, the society would have new expenses for social security for the
newly unemployed farmers. In this case, a cost-benefit analysis on
societal level would speak against the introduction of genetically
modified crops. And particularly, given the commercial links
between plant breeders and herbicide merchants, and not least the
new consolidation of the entire food chain through the vertical
integration of the agro-food industry that will accumulate
knowledge, patents, too much power and control over the price and
market mechanism (naturally to their favour), as the regulation of
genetically modified plants is made with a societal purpose, the only
relevant level to make the assessment at, is the social-economic
level.
Finally, I think that government should put in place a "Strategic and
Integrated Agricultural Action plan" or a "Strategic and Integrated
Future Food Action Plan". This plan should be based on an inter-
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ministerial decision-making procedure as well as on various public
debates. Such a plan would stipulate what kind of food or
agriculture is needed and wanted by Danish society - now and in
the future. In Denmark, as in many other western countries today,
there are lots of problems with the food and agricultural sectors.
Every day, we encounter the problem of the over production of pigs;
pesticide in the drinking water or food, the problem of growth
hormones; the problem of the over-use of antibiotics in animal
productions; the problem of salmonella; the problem of genetic
pollution; the problem of public fear of the risks involved with
genetically modified foods - the list is endless. The existence of so
many problems in the food sector shows that there is something
inherently wrong with how things are today. There is an urgent
need to address this issue. Society must decide: Do we want to live
thus? Do we want to change the way things are today? If so, how do
we want to go about this? What is our goal? Is the goal realistic?
What instruments or tools could we put in place to help us achieve
these highly desirable goals? Are these instruments available? If
available, will these instruments be effective? Based on the agreed-
upon decision, society should also stipulate some guidelines that
should be used as criteria for future food and agricultural policy -
and for that matter, for future science and technology policy more
generally.
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geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989;
Miljøstyrelsen bioteknologikontoret, den 31-januar 1992: Notat vedrørende krav til
undersøgelse med udsætning af frit blomstrende genetisk modificerede sukkerroer;
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og §16 i Lov nr. 356 af 6. Juni om miljø og
genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg med genetisk modificerede bederoer, dated the 2nd May
1994. Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologiskkontoret: Notat om ansøgning om
godkendelse til markedsførong i EU af genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant foderroe i
henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF.
130Godkendelse in henhold vil §11 og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og
geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989;
Miljøstyrelsen bioteknologikontoret, den 31-januar 1992: Notat vedrørende krav til
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undersøgelse med udsætning af frit blomstrende genetisk modificerede sukkerroer;
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og §16 i Lov nr. 356 af 6. Juni om miljø og
genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg med genetisk modificerede bederoer, dated the 2nd May
1994. Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologiskkontoret: Notat om ansøgning om
godkendelse til markedsførong i EU af genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant foderroe i
henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF.
131
 (source: Ansøgning i henhold til lov nr. 356 af 6. Juni 1991 om tilladelse til forsøg med
udsætning af genetisk modificerede sukkerroer i 1993. Maribo Frø November 1992).
!32Godkendelse in henhold ti! §11 og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og
geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989;
Miljøstyrelsen bioteknologikontoret, den 31-januar 1992: Notat vedrørende krav til
undersøgelse med udsætning af frit blomstrende genetisk modificerede sukkerroer;
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og §16 i Lov nr. 356 af 6. Juni om miljø og
genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg med genetisk modificerede baleroer, dated the 2nd May
1994. Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologiskkontoret: Notat om ansøgning om
godkendelse til markedsførong i EU af genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant foderroe i
henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF.
133letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish EPA on: Directive 90/220/CEE:
Notification to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher Plants: Roundup Ready™
Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by DLF-Trifolium, Monsato Company and Danisco Seed -
dated 4 April 1997 - Item 6: Ecological effects of hybridisation between Beta vulgaris and
wild relatives).
134Godkendelse in henhold til §11 og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og
geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989;
Miljøstyrelsen bioteknologikontoret, den 31-jaiuiar 1992: Notat vedrørende krav til
undersøgelse med udsætning af frit blomstrende genetisk modificerede sukkerroer;
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og §16 i Lov nr. 356 af 6. Juni om miljø og
genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg med genetisk modificerede bederoer, dated the 2nd May
1994. Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologiskkontoret: Notat om ansøgning om
godkendelse til markedsførong i EU af genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant foderroe i
henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF.
(source: A letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish EPA on: Directive
90/220/CEE: Notification to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher Plants:
Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by DLF-Trifolium, Monsato Company
and Danisco Seed - dated 4 April 1997 - page 4).
136
 letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish EPA on: Directive 90/220/CEE:
Notification to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher Plants: Roundup Ready™
Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by DLF-Trifolium, Monsato Company and Danisco Seed -
dated 4 April 1997 - Item 4: Contribution of Roundup Ready beet to reducing the quantities
of beet herbicides).
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137
 (p.9 - 13). (Source: Application to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher
Plants: Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from line A5/15 by DLF-Trifolium A/S and
Monsanto Company represented by Monsanto Europe S.A and Danisco Seed).
138
 (source: A letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish E P A on: Directive
90 /220 /CEE: Application to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher Plants:
Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by DLF-Trifolium, Monsa to Company
and Danisco Seed - dated 4 April 1997 - Item 4: Contribution of Roundup Ready beet to
reducing the quantities of beet herbicides).
139
 (p25-26 (source source: A letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish E P A on:
Directive 90 /220/CEE: Application to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher
Plants: Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by DLF-Trifol ium, Monsa to
Company and Danisco Seed - dated 4 April 1997 - Item 6: Ecological effects of
hybridisation between Beta vulgaris and wild relatives).
140
 (source: A letter from Skov- og Naturstyrelsen Økologisk kontor to Miljøstyrelsen: Skov-
og Naturstyrelsen økologiske risikovurdering af anmeldelsen fra DLF-Trifol ium A/S ,
D A N I S C O Seed og Monsanto Europe S.A. vedr. markedsføring af genetisk modificeret
herbicidtolerant bederoe (Beta vulgaris L.ssp. vulgaris) i henhold til del, artikel 12(3) i
Direktiv 90 /220/EØF - dated 21 July 1 9 9 7 ) .
u l C f . Brev til Skov og Naturstyrelsen fra Naturfredningsrådet (den 29-03-89) , vedr:
principielle overvejelser ved udsætning af genteknologisk ændrede planter; see also
Folketinget forhandling nr. R22 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R 2 2 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24 . Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
142
 Godkendelse in henhold til §11 og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og
geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret Rammenotat : Ansøgning o m
markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidetolerant foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv
90 /220 /EØF - 22.July 1997
144
 Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret Rammenotat : Ansøgning o m
markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidetolerant foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv
90 /220 /EØF - 22.July 1997
T h e Danish botanical association and the Biotech Commission under the research
directorate and the N C C
146
 (Source: A letter and a draft permit for the release from the Minister of Environment to
the Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg (26-02-93))
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147
 Cf. Naturfredningsrådet blev to SNS vedr: principielle overvejelser ved udsætning af
genteknologisk ændre planter, den 4-04-1989.
148
 Brev til Skov og Naturstyrelsen fra Naturfredningsrådet (den 29-03-89), vedr:
principielle overvejelser ved udsætning af genteknologisk ændrede planter; see also
Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
149Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi.
150
 The National Food Agency and the Nature and Forest Administration had evaluated that
the transfer of the pollen may be expected to be small
151
 Cf. Naturfredningsrådet blev to SNS vedr: principielle overvejelser ved udsætning af
genteknologisk ændre planter , den 4-04-1989; Folketinget forhandling nr. R22:
Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede
sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi.
Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi.
152
 For example the Specialarbejderforbundet i Denmark. Folketinget forhandling nr. R 2 2 :
Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 o m forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede
sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi;
Folketinget forhandling nr. R22 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24 . Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Cf.
Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret Rammenota t : Ansøgning o m
markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidetolerant foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv
9 0 / 2 2 0 / E Ø F - 22.July 1997) .cf also Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologiskkontoret:
Nota t o m ansøgning o m godkendelse til markedsførong i E U af genetisk modificeret
herbicidtolerant foderroe i henhold til Rådets directiv 90 /220 /EØF.
153
 For example the "Foreningen af Danske Biologer" and N O A H ' s Genspl ic ing group:
1 E 4Brev til Skov og Naturstyrelsen fra Naturfredningsrådet (den 29-03-89) , vedr: principielle
overvejelser ved udsætning af genteknologisk ændrede planter; see also Folketinget
forhandling nr. R 2 2 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 o m forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget forhandling nr. R 2 2 :
Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24 . Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede
sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11 og 16 i lov nr.
170
288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og gencteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede
sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
155
 (Source: A letter and a draft permit for the release from the Minister of Environment to
the Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg (26-02-93))
(Source: A letter and a draft permit for the release from the Minister of Environment to the
Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg (26-02-93))
156 Such as De Danske landboforeninger, Landbrugsraadet og Danske Familielandbrug
157
 Det Kgl. Veterinær- og Landbohøjskoles; Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og
bioteknologikontoret Rammenotat: Ansøgning om markedsføring af genetisk modificeret
herbicidetolerant foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF - 22July 1997) .
158
 Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989; Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og
bioteknologiskkontoret: Notat om ansøgning om godkendelse til markedsførong i EU af
genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant foderroe i henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF;
Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret Rammenotat: Ansøgning om
markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidetolerant foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv
90/220/EØF - 22.July 1997) .
159
 see also Folketinget forhandling nr. R 2 2 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Ma j 1989
om forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi;
Folketinget forhandling nr. R 2 2 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Ma j 1989 o m
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov o m miljø og genekiiologi; Godkendelse
in henhold til §11 og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4 j u n i 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til
forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
160
 see also Folketinget forhandling nr. R22 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989
o m forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov o m miljø og geneknologi , p .10004
161
 see also Folketinget forhandling nr. R 2 2 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989
o m forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter !ov om miljø og geneknologi , p . 10003
Miljøministeriet til Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg: Vedrørende
miljøministeriets redegørelse til Folketinget o m forsøgsudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer
efter lov o m miljø og genteknologi (spørgsmål 14) den 20 t h jun i 1989.
163
 Folketinget forhandling nr. R22 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 o m
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R 2 2 : Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24 . Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov o m miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
171
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
164Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
165
 Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
16esee also Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989
om forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi, p. 10013
167
 Statement of the Competent Authority of Denmark concerning Notification C/DK/97/01
submitted according to Article 12.3 of Directive 90/220/EEC: Summary of the evaluation
carried out by the Danish competent authority p. 3.
168Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
169
 Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
170Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
171
 It should be noted here that this discussion was based on an article in the Information the
day before the parliamentary discussion (23/05/89) that the Institute of the Botanical
Ecology (Institut for Økologisk Botanik ved Købehavns Universitet) applied for funds from
172
the biotek programme with no success. The biotek co-ordination council declared the
institute as unqualified
172Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
173Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
174
 Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4.juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkerroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
175Folketinget forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 17. Maj 1989 om
forsøgudsætning af gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Folketinget
forhandling nr. R22: Miljøministeriet redegørelse af 24. Maj 1989 om forsøgudsætning af
gensplejsede sukkerroer efter lov om miljø og geneknologi; Godkendelse in henhold til §11
og 16 i lov nr. 288 af 4Juni 1986 om miljø og geneteknologi til forsøgsudsætning i 1990 af
gensplejsede sukkeiroer - dated 30 juni 1989.
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NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Volume 16 April 1998, page 345: "Containment of
herbicide resistance through genetic engineering of the chloroplast genome" - by Henry
Daniell, Rina Datta, Sam Varma, Steven Gray, and Seung-Bum Lee; NATURE, Volume
392, 16 April 1998, page 653: "Reducing transgene escape routes" - by Alan J. Gray and
Alan F. Raybould.
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tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede planter.
Maribo Frø November 1992. Ansøgning i henhold til lov nr. 356 af 6.
Juni 1991 om tilladelse til forsøg med udsætning af genetisk
modificerede sukkerroer i 1993. Maribo Frø, den 30-11-1992.
Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
sukkerroer og tillægsansøgning om udsætning af fodersukkerroe i
1993, den 01-02-1993.
Levnesmiddelstyrelsen brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. Ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om Tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificered
sukkerroer og tillægsansøgning om udsætning af fodersukkerroe i
1993).
191
Miljøministeriet brev til Vestsjællands Amtskommune, vedr.:
Besigtigelse af potentielle strandarealer for etableringsforsøg med
genetisk, modificerede sukkeiroer, den 03-02-1993.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen med henvisning til Deres brev
dateret 27. Januar 1993, om udsætning af genetisk modificerede
sukkerroer, den 03-02-1393.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. Tillæg sansøgning til
"Ansøgning om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificered
planter": Miljøstyrelsens jr.nr.M642-0002, 04-01-1993.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen med henvisning til telefonsamtale
med hans Erik Svart, SNS onsdag den 3/2/1993, den 08-02-1993.
Miljøministeriet brev ti SNS. vedr. Ansøgning fra maribo Frø om
tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede sukkerroer, den 08-
01-1993.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen, vedr.: Rapport over markforsøg
med transgene glyphosattolerante sukkeiroe udført i 1992, den 14-
01-1993.
Miljøministeriet brev ti SNS. Vedr. Ansøgning fra maribo Frø om
tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede sukkerroer, den 15-
01-1993
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om
udsætning af genetisk modificerede roer i 1993, den 23-12-1993.
Maribo Frø' Report on Agronomic performance of the 1992 Field-Trials
with transgenic Glyphosate Tolerant Sugar beet.
Maribo Frø' Report on Morphological Observations in 1992 - Field
Trial with Transgenic Glyphosate Tolerant Sugar-beet.
Maribo Frø Report on 1992 Yield Trials with Transgenic Glyphosate
Tolerant Sugar beet.
Maribo Frø Report on 1992 Spraying Trials with Transgenic
Glyphosate Tolerant Sugar beet
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Maribo Frø Report on Analysis of 1992 Spraying Trials with
Transgenic Glyphosate Tolerant Sugar Beet Using Remote Sensing
Equipment
Maribo Frø Report on Analysis of Segregation in 1992 Spraying Trials
with Glyphosate Tolerant Sugar Beet.
Maribo Frø Report on 1992 - Pollen Dispersal Study with Transgenic
Glyphosate Tolerant Sugar Beet
Skov- og Naturstyrelsen brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. Ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om Tilladelse til Udsætning af Genetisk Modificerede
Sukkerroer i 1993 samt tillægsansøgning til forannævnte ansøgning,
den 05-02-93.
A letter and a draft permit for the release from the Minister of
Environment to the Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg (26-02-
93).
Miljøministeriet. Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og § 16 i lov nr.
356 af 6. Juni 1991 om miljø og genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg
med genetisk modifiecerede sukkerroer og fodersukkerroer. 30-03-
1993.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. Ansøgning om tilladelse til
udsætning af genetisk modified planter, den 22-11-93
Ansøgning i henhold til lov nr. 356 af 6. June 1991 om tilladelse til
forsøg med udsætning af genetisk modijicered bederoer i 1994.
ROUNDUP TOLERANCE. Maribo Frø. November 1993.
Ansøgning i henhold til lov nr. 356 af 6. June 1991 om tilladelse til
forsøg med udsætning af genetisk modificered bederoer i 1994.
ROUNDUP-TOLERANCE. Maribo Frø., den 25-11- 1993.
Miljøministeriet brev til SNS. vedr. Ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om
tilladelse til udsætning i 1994 af genetisk modificerede sukkerroer,
den 29-11-1993.
Miljøministeriet til Maribo Frø' vedr. ansøgning om tilladelse til
udsætning af genetisk modificerede planter, den 13-12-1993.
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Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen, vedr. Spørg smal jævnfør fax dateret
13/12/1993 til ansøgning om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modifiecerede planter i 1994, den 13-01-1994.
Maribo Frø reports on 1993 field trials and analyses with transgenic
glyphosate-tolerant sugar-beet.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. Ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om
Tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificered hederoer i 1994 samt
tillæg sansøgning til forannævnte ansøgning, 4.02.94.
Nørgaard Niels i Politiken 'Fagre nye verden på kaffebodet", den 7-2-
94.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen, vedr. ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om
tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede bederroer i 1994,
1995 og 1996.
Levnedmiddelstyrelsen brev til Miljøstyrelsen, vedr. ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til forsøgsudsætning med Basta-svampe- og
virustolerante gensplejsede bederoer i 1994-1996, den 10-02-1994.
Bekendtgørelse nr. 1098 af 11. December 1992.
Brev fra "Specialarbejderforbundet til Miljøstyrelsen". Vedr.:
Ansøgning om markedsføring af genetisk modificerede sukkerroer,
den 13.12.93
"Arbejdstagerorganisationerne Branchsikkerhedsråd nr. 10 - det
grønne område" til "Miljøstyrelsen". "Vedr.: Ansøgning om
markedsføring af genetisk modificerede sukkerroer" den 13.12.93 .
Brev fra Botanisk Institut, Københavns Universitet to
Miljøministeriet. Vedr. Kommentarer til ansøgning (23.11.93;
25.11.93) fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modificerede bederoer, den 08-12-93.
"Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen" brev til "Miljøstyrelsen" 'Vedr.'.Høring i
forbindelse med ansøgning om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modificerede Roundup tolerante sukkerroer", den 29.12.93.
194
Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedrørende
ansøgning om udsætning i 1994-1998 af gensplejsede glyphosat
tolerante bederoer, den 15-02-94:.
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og §16 i Lov nr. 356 af 6. Juni om
miljø og genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg med genetisk modificerede
bederoer, dated the 2nd May 1994.
Dansk Erhvervsgartnerforening brev til Miljøministeriet, vedr.
ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modificerede Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 30-11-1994.
Bioteknologisk Institut brev til Miljøministeriet, vedr. ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 1-12-1994.
Bioteknologisk Institut brev til Miljøministeriet, vedr. ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 1-12-1994.
Maribo Frø til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr.: Tillægsans øgning til ansøgning
om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede,
glyphosattolerante bederoerj.nr. M642-0007, den 14.12.94.
Landbrugsraadet brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroerm, den 23-12-1994.
Foreningen af Bioteknologisk Industrier i Danmark brev til
Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til
udsætning af genetisk modificerede Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den
21-12-1994.
Holeby Kommune brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 15-12-1994.
Specialarbejdeforbundet brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning
fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 13-12-1994.
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Danske Veterinærhygiejnikeres organisation brev til Miljøministeriet
Vedr. ansøgning fra Maribo Frø omi tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modificerede Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 13-12-1994.
Danske Handel & Service brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning
fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 07-12-1994.
Arbejdetilsynet brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning fra Maribo
Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 08-12-1994.
Arbejdstagerorganisationerne Branchsikkerhedsråd nr. 10 - Det
Grønne Område brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. ansøgning fra Maribo
Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
Rounduptolerant sukkerroer, den 13-12-1994.
SNS brev til Miljøministeriet. Vedr. kontakt med journalist Kirsten
Jacobsen, Danmarks Radio om genmodificerede Roer, den 19-04-
1994.
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1 og § 16 Hov nr. 356 af 6. Juni om
miljø og genteknologi af udsætningsforsøg med genetisk modificerede
bederoer, den 2-05-1994.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. supplerede oplysninger i
tilkyntning godekendelse af fiereårige forsøg med udsætning af
genetisk modificerede, glufosinattolerante, svampetolerante eller
virustolerante bederoer, den 9-12-1994.
Maribo Frø til Mjøstyrelsen. Vedr.: Tillægs ansøgning til ansøgning om
tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede, glyphosattolerante
bederoer j . nr. M642-0007, 12.12.94.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. Anmodning om vurdering af
supplerende oplysninger vedr. Maribo Frø udsætninger af genetisk
modificerede roer i 1995, den 13-12-1994.
Maribo Frø brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. Rapporter over markforsøg
med transgene bederoer udført i 1994, den 23-02-1995.
Maribo Frø Reports on 1994 Field Trials and Analyses on Glufosinate
(Basta) Tolerant, Fungus Tolerant and Virus Tolerant Beet.
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Skov- og Naturstyrelsen til Miljøstyrelsen Vedr. Supplerede
ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modificerede sukkerroer i 1995, 11.01.95.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. documentation vedrørende
blomstringsfænologi i væksthus, den 27-02-1995.
Godkendelse i henhold til §9, stk. 1, i lov nr. 356 af 6 juni 1991 om
miljø og genteknologi af udsætning af genetisk modificerede bederoer i
forskningsøjemed ved Bredehakke, den 24-03-1995.
Miljøstyrelsen til Skov- og Naturstyrelsen Vedr.: Supplerende
oplysninger til ansøgning om forsøgsmæssig udsætning af genetisk
modificerede roer ved Bredeløkke (Store Heddinge), den 02.02.95.
Skov- og Naturstyrelsen til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr.: ansøgning fra
Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
bederoer i 1995 med indsat herbicide resistans, den 14.02.95.
Instituttet for Toxikologi's (Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen" tobrev til
Miljøstyrelsen, Vedr. Forsøgsudsætning af genteknologisk
modificerede roer: glyphosate tolerante bederoer j.nr. m.642-0007 og
glufosinate- svampe- eller vims- tolerante bederoer j.nr, m942-0008.
Instituttet for Toxikologi's (Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen) vurdering af
ansøgningerne og de supplerende oplysninger for 1995), 10.02.95.
Brev fra Skov- og Naturstyrelsen til Miljøst5^relsen Vedr. Supplerede
ansøgning fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk
modificerede sukkerroer i 1995.), den 11.01.95.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen, vedr. anmodning om vurdering af
supplerende oplysninger verd. Maribo Frøs udsætning af genetisk
modificerede sukkerroer i 1995, den 11-01-1995.
Miljøstyrelsen til Skov- og Naturstyrelsen dated. Vedr.: Supplerende
oplysninger til ansøgning om forsøgsmæssig udsætning af genetisk
modificerede roer ved Bredeløkke (Store Heddinge), den 02.02.95.
Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen fax til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr.
forsøgsudsætning af genteknologisk modificerede roer: glyphosate
tolerante bederoer og glufosinate-svampe- eller virus tolerante
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bederoer Intituttet for Toksikologi's (levnedsmiddelstyrelsen)
vurdering af ansøgningerne og de supplerende oplysninger for 1995,
den 10-02-95.
Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen fax til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr
Levnedsmiddelstyrelsens (ITS) bemærkninger til rapporter fra Danisco
Seed om resulter af 1994 markforsøg med genetisk modificerede
bederoer. 1: glyphosate toletance, den 13-03-1995.
Levnedsmiddelstyrelsen fax til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. Intituttet for
Toksikologi's (levnedsmiddelstyrelsen) vurdering af
tillæg sansøgningerne m 642-0014 (Flakkeberg) og M 642-0015
(Bredeløkke) om forsøgsudsætning af genetisk modificerede bederoer,
den 15-02-1995.
"Skov- og Naturstyrelsen" brev til "Miljøstyrelsen" . Vedr.: ansøgning
fra Maribo Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modificerede
bederoer i 1995 med indsat herbicide resistans), den 14.02.95.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. supplerede ansøgning fra Maribo
Frø om tilladelse til udsætning af genetisk modiftcerede sukkerroer i
1995, den 11-01-1995.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS vedr. Anmodning om kommentarer til
rapporter fra Maribo Frø om markforsøg med genetisk modifiecerede
bederoer i 1994, den 01-03-1995.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. Anmodning om vurdering af en
anmeldelse om markedsføring af genetisk modificeret foderroe (Beta
vulgaris), den 24-02-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg.
Vedr. godkendelse af forsøgsudsætning af genetisk modificerede
bederoer i Danmark (Danisco Seed), den 18-03-1997.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen vedr. anmeldelsen af Roundup Ready
fodderroe til markedsføring. Notifications nummer C/DK/97/1, den
24-03-1997.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. anmeldelsen af Roundup Ready
fodderroe til markedsføring. Notifications nummer C/DK/97/1, den
26-03-1997.
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Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. Anmeldelse nr. C/DK/97/01, den
15-04-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr.tidsregistrering med vurdering af
ansøgning nr. C/DK/97/01 om godkendelse af en genmodificerede
roe til markedsføring, den 07-05-1997.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr.gennemgang af fortroligt materiale,
den 28-05-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. Anmeldelse nr. C/DK/97/01, den
14-05-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. Anmodning om kommentarer til
rapporter fra Maribo Frø om markforsøg med. genetisk modifiecerede
bederoer i 1994, den 20-12-1994.
Application to Place on the Market Genetically Modified Higher Plants:
Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from line A5/15 by DLF-
Trifolium A/S and Monsanto Company represented by Monsanto
Europe S.A and Danisco Seed, 1997).
Resume af Anmeldelse om Markedsføring af Produkter, som
Indholder Genetisk Modificered Organismer (GMO) i henhold til
artiklel 12 i direktiv 90/220/BØF. RoundupReady™ Foderroer
udviklet fra roen A5/15 af DLF-Trifolium A/S and Monsanto
Company represented by Monsanto Europe S.A and Danisco Seed).
A letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish EPA on: Directive
90/220/CEE: Application to Place on the Market Genetically Modified
Higher Plants: Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by
DLF-Trifolium, Monsato Company and Danisco Seed - dated 4 April
1997).
A letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish EPA on: Directive
90/220/CEE: Application to Place on the Market Genetically Modified
Higher Plants: Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from A5/15 by
DLF-Trifolium, Monsato Company and Danisco Seed - dated 4 April
1997 - Item 4: Contribution of Roundup Ready beet to reducing the
quantities of beet herbicides).
Skov- og Naturstyrelsen Økologisk kontor brev til Miljøstyrelsen:
Skov- og Naturstyrelsen økologiske risikovurdering af anmeldelsen
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fra DLF-Trifolium A/S, DANISCO Seed og Monsanto Europe S.A. vedr.
markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant bederoe (Beta
vulgaris L.ssp. vulgaris) i henhold til del, artikel 12(3) i Direktiv
90/220/EØF , den 21 July 1997 .
Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret J.nr M643-0024 Ref. JA/13
brev til Skov- og Naturstyrelsen. Vedr. ansøgning om tilladelse til
markedsføring af genmodificeret foderroe (C/DK/97/01), den 26
March 1997.
A letter from the Danish EPA, Agriculture and Biotechnology Office
to DLF-Trifolium: Referring to your application to place on the market
genetically modified Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from line
A5/15, dated 24 March 1997).
A letter with Annexes from Monsanto to the Danish EPA on:
Directive 90/220/CEE: Application to Place on the Market Genetically
Modified Higher Plants: Roundup Ready™ Fodder Beet derived from
A5/15 by DLF-Trifolium, Monsato Company an.d Danisco Seed, dated
04-04-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. supplerende materiale til ansøgning
nr. C/DK/97/01, den 09-06-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr. deadline for risikovurdering af
ansøgning C/DK/97/01, den 23-06-97.
Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS. Vedr.ansøgning om godkendelse af
genmodijlceret foderroe til markedsføring (nr. C/DK/97/01), den 17-
07-1997.
SNS brev til Miljøstyrelsen. Vedr. anmeldelse af foderroe (Beta
vulgaris L ssp.vulgaris) til markedsføring, i henhold til del C, artikel
12 (2) i Direktiv 90/220/EØF, den 21-07-1997.
SNS. Økologisk risikovurdering af anmeldelsen fra DLF-Trifolium
A/S, Danisco Seed og Monsanto Europe S.A. vedr. markedsføring af
genetisk modificeret herbicidtolerant bederoe (Beta vulgaris
L.ssp.vulgaris) i henhold til del C, artikel 12 (3) i Ditektiv
90/220/EØF.
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Miljøstyrelsen brev til SNS vedr.supplerende oplysninger til
ansøgning om godkendelse af genmodificeret foderroe til
markedsføring (nr. C/DK/97/01), den 22-07-1997.
Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret. Rammenotat:
Ansøgning om markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidetolerant
foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF, den 22.July 1997.
Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologikontoret. Rammenotat:
Ansøgning om markedsføring af genetisk modificeret herbicidetolerant
foderoe i henhold til Rådets directiv 90/220/EØF, den 22.July 1997.
Miljøstyrelsen Landbrugs- og bioteknologiskkontoret: Notat om
ansøgning om godkendelse tit markedsførong i EU af genetisk
modificeret herbicidtolerani foderroe i henhold til Rådets directiv
90/220/EØF.
Miljøstryrelsen brev til Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg.
Vedr. ansøgning om godkendelse til markedsføring af en
genmodificetet foderroe i henhold til §5 i bekendtgørelse nr. 1989 af
11. December 1992 om godkendelse af forsøgsudsætning og
markedsføring af genetisk modificerede organismer, den 26-08-1997.
Monsanto Europe S. A letter to Danish EPA. Re: Directive
90/220/EEC: Application to Place on the Marlet Genetically Modified
Higher Plants: Roundup Ready"" Fodder Beet derived from line A5/15
by DLF-TRifolium Monsanto Company and DANISCO Seed, dated 05-
09-1997,
Miljøstyrelsen. Notits til brug for ministerens besvarelse af spørgsmål
DK - DO vedrørende ansøgning om godkendelse af genmodificeret
foderroe til markedsføring of'g revision af udsætningsdirektivet i
samråd i Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg den 11-09-1997,
den 10-09-1997.
Miljøstryrelsen brev til Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg.
Vedr.besvarelse af spørgsmål 752, 753-759, 763, 764-773, 774-775
og 776-787 (aim del -bilag 1588.. 1593, 1601, 1604, 1605 og 1607),
den 18-09-1997.
Miljøstryrelsen brev til Folketingets Lovsekretariat. Vedr.besvarelse
af spørgsmål nr. S 3398, S 3399 og S 3400, den 23-09-1997.
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Miljøministeren brev til Folketingets Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalg.
Vedr. videresendelse af ansøgningen til Kommissionen med en positiv
udtalelse, den 26-09-1997.
Miljøministeriet letter to the European Commission DG XI.E2. Re:
Genetically modified herbicide tolerant Jodder beet - notification
C/DK/97/01, dated 7-10-1997.
Statement of the Competent Authority of Denmark concerning
Notification C/DK/97/01 submitted according to Article 12.3 of
Directive 90/'220/EEC:
Notification C/DK/97/01 Summary of the evaluation carried out by
the Danish competent authority.
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